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ABSTRACT 
 
Two major trends have emerged in the hedge fund industry over the last ten years. On 
the one hand, this industry became one of the most creative and innovative fields in 
international finance. Due to its fast growth and its constant development, regulators 
found it difficult to mitigate the potential risks induced to both investors and the 
financial system. On the other hand, the crisis emerging in 2007-2009 concurrently 
caused many recalls within the hedge fund industry. This shut down many funds. 
Similarly, hedge fund managers received arbitration and litigation charges in recent 
years, all at investors’ expense. These cases were extremely rare during the previous 
years. These trends raised two major questions: Should tighter regulation or lighter 
regulation be applied to the hedge fund industry? Which one favours the investors better 
and assures their increased protection? 
 
This thesis pursues the answer to these questions, by examining the regulation of hedge 
funds focusing mainly on investor protection firstly in the US, including the impact of 
the Dodd-Frank Act and secondly in the EU and the selected single European 
jurisdictions (the UK, Italy, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta and Switzerland), and 
the impact of the AIFM Directive on the local jurisdictions, with the final purpose to 
establish the framework for a global hedge funds regulation, especially in terms of 
investors’ interests protection. In addition, this thesis provides practical 
recommendations for their regulatory future. 
 
The present research confirms that the lack of global regulation in this industry before 
the crisis simply indicated the preferences of the two prevailing financial world leaders: 
the US and the UK. However, hedge funds regulation should not be performed in 
absurdum. Risks mitigation alone is not enough reason for eliminating the advantages 
of hedge funds. 
 
Real progress in providing protection to investors is necessary for the coordination of 
the hedge fund regulation in the European countries with those in the US, while 
simplifying the financial regulatory system, as investor protection and prudential 
regulation are the main financial stability instruments in the hands of law-makers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Background 
During the last two decades, hedge funds gained the status of one of the most powerful 
players in the financial and banking sector although they were part of the financial 
markets since the 1940s. This thesis comprehensively analyses all legal investor 
protection-based regulations, approaching the possible shift in the hedge funds 
regulation paradigms, from an interdisciplinary point of view, with an emphasis on the 
implications of regulatory systems. The core of the thesis is represented by the potential 
changes of investors’ rights stemming from the financial crisis, addressing their limits 
also. 
 
While severe criticism attacked hedge funds during the 2007-2009 financial crisis, risk 
mitigation and the increased level of investors’ interests protection was paid much 
attention globally not only by investors but also by the entire financial system. Their 
poor transparency and light regulation made hedge fund activities more and more 
interesting even to regulators, lately. The great potential of hedge funds is greatly 
revealed by literature, while in the meantime investor protection is a crucial subject of 
hedge funds regulatory systems. Nevertheless, researches are rather fragmented, 
addressing extensively theoretical debates and a few case studies. 
 
Nowadays, hedge funds are greatly appreciated not only by the investors, but also by 
the regulators and the media. One major aspect of the debate has been whether hedge 
funds should be allowed to keep their status of lightly regulated entities, and whether 
increased regulation is required in order to mitigate the risks induced by hedge funds. 
Another aspect emerges from the recent financial crisis that had stricken hedge funds 
markets investors, together with misconduct of issuers and financial intermediaries. 
These failures resulted in losses to investors, and simultaneously negatively affected the 
market confidence. Under these circumstances, the investor protection concept and the 
struggle to restore market confidence became essential in the hedge fund debate. 
 
13 
This thesis depicts an overview of the financial regulatory systems before the 2007-
2009 crisis and a view of the recent regulatory frameworks in various jurisdictions, 
namely, the US, the UK and the EU and single jurisdictions. With the increase in 
complexity and innovation of financial products, the creative and proactive nature of 
financial regulation and insurance of investors’ rights protection needs to be the highest. 
In this context, the key pieces of legislation adopted in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis (the Dodd-Frank Act in the US and the AIFM Directive in the EU) are compared 
and analysed in a critical manner. The regulation and legal structure are critically 
examined, checked and evaluated. This research pursues also to contribute to a better 
understanding of the hedge funds development during volatile times, focusing on 
investor protection and to provide a global framework for the most frequent available 
alternative investment tools. 
 
The thesis has a twofold aim: to find out similarities and differences, choosing between 
different regulatory models, and to evaluate the supreme regulatory version of hedge 
funds management in order to provide the best answer to a global financial area. The 
ultimate goal is an international hedge funds regulation focused on providing investor 
protection and mitigating the risk. The thesis analyses the US and the EU hedge funds 
regulatory frameworks and also focuses on several local jurisdictions such as UK, Italy, 
France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta and Switzerland to measure the consequences of 
local rules on hedge fund investor protection-based regulation and their effect on the 
spreading of hedge funds in this area.  
 
The figure below illustrates the interconnection of the American, British and European 
financial regulatory systems: common core elements, similarities and differences.  
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Figure 1. The financial regulatory systems interconnection 
 
Pursuant to the financial crisis, the investors’ interests emergence on the agenda of legal 
debates besides stronger supervisory regulations is unsurprising, questioning the 
sufficiency of traditional means and instruments in avoiding such problems in the 
future. The thesis points out the similarities and particularities of the analysed financial 
regulatory frameworks emphasising investor protection, before and after the financial 
crisis of 2007-2009, by different methodological and contrastive approaches, analytical 
and comparative studies.  
 
The common principles of American, English and European methods of post-crisis 
financial regulation, as well as the future ones shall meet the requirements of a 
globalised society where free capital movement ignores national or regional boundaries: 
a new architecture of financial regulation, an internationally coordinated process of 
financial regulation, an international cooperation for a sustainable financial stability, the 
prudential regulation to limit the abuse of finance, the mitigation of the risk at global, 
regional and national level, accountability and transparency in the financial system, the 
protection of investors and market integrity. 
 
Problem discussion 
The significance of investors’ interests protection on the global financial stage is 
highlighted in this research, together with the role of the lessons learnt from several 
countries’ past and present regulatory experiences. The construction of a comparative 
15 
approach in such a complex field of interest requires the thorough study and 
examination of hedge fund regulatory systems in the US, the UK, the EU and single 
jurisdictions (Italy, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta and Switzerland). In Europe, 
new laws or directives are on the agenda to protect investors and customers, such as the 
recent Alternative Investment Funds Managers Directive (AIFMD), the Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) or the revised Prospectus Directive. However, 
the overregulation of markets by defending the investors’ rights could result in an 
uneconomical underproduction of new financial products. The perfect balance between 
these two poles seems to be difficult to find by legislators. Therefore, normative 
guidelines in investors protection are most of the times considered and used by 
legislators worldwide, especially in Europe and in America. 
 
In choosing this topic one presumed that hedge funds legal characteristics could be 
defined by studying their regulatory forms, features and strategies in the American and 
European systems, aiming to understand how they may lead to similar regulatory 
frameworks (and in the end to one single global regulation), enabling risk mitigation, 
greater transparency and investors’ protection in the US and the European countries. 
 
Hedge funds regulatory field is continuously changing because of its internal and 
external interacting processes. In this context, the thesis researches various shifting 
regulations in the US, the EU and national jurisdictions in Europe in terms of financial 
law, following the reform of their legal statutes in the aftermath of the crisis. The thesis 
aims to empirically determine the guidelines and techniques used by hedge fund 
regulators worldwide in the context of the rapidly changing regulatory field, particularly 
addressing investor protection. Various types of hedge fund regulatory codes applicable 
in the analysed countries are identified by the author of the thesis, who also addresses 
the regulatory factors that could motivate or inhibit the development of the hedge fund 
industry. 
 
Objectives of the research 
Therefore, the main objective of this research is to explore new hedge funds’ regulatory 
elements of the national, the EU and the US frameworks, and the legal system of 
financial policy collaboration, characterised by discrepancies and unsolved 
interrogations, presented within an ample, interconnected methodological approach and 
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focused on investor protection issues with grouping of the different sets of regulation 
applicable to hedge funds worldwide (in certain countries). 
 
The actuality of the theme 
It is undeniable that the research is of great interest nowadays. The current international 
depression, hedge funds supervision, and the evaluation of their regulatory bodies 
surface and surpass the national regulators and reveal themselves at the international 
level. The same reform process occurs not only within the EU through the “Alternative 
Investment Fund Managers Directive” (AIFM Directive), but also in the US, through 
the “Dodd-Frank Act Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act” (Dodd-Frank 
Act) This makes the author of this thesis consider and promote internationally the 
subject of regulation and supervision of hedge funds, with major focus on investors 
protection. The reform of hedge funds regulation which aimed to mitigate the risk and 
increase the level of investors’ interests protection within the EU and the US 
governance, is not over yet. However, inherently, the different regulatory approach of 
the selected countries analysed in the thesis implies a clear grouping of the sets of hedge 
funds regulation. These countries are all trying to reform their legal systems through 
cooperation and closer supervision of financial policy within the EU, revolving around 
investor protection and risk mitigation. In addition, the overall approach of EU and 
American regulation regarding investors’ rights protection is progressively attacked on 
grounds of behavioural economics that consider irrational behaviour. 
 
The thorough examination of the unique phenomenon of the hedge funds reform in the 
EU and the US required the detailed research of the regulatory framework and the study 
of the EU and US financial policy on hedge funds and their results achieved so far 
regarding mainly the protection of investors’ rights. In addition, the author reveals the 
features and the possible deficiencies, and the lack of consistency characterising the 
hedge fund regulations. 
 
The author looks at the fundamental coordination of European and US hedge fund 
policy, highlighting common issues of the European and the American regulatory 
systems. Many hedge fund regulation inadequacies were revealed by the present 
financial crisis. Meanwhile, major problems were identified by the same financial crisis 
with regard to the traditional approach in finance and securities markets regulation, 
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challenging the paradigm of rationale behaviour and well-informed investors. 
Considering the significance and niche nature of the research, the author analyses the 
distinctive features of the “European hedge funds regulatory integration”, focusing 
mainly on regulatory statutes, regulations and other financial tools of hedge fund policy 
systems and their changes until 1 December 2012. 
 
The research methodology 
This research uses several distinct methods: deductive method, analytical study, 
interpretation of statutory tools, teleological method, historical research and 
comparative study. Due to a consolidated and complex empirical approach of hedge 
fund regulations, the author examines hedge fund regulatory features, paying particular 
attention to investor protection in the EU and US systems through several complex 
methods. The method used is both factual and doctrinal, including illustrative, but also 
expository issues. 
 
The EU has built up special international relationships and forms of integration with 
other countries. Hedge fund law features of the above-mentioned relations may be 
established by analysing the hedge fund regulatory policies in some European countries. 
Therefore, the author outlines the hedge fund law in selected single jurisdictions, 
including the impact of the AIFM Directive, in a case study approach. These are based 
on subjective selection with the main intention to add value to this thesis. The selected 
case studies also included some statistical data. 
 
Further complexity is provided to the thesis by the advantages and disadvantages of the 
distinct methodological approaches, analysing different rules and mechanisms 
developed under the investor protection concept whose first goal is both to better inform 
investors and to protect them by limiting exposure to financial loss. In addition, the 
author studies the hedge fund legal order of the selected European countries from the 
“regulatory integration models” point of view, rejecting the solely classical positive 
method and the purely descriptive approach, and focusing mainly on the contrastive 
approach.  
 
In the process of using the analytical methods, the researcher also uses an interpretation 
technique of statutory tools. This method is applied when closely analysing relevant 
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national, EU and US legal instruments regarding hedge funds, focusing mainly on 
investors’ rights protection. Within this overview, the examination of hedge fund 
regulation in the selected countries implies the use of the historical method and 
comparative analysis, as well as the case studies approach. 
 
The historical method and teleological analysis are used when studying legal history 
related to the hedge funds regulation. In addition, in attempting to analyse the 
development and the shifting of regulatory bodies, the researcher intends to establish the 
particular changes, reasons, scopes, and features of the examined legal institutions 
within a critical approach, considering the financial crisis circumstances and provision 
of investors’ interests protection. 
 
Research question 
In this dynamic regulatory field, which are the practices and tendencies related to hedge 
fund regulation, mainly investor protection-based regulation that can provide guidelines 
for a successful global hedge funds regulatory system? Therefore, the thesis clearly 
groups the different sets of hedge funds regulation aiming to: mitigate the risk, increase 
investors’ interests protection, market integrity and financial system stability.  
 
The thesis outline 
The six chapters of this thesis attempt to provide an answer to this question. The first 
chapter includes an overview of hedge funds, their definition, history, structure, 
advantages, investment strategies and the description of the parties involved. It also 
explains their light regulation before the 2007-2009 financial crisis. The hedge fund 
overview presented in this chapter is necessary for the clear understanding of all aspects 
of the regulation further discussed in this thesis. The purpose of the first chapter is to 
give an overview of the present framework regarding hedge funds, “the nature of hedge 
funds, their characteristics, and their use in investment portfolios.” The author 
considered that the detailed explanation of the hedge fund framework is necessary in 
order to better comprehend why the hedge fund managers are controlled by regulation 
instead of the fund itself. Therefore, the first goal of this thesis is to present “a review of 
definitions and descriptions of hedge funds found in literature, and an outline of the 
complex investment strategies they employ” in order to understand the hedge fund and 
the complexity of its operation. The author considers that registration rules and 
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reporting requirements must be developed by regulators in prompting investor-centric 
regulation and in enhancing protection for investors, by diminishing some of the higher 
risk behaviour of hedge funds. Moreover, logical concerns have been expressed on the 
impact of the hedge funds industry increase on (1) the overall financial markets, 
particularly during the high insecurity period doubled by disruption, and on (2) the 
many potential conflicts of interest and risk factors uniquely applicable to hedge funds 
and affecting mainly the investors. 
 
The second chapter analyses the rationales of hedge fund regulation, namely, investor 
protection, market integrity and financial stability. One idea needs to be apprehended: 
the hedge fund involvement in market manipulation and insider dealing is clearly 
unsupported. Hedge funds were not the cause, as they spread systemic risk, but they did 
not create it. To increase the level of investors’ rights protection, one need to understand 
the rationale of hedge fund regulation centred on prudential regulation and investors’ 
interests protection, together with the re-thinking of the entire hedge funds’ regulation 
and disclosure policy. The chapter explains why hedge fund regulation in general and 
investor protection-based regulation in particular is both necessary and desirable, stating 
that with the prevalence of moderation and good sense, there are no reasons to believe 
that its implementation would not be feasible. As Professor Rosa Lastra stated: “We 
should also beware of the excesses of regulation and the dangers of over-regulating a 
given sector or type of institutions, creating incentives for businesses to move outside 
the regulatory framework. Any regulatory perimeter brings its own shadows and 
loopholes.”1 Debates on whether tighter or lighter regulation should prevail still 
continue. 
 
The EU legislation on hedge funds is examined in chapter three, particularly the 
“Undertakings for Collective Investments in Transferable Securities” (UCITS) and “The 
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive” (MiFID) frameworks, and the new AIFM 
Directive. This chapter aims to provide first an overview of the EU regulation on hedge 
funds and then a discussion on the AIFM Directive. The author analyses the 
repercussions of recent EU regulatory developments in the financial services field on 
the hedge fund regulatory dispute (with an emphasis on the UCITS reform and the 
MiFID application). The author also argues that, although the revised UCITS 
                                                 
1
 Lastra, Rosa Maria, “The Quest for International Financial Regulation”, Inaugural Lecture, Queen 
Mary University of London, Charterhouse Square, 23 March 2011. 
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framework does not include EU hedge funds, it might provide a basis and a possible 
model for their future EU-wide law. Another observation is that the impact of MiFID on 
the prospective regulation of the EU hedge fund industry is expected to be significant, 
even though it is too early to establish this with any degree of certainty. In addition, the 
investigation of the AIFM Directive approved in the aftermath of this unfolding 
financial depression is imperative to understand the new rules regarding hedge funds in 
the EU financial industry. The consequences of the AIFM Directive on the hedge fund 
sector led to the author’s decision to make an overview of the critical assessment of the 
AIFM Directive. This review involves also a more critical analysis that goes further 
than the simple description of the regulatory process integration. Due to the ongoing 
financial crisis, this will probably govern the next round of regulatory integration. In 
this context, the author acknowledges the cross-border nature of the hedge funds sector 
and the need to create a harmonised international hedge funds regulation regime. 
 
Chapter four conducts an examination of UK hedge fund regulation, examining the 
international regulatory intervention. It also analyses the hedge funds regulation in 
various European jurisdictions: Italy, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta and 
Switzerland. These have become popular jurisdictions for hedge funds registration. The 
chapter also addresses the impact of the AIFM Directive on these local jurisdictions. 
The importance of this chapter lies in the fact that it explains not only the hedge funds 
regulation in the selected jurisdictions in their current version, but that it also debates 
the impact of the AIFM Directive on each of the examined jurisdictions. The 
comparative analysis performed in this chapter concludes that uncoordinated national 
solutions have led to cross-jurisdictional disparities in handling the hedge funds, which 
will later support, the author’s opinion that a global regulation approach for hedge funds 
is urgently needed. The common features of national hedge fund regimes encompassing 
their emphasis on product regulation and investor security do not lead to a de facto 
convergence towards a general model capable of removing the need for harmonised 
hedge fund regulation. Expanding over such a vast-range problem, cross-jurisdictional 
regulatory differences are unlikely to disappear by the operation of simple market forces 
alone and by absent legislative arbitration. Several topics are debated for each of the 
jurisdictions mentioned above, particularly: a comparative presentation of the legal 
regimes relevant to hedge funds; the regulatory developments concerning hedge funds; 
the scope and intention of the hedge funds-oriented regulation and the benefits and 
disadvantages of the regulation. A better-regulated industry at European level may or 
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may not lead to a development of this sector. The impact of the AIFM Directive on the 
local regulation in each jurisdiction represents a very significant issue. One may notice 
that regulators can provide a lighter touch and can clearly articulate their best practices, 
instead of assuming the over-regulation risk. 
 
Chapter five debates the hedge funds regulation in the US, particularly in the context of 
the economic reform introduced by the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010. This chapter begins 
with an overview of the laws addressing hedge funds regulation in the US and it 
continues with the analysis of the revolutionary financial reform introduced by the 
Dodd-Frank Act and its impact on hedge fund regulation. This is read and discussed in 
the context of the financial crisis that affects the financial world. In the aftermath of the 
crisis, governments were asked to introduce forceful financial reforms to avoid a future 
Lehman Brothers scenario. The author of this thesis would like to indicate that the 
financial reform introduced by the Dodd-Frank Act will have a severe impact on the 
hedge fund industry. It will certainly be a challenge to study how the sector will cope 
with such massive changes, particularly if hedge funds decide to stay and comply with 
all the reporting requirements or relocate to other more lightly-regulated jurisdictions. 
One observable issue in this over-regulation debate is to clearly define the limit between 
too much and too little regulation by considering the tolerable and the intolerable risks. 
Dodd–Frank acknowledges the problem of investor protection. However, its solutions, 
while useful, seem too small to stop or even delay the growth of such an important 
problem. The author’s opinion is that more efforts should be done, such as changing the 
relationship between financial service providers and their clients from wary antagonism 
to trusted, well-trained protectors and guardians. 
 
The sixth chapter of this thesis discusses several cases concerning hedge funds litigation 
and arbitration. The litigation and arbitration cases illustrated in this chapter are only the 
latest of the regulatory enforcement failures during the last ten years. Unlike Madoff’s 
alleged Ponzi scheme, which apparently was a single huge fraud, many of the other 
cases involved very frequent abuses in the hedge fund industry. Considering the above-
mentioned aspects, it becomes clear that authorities regulate under uncertain 
circumstances, especially due to the complex strategies of funds. Since 2000, regulators 
have failed to take timely and effective action to prevent hedge funds-related abuses, 
which led the author to the conclusion that regulatory enforcement is more than 
necessary. In addition, investors’ protection is another aspect that should be carefully 
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explored. This chapter provides a well-structured perspective of lawsuits types faced by 
financial institutions upon the collapse of a regulatory enforcement. Recent litigation 
and arbitration cases show that affected investors tend to become highly innovative, 
pursuing mainly financial organisations that might have been involved. It is possible 
that these trends become patterns, not only due to the stagnant economic situation but 
also to the increasing social outrage regarding poor or no supervision of financial-
markets. Hence, this chapter addressed the conflicts of interest that hedge fund 
managers face and the regulatory measures necessary to better protect hedge fund 
investors.  
 
This thesis was written using standard legal research methodology. The main sources 
used were reference books and scientific articles, primary and secondary Community 
legal acts and non-binding measures, national regulations and instruments, as well as 
studies and technical reports relevant to the subject matter of this particular research. 
Given the technical dimension of precise aspects of this research topic, the author also 
used papers written by economists and experts in risk management and investment. 
 
The subject of the thesis is interdisciplinary, as it addresses not only financial law 
matters, but also different branches of law (for instance, international law, European 
primary and secondary legislation, US law, UK national law) and second disciplines 
(for instance, economics). Therefore, interdisciplinary approach is necessary in the 
research of hedge fund regulatory systems in the American, British, European and 
single jurisdictions from a financial law standpoint. 
 
It is essential to perform an in-depth assessment. Therefore, by using the normative 
method regarding financial law, the scope, function and discrepancies between some 
legal authorities cannot be comprehended in the absence of political and economic 
processes. Hence, the analysis of hedge fund regulation must only be performed by 
referring to both political and economic background. 
 
The law is stated as of 1 December
 
2012, and all forthcoming changes are mentioned, 
where important. Website citations are applicable to the same date. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
OVERVIEW OF HEDGE FUNDS 
 
1.1  Introduction 
 
Hedge funds represent lightly regulated active investment vehicles with large trading 
flexibility, with main purpose to execute highly sophisticated investment strategies so 
that they can deliver absolute returns to their investors regardless of the conditions and 
fluctuations of the financial markets.  
 
The hereby chapter offers a broad image of the evolution and growth of hedge funds, 
and describes the history of this alternative investment vehicle together with the 
characteristic features. Its purpose is to lay down the foundation for the analytical part 
of the thesis by introducing the relevant theoretical knowledge for the parts to come. In 
addition, this chapter is designed to offer less critical comments but rather to place this 
subject into a larger conceptual framework, in order to illuminate wider and 
longstanding concerns about hedge funds universe and characteristics as to grasp a 
general view which will further allow us to asses investor protection, market integrity 
and financial stability. 
 
1.2 The shape and profile of the global fund industry 
 
Over the last twenty years, the hedge fund industry experienced tremendous expansion 
and success. The number of funds and assets under management in this industry grew 
rapidly from 610 funds in 1990 to more than 8,923 in the second quarter of 2009
2
, 
according to Hedge Fund Research, Inc. Moreover, the development of the hedge fund 
industry was extremely rapid in these last 15 years. The most recent estimates illustrated 
the total assets under management to be about “USD2.19 trillion as of the end of 
                                                 
2
 http://www.hedgefundfacts.org/hedge/statistics/number-of-funds/, accessed 20 April 2011. 
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3Q12.”3 Also, the frauds related to hedge funds have become more common and more 
concerns were expressed regarding the reality of reported returns. According to recent 
research, hedge funds misreport their returns and due to these misreports, the wealth 
transfer ranged from USD1 to 2 billion between 1994 and 2005.”4 In a recent speech, a 
Commissioner from the “Securities and Exchange Commission” (SEC) stated that there 
has been a clear progress of this industry, from around USD38 billion in 1990, to 
USD625 billion after twelve years, reaching about USD1.9 trillion in 2007.
5
 In addition, 
the industry estimates reached the climax in mid-2008, stating that the hedge fund 
market has grown above USD2.5 trillion in assets
6
. Six months later, researches from 
IOSCO
7
 and OECD
8
 estimated that the hedge fund industry had reached USD1.4 trillion 
in assets under management (AUM).
9
 Hence, almost a third of the assets under 
management crashed due to negative investment returns, associated investor 
withdrawals, and fund closures.
10
 In terms of market impact, hedge funds were 
responsible for 18–22% of the total exchanging amount on the “New York Stock 
Exchange” (NYSE).  
 
During the last months of the year 2010, the professionals of the so-called global macro 
and relative value gained the most from client inflows, reflecting the investors’ concerns 
over economic uncertainty. The strategy remained popular despite the fact that many 
managers of hedge funds, whose purpose is mainly to take advantage of international 
economical changes through currencies and bond investments failed to generate rapid 
returns.
11
 “Hedge Fund Research” states that during the third quarter of 2010, the global 
macro funds acquired net subscriptions totalling USD6.9 billion.
12
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 Bollen, N. P. et al., “Do Hedge Fund Managers Misreport Returns? Evidence from the Pooled 
Distributions”, 2009, Journal of Finance, 64(5). 
5
 Speech by SEC Commissioner, “Hedge Fund Regulation on the Horizon — Don’t Shoot the 
Messenger” (June 18, 2009), in Mitchell E. Nichter & Sasha Burstein, Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & 
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N
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 2 S Fund Management September 21, 2009, p. 1. 
6
 Ineichen, A., et al, (2008) “AIMA’s Roadmap to Hedge Funds. Alternative Investment Management 
Association”, pp. 16-17, http://www.aima.org/ , accessed on 05.05. 2011. 
7
 International Organisation of Securities Commissions. 
8
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.  
9
 Blundell-Wignall, Adrian (2007) “An Overview of Hedge Funds and Structured Products: Issues in 
Leverage and Risk”, OECD. 
10
 Eshraghi, Arman and Taffler, Richard J., 2009, “Hedge Funds and Unconscious Fantasy:” 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1522486, accessed May 2011. 
11
 Jones, Sam, (2010), “Hedge Funds Enjoy Biggest Asset Boost in 3 Years”, The Financial Times 
Limited, 19 October, 2010. 
12
 Hedge Fund Research Report, 3rd Quarter 2010, published in October 2010, 
www.hedgefundresearch.com, accessed May 2011. 
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Hedge funds came to dominate the investment fund market. These are private, limited 
membership collective investment tools and will be further approached by the author of 
the thesis. The expected high returns generated by these funds made them increasingly 
attractive. The hedge funds provide a high enough investment return and create many 
other economic advantages, among which an optimised portfolio risk management and 
diversification, reduced market distortion and volatility, improved liquidity and 
information supply, as well as a higher general market profitability, efficiency and 
stability.
13
 
 
Problems occurred due to regulatory neglect and/or eluding, forceful selling, over-
leveraging, subsequent consolidation and market misrepresentation, market herding and 
settlement issues, and due to possible conflicts of interest and market abuse. Fund 
closure and winding up create further problems and consequently market contagion, 
crisis and lack of any effective market support. Wanted or unwanted publicity also 
contributed to hedge funds reputation. “Long Term Capital Management” (LTCM) from 
1998, Amaranth from 2006, and more recent outrages such as Philippe Jabre in the UK, 
in 2009 are among the most famous publicity topics. 
 
Like other acknowledged alternative investments (real estate, commodities, venture 
capital, private equity), hedge funds give access to returns, which do not correlate with 
traditional investments, and superior risk-adjusted returns.
14
 
In the author’s opinion, hedge funds are specifically established, structured and operated 
to take maximum advantage of the available legal and regulatory exemptions and 
concessions. Funds are not unregulated although they make maximum use of regulatory 
concession to operate under maximum regulatory advantage conditions. A number of 
complex issues arise in understanding the present regulatory treatment of hedge funds. 
This is also subject to ongoing review in the context of the identified concerns. It should 
nevertheless be possible to enable alternative investment practices and hedge funds, in 
particular, to continue playing an essential financial and social role while working in a 
fair, harmonious regulatory scene. 
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 Lhabitant, Francois-Serge (2002), “Hedge Funds – Myths and Limits” (John Wiley & Sons, 
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 Eichengreen, Barry et al., “Hedge Funds: What Do We Really Know?”, IMF, 1999 
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Risk management 
Systemic instability may arise if hedge funds and their counterparties do not implement 
an adequate management, creating a domino effect affecting the entire system. If the 
institution collapses and an associate needs to turn assets into cash through the massive 
closing-out of positions and realisation of collateral by counterparties, this will cause 
market prices alterations and volatility.
15
 
Hedging is a technique which involves “buying and holding assets that have good long-
term prospects while simultaneously selling assets that have doubtful prospects.”16 
Hedge funds are liquidity providers offering great flexibility. Risks occur even if they 
have positive effects.
17
 Both the investment strategies and funds classification influence 
the hazards. One must consider costs and benefits to achieve successful regulation.
18
 
Overall costs and impacts of regulation but also of non-regulation should be 
apprehended to make a decision whether to regulate or not. Therefore, the proper 
assessment of risks associated to this industry is very important.
19
 
Financial stability risk-systemic risk 
The simultaneous collapse of hedge funds strategies represents a possible threat to 
financial security. This is of lesser concern for the investors and more important for the 
manner it affects associates and the bankers usually supporting these funds. The major 
failure might alter the price data, liquidity and market confidence. Financial stability is 
threatened by market confidence failure, as all the investors escape. Consequently, 
regulation is necessary when social costs are very high and when the financial system as 
a whole experiences a heavy burden due to this situation
20
, according to Goodhart. 
“Long Term Capital Management (LTCM)” failure 
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Due mainly to market instability, LTCM fund nearly collapsed in 1998, and this eroded 
confidence. The failure was globally debated. Leaving leverage aside, LTCM had also a 
liquidity problem. Amaranth is another example of a large hedge fund failure. 
Risks of defective assets appraisal 
Many essential operational risks within the hedge funds assets appraisal affect 
investors’ ability to control performance and make informed decisions regarding their 
investments, influencing price information, markets and market quality. 
 
For a correct asset valuation, the fund manager analysed further in this chapter needs to 
depend on: valuation models frequently used by the manager, associates shares and 
estimations from the manager. 
Undoubtedly, this requires the answer to the question whether these appraisals tend to 
be right and entirely free, since conflicts of interests may occur.  
 
Other risks related to market trust refer either to the fact that regulators have 
insufficient data to make informed decisions about risk, or that certain managers do not 
have the necessary skills. The hedge fund managers’ background is that of traders rather 
than fund managers. The chapter further examines and discusses this. 
Risk to market cleanliness 
Trading on non-public information 
Some concerns have been raised that particular hedge funds are pushing at the limits of 
admissible practice in terms of trading based on non-public information. 
Market manipulation 
The hedge fund regulators can also test the limits of admissible practice as far as market 
manipulation is regarded. Major hedge funds seems tempted to use their size, or begin 
market rumours, to deliberately move the market and take advantage of profitable 
prices.  
Financial crime risk. Fraud  
28 
Investors were deprived of important amounts of capital lately, mainly because of 
frauds. On this matter, fifty-one fraud cases were pursued by the SEC against US hedge 
fund managers in 2005 alone, while in 2010, the amount of money reached USD1.1 
billion. There are two important fraud methods, namely: misreporting, when incomes 
are inflated, and Ponzi schemes, which will be analysed in chapter six. 
Money laundering 
It is always possible to use a fund for money laundering purposes. Nowadays, hedge 
funds in Europe are regulated by “the Anti Money Laundering Directive.”21 
 
As closing remarks on risks, the author would like to emphasize that the national 
regulators around the globe are concerned about all the above-mentioned issues, 
focusing on investor security, but also on industry security.  
 
 
1.2  Features of hedge funds 
 
Hedge funds are characterised in terms of their light regulation, in comparison with 
mutual funds in the US or UCITS in the EU. 
 
Funds take advantage of legal exclusions in the US, failing to register themselves or 
their managers. Hedge funds are unregulated in the UK, because they are generally 
located offshore in order to achieve tax and regulatory exemptions. This is a feature 
explored by the author throughout this thesis. This chapter further presents, examines 
and discusses regulation of hedge fund managers in the subsection dealing with the 
parties involved in a hedge fund structure. 
 
In terms of performance fees and absolute return, the hedge funds manager acquires 
performance fee based on funds performance. This is not valid for traditional 
investments funds.
22
 “Absolute return investing occurs when portfolio managers seek 
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positive holding period returns without any benchmark except for, possibly, the return 
on the risk-free asset.”23 
 
Consequently, in order to improve performance even under unfavourable market 
conditions, hedge funds develop their strategies with the purpose of achieving a return, 
which does not correlate to the market performance or to a particular market 
benchmark. In case of a major failure, both price data and liquidities lead to significant 
losses in terms of confidence, which might spread all over the economic system. 
According to Goodhart, when social costs are colossal, and when there are burdens to 
the overall financial system
24
, regulations must be tightened. 
 
The structures of classical funds include: (a) a fund, which is the capital pool usually 
located offshore; (b) a manager, who makes all the investment decisions, who is 
established in most cases in an important financial centre; (c) a prime broker, usually an 
investment bank that supply credit and financial services to the fund (stock lending and 
direct financing, and asset valuation and custody); (d) investing individuals. They can 
be either institutional investors or persons with important net-value; (e) administrators 
who manage funds from their offshore centres namely, from those particular locations 
where they were made.
25
 At the same time, the investment strategy can reinvest some of 
the hedge funds in other different hedge funds.
26
 This complex configuration of hedge 
funds will be analysed in detail in the section dealing with hedge fund parties.
27
 
 
 
1.3  Characteristics of hedge funds 
 
Hedge funds have some common characteristics. In enumerating these common features 
of hedge funds, the author calls attention to Dale Gabbert’s book on “Hedge Funds.”  
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One main feature of the hedge funds is the capacity of their assets to invest in financial 
instruments. Examples of such instruments are securities traded on exchanges or “over-
the-counter” (OTC), related financial instruments (known as “derivatives” because their 
value derives from another asset) or debt obligations of companies undergoing 
insolvency (“distressed” debt). The significance lies in the fact that the fundamental 
portfolio has some amount of liquidity, which ranges substantially between the hedge 
funds and the strategies (example: distressed debt may be mainly illiquid). The former 
started to invest capital in supplementary classes of assets (private equity but also 
property) in trying to reduce the portfolio liquidity and mask some of the gaps between 
hedge funds and secondary industry members. 
 
The second characteristic is the unregulated nature of funds. These are not subjected to 
regulation by “onshore” regulators such as the FSA28 and SEC, because they are usually 
set up in offshore jurisdictions
29
, where they are not taxed directly. In case of laws 
conflict, countries usually avoid regulation of activities that occur outside their own 
borders, unless those entities have some connections with their country. This connection 
can be management, trading or sale of hedge funds in onshore jurisdictions.  
 
The third feature of hedge funds consists in their tendency to have broad investment 
parameters. Most onshore jurisdictions have certain restrictions controlling the scope of 
permissible investments and investment techniques in funds sold to the public. In UK, 
there are rigorous limits on “authorised funds” (funds that can be marketed freely), like 
“Unit Trusts” and “Open Ended Investment Companies” (OEICs). The European law 
has issued a set of conditions
30
 for funds in one EU state to be marketed in another, 
which encourages normal principles on diversity, leverage and investment methods. The 
range of investment techniques used by hedge funds is much wider than that available 
to traditional authorised funds, for a simple reason – the better the freedom of a fund in 
its investment policy, the better its opportunity to make positive returns (and 
conversely, losses).
31
 
 
The fourth characteristic is their purchase unavailability directly to the society. This 
does not mean that the general public is not exposed to them. There are some 
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jurisdictions (Germany for example) that enable funds sale to invest in hedge funds 
portfolio. Additionally, there are several hedge funds which use other routes to achieve 
investor concurrence and regulation.
32
 
 
The fifth characteristic is their capacity to use leverage or borrowing to increase the 
performance of the fund. The borrowing level alternates a lot and can be determined “by 
the rules of the exchange on which the shares of the fund are listed.”33 Managers of fund 
of hedge funds can have problems due to the proposed restraint on leverage to 10%, 
since managers may want to have a greater leverage cushion to meet redemption 
requirements. 
 
The sixth characteristic is that they would have to double charge investors: first for 
yearly management (1.5% to 2% tax); second for accomplishments, one-fifth of its 
returns.  
 
None of the above characteristics is unique to hedge funds. Still, a fund featuring all 
these characteristics can legitimately be described as a hedge fund. 
 
1.4  Definition of hedge funds 
 
Hedge funds represent a legitimate investment vehicle for individuals with excess 
funds. This placement offers investment capital, increases liquidity and improves 
market efficiency. The use of arbitrage techniques can correct instabilities within 
markets, while volatility is generally ameliorated and stability optimised. The 
development of advanced techniques improves financial engineering and innovation, 
which assists longer-term market growth and efficiency. Nevertheless, ongoing 
concerns arise despite these benefits. 
 
These concerns deal mainly with leverage, complexity, concentration and lack of 
transparency, as well as with possible market distortion problems (intentional or un-
intentional), market abuse and possible insider trading. Herding, settlement, closure and 
winding down of outstanding positions may also generate some issues. The potential 
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exposures created by particular strategies that arbitrage position across separate sectors 
or markets also create additional levels of interdependence and possible contagion. All 
this may increase the occurrence possibility or financial instability level, and possible 
crisis and collapse.  
According to the above-mentioned risks with hedge funds (see section 1.1.) and the 
ones mentioned also below, a rigid and comprehensive grouping of risks is arising from 
hedge fund operation: 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Grouping of risks from hedge fund operation 
 
The national and international bodies throughout the world are treating these issues. The 
next chapters will describe the national and international regulations and efforts that are 
made to mitigate the risks associated with hedge funds from the view of investor 
protection and stability in the financial markets since these are the main risks. 
 
Several definitions of a hedge fund are used for legal or regulatory purposes. Different 
bodies use various expressions to separate papers with various degrees of accuracy.
34
 In 
practice, it is simpler to distinguish funds by their main characteristics. 
 
Usually, the hedge fund term illustrates “any fund that is not a conventional investment 
fund – that is, any fund using a strategy or set of strategies other than investing long in 
bonds, equities (mutual funds), and money markets (money market funds).”35  
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At the same time, an alternative strategy includes: hedging by selling short – selling 
shares without being the owner of these shares, intending to purchase them back 
cheaper, hoping that their prices will fall; using arbitrage – trying to analyse inabilities 
emerging from price determination through connected securities; exchanging options – 
agreements with values settled based on the efficiency of every essential financial asset; 
making use of leverage – leveraging to increase the profits. Another strategy is 
investing in underestimated securities
36
 or trying to benefit from the discrepancy 
between the present market prices and the buying prices, under the circumstances 
caused by hostile mergers/takeovers by the target company management.
37
 
 
Hedge funds are considered investment vehicles providing risk and return possibilities 
hardly attained by classical long-only stock or by bond investment vehicles. These 
opportunities could be reached mainly by taking part in many financial products and 
international markets generally unavailable to classical investors, and by their abilities 
to hold not only long- but also short-security positions.
38
 Hedge funds provide benefits 
for returns under different financial circumstances. Their structure is mostly that of 
privately pooled investment vehicles employing different leverage rates and charging a 
performance tax.
39
 
 
This analysis of the hedge fund activities provides a common ground for the 
understanding of such a definition. Hedge funds “are eclectic investment pools, 
typically organised as private partnerships and often located offshore for tax and 
regulatory reasons.”40  
 
Several national and international fora and bodies dealing with hedge funds have 
defined them according to certain criteria. According to the “Report of the Asset 
Managers Committee of US President’s Working Group on Financial Markets”41, hedge 
funds fail to be strictly regulated, “private investment pools of capital available only to 
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institutional or wealthy investors which due to the performance tax”42 seen as a payment 
offered to managers, in exchange for performing an vast range of exchanging strategies 
in order to get not relative, but absolute return. 
 
The Asset Managers Committee identifies several criteria that characterise a hedge 
fund. These criteria tend to be connected with: 
 the private character of the hedge funds offer, respectively, they cannot be 
publicly sold; 
 the restricted nature of investors in a hedge fund, usually including the 
high net worth persons and organisations; 
 the different manner to record the fund, not similar to that of an 
investment entity according to the active laws (for example, the 
Investment Company Act of 1940 in the US); 
 the management of these fund assets by an expert investment management 
company partly compensated by the vehicle’s investment performance; 
 the aim of hedge fund major investment is to place money and other 
investment assets within a liquid securities portfolio; 
 the regular, but rather restrained or limited redemption rights of hedge 
fund.
43
 
 
“Hedge fund” illustrated a type of financing fund requesting an amount of money from 
investors as a tax, using two techniques: first, over-leveraging for amplifying income, 
second, short selling for market risk limitation. Even nowadays, parts of the features 
presented above can be true, but not for all funds. 
 
The term “hedge fund” implies a “fund or collective investment scheme which allows 
several investors to participate in a common pool of assets that hedges i.e. utilises the 
investment technique known as hedging, which pursues to offset the risk inherent in one 
investment by purchasing another investment considered likely to move in the opposite 
direction.”44 
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There is no legal or regulatory clear separation of a “hedge fund” in the UK. Similarly, 
there is a large series of funds called as such. Hedge funds do not all use leverage, nor 
do they all get involved in short selling. Very few are currently used and operated for 
retail investors.
45
 
 
To conclude, funds apparently are more difficult to label than to perceive. Nevertheless, 
it seems that the elephant test fits them comprehensively: one definitely recognizes a 
fund when sees it despite not being able to describe it. 
 
The ability to differentiate the funds and funds’ managers is very important. The latter 
must normally observe regulations and ethic codes. Contrary to classical, long-only 
asset managers, fund managers apparently have supplementary instruments, and this 
explains the high returns. 
 
These tools include: 
 Generation of returns and/or hedge market vulnerability by losing stock. 
This means taking stocks on loan, and gaining from the decrease of the 
security worth after trading it; 
 Increase of returns by the use of leverage. Leverage is to be understood 
here as buying securities with borrowed money; 
 Generation of returns and/or risk reduction by employing derivatives. 
These might represent a productive manner to increase exposure and 
possible profit/loss, and hedge vulnerability thus mitigating risks; 
 More active exchange as compared to traditional managers.46 
 
Nevertheless, funds cannot be completely defined by a single feature mentioned above, 
because sometimes funds may have some common features and sometimes they are 
completely different from one another.  
 
The tax form might be the common feature of most if not all hedge funds. Generally, 
“hedge funds will charge investors a management fee of 1.5-2.0% and a performance 
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fee of 20%. This means managers are heavily incentivised to generate good 
performance for investors.”47 
 
1.5  History of hedge funds 
 
Various forms of investment resembling several aspects of the modern hedge fund have 
always been available throughout history. These include early forms of cooperative 
trade venture dating back from pre-Roman times.
48
 More specialized individual 
investment management services have also been available for as long as individuals and 
governments have held assets in need of management. Organised forms of collective 
investment in the US and UK began with the origins of the mutual fund and unit trust 
industries. 
 
The modern history of hedge funds began in the late 40’s, more precisely “in 1949 
when Winston Jones established the first hedge fund.”49 He is considered to be the 
father of modern hedge fund and he was a Harvard graduated financial journalist who 
was once a US diplomat in the German capital during the ‘30s. Winston Jones was later 
hired by Fortune, a US business periodic publication. There, he grew an interest in 
investments establishing also an investment association. The fund he managed was 
composed of a limited partnership allowed to have maximum 99 investors. He did this 
to escape requests from the US regulation of the Investment Company Act of 1940, but 
also so that the general associate/fund manager could receive 1/5 of the profits as 
payment for the services provided. Aiming to increase exposure but also returns while 
using the short selling of stock, and to eliminate market risks, his investment approach 
seemed to have the main objective of using leverage.
50
 According to Jones, his purpose 
resided in hedging out industry risk by transforming the fund into a neutral one. The 
other way around, returns would depend rather on choosing the right stocks, than on the 
fluctuations of the stock market.
51
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In 1966, an article presenting Jones’s ideas was written in the Fortune magazine. Its 
outcome was remarkable: a large number of persons adopted his rationale. 
 
At the beginning, the funds market was not large probably due to the small amount of 
advertising. However, “the number of hedge funds, and the total assets under 
management began to increase significantly during the 1990s and the rate of growth has 
accelerated enormously in the last years.”52 
 
Several reasons accounted for the boost. The first was the agreeability of the hedge fund 
payment organisation, which occurred as a good motivation for endowed merchants but 
also investors to allow investment credit institutions and large capital managers start 
their own funds. The second reason was the intellectual and regulatory freedom 
achieved from operating their own hedge funds without having to be bound by the 
institutionalised, benchmark-driven approach preferred by many of classical capital 
managers. This freedom attracted many endowed investors in this universe of hedge 
funds. The third reason dealt with the technological advances, which enabled the 
endowed investors from this market to start their own investment businesses, 
outsourcing back office activities to relevant providers.
53
 
 
The relationship between hedge funds and financial crisis emerges as ampler and less 
causal than it is described most of the times. Nevertheless, there is consensus that 
measures need to be taken, but there is not a general consensus on what these measures 
should be. Some scholars support the idea that hedge funds are to blame
54
 for extensive 
and damaging industry shifts in the exposed economies. Still, many exhaustive studies 
consider that hedge funds were not actively involved in speeding up the financial 
market crisis during the last few years
55
, as hedge funds were unidentifiable “as the 
culprits for the financial crisis”.56 One of the strongest arguments in favour of the 
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assertion that hedge funds are not responsible for the current financial crisis is that, on a 
large scale, they were negatively impacted,
57
 because, as Billio et al. put it, the ongoing 
crisis has considerably diminished “returns to all hedge fund strategies, leaving no safe 
place for investors.”58 Also, hedge funds by themselves are not large enough to be 
capable of affecting prices on liquid markets, because their capital is not significant in 
connection to that of other investors, among which one can mention banks and 
insurance companies. Other studies
59
 blamed banks and credit-rating corporations, 
considering they hold far bigger responsibility for generating the crisis than did hedge 
funds. 
 
Current researches focus on the liquidity risk as far as hedge funds are concerned. 
Liquidity risk affects hedge fund performance to a high degree and correct foreseeing of 
liquidity leads to avoidance of losses. 
 
Current researches considering hedge fund performance concluded that hedge funds, in 
comparison with investment benchmarks involve higher profits, but also higher risks.
60
  
 
1.6  Advantages of hedge funds 
 
Hedge funds provide a number of market benefits or advantages, by delivering a 
number of important market functions and corrections. As the industry continues to 
grow, these advantages and functions will improve accordingly. 
 
They are valuable in terms of flexibility, absorption, profit, correction and liquidity”61, 
and they have a key role in the re-appropriation of assets but also risk among market 
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participants
62
, promoting at the same time a diverse and innovative character
63
. This 
allows other investors to adjust their position “in times of stress”64 and assist “stabilised 
markets in times of distress.”65 
 
The main point of attraction regarding hedge funds is “the potential high-level of return 
generated”66, through innovative strategies, which should allow the fund to gain profit 
and to be hedged. Modern hedge funds no longer follow complete hedging practices.
67
 
Nevertheless, funds can also lose money. Despite “the risks, investors poured money 
into hedge funds in recent years, until market losses in 2008 prompted a wave of 
redemption requests.”68 Many funds have closed and George Soros estimated “that the 
value of capital under management may shrink with 75%.”69 
 
The increased investment portfolio diversity is possible by the active investment 
management of hedge funds
70, also available through investment in “funds of funds.” 
By this, fund managers can trade or arbitrage across different asset classes and markets, 
causing increased linkage, markets dependence, risk propagation, and arguably increase 
of market stability. 
 
The development of risk management techniques by investment strategies enables 
improvements in industry risk management. The author considers that anticipated 
results on hedge funds and their connected risks do not depend only on the ex ante 
assessment of their portfolios strategies per se, but they also depend on the managers’ 
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abilities to efficiently handle the funding and redemption opportunities.
71
 
Correspondingly, risk management is at the forefront of present financial engineering 
and innovation. Many investment banks provide partial assistance in this matter, while 
help is given also by the competition between managers in the hedge fund sector.
72
 
 
Hedge funds play a significant role in the efficient re-appropriation of assets and risks
73
, 
by locating and placing capital where it can be used efficiently and by transferring risk 
where it can be handled effectively. This applies “to financial risks generally, in higher 
risk areas like higher risk structured finance”74, “derivatives markets”75 or in “distressed 
markets”76. In doing so, funds “can provide liquidity in all markets.”77 Basel III new 
capital rules will inevitably involve the increased use of credit derivatives by banks and 
other collateral and credit risk mitigation techniques with hedge funds becoming major 
investors. In response to the EU Solvency II and associated IFRS
78
 adjustments, funds 
are expected to take over more risks from insurance companies.
79
  
 
Funds identify price distortion and instabilities they profit from. In doing so, prices 
change to the correct form
80
, become true prices
81
, favouring the competitive pressure 
and efficiency of financial markets.
82
 
 
Correcting price distortions and providing liquidity in all markets increases the amount 
and quality of information within markets, improves market efficiency, optimises risk 
management, diversifies investments, corrects imbalances, and reduces market 
volatility. All these contribute to improved stability.  
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The design, development application, revision and correction of investment strategies 
improve risk management, supporting financial engineering. Hedge funds commonly 
invest in “Contracts for Differences” (CFDs), “Credit Default Swaps” (CDSs), 
“Collateralised Debt Obligations” (CDOs), “Collateralised Loan Obligations” (CLOs), 
other “Asset Backed Securities” (ABSs) and “Payments in Kind Loans” (PIKs).”83 
These concepts are approached in more details below. 
 
CFDs or contracts for difference are derivative products providing the investors with 
unprecedented trading opportunities, allowing them “to trade on the price movements of 
securities and indices without owning the underlying asset, and offering a leveraged, 
flexible, cost-effective alternative to traditional trading methods.”84 
 
CDS embodies one agreement through which a certain firm/country provides assurance 
in case of a credit risk, also called credit event. If a credit event occurs, the insurance 
purchaser is allowed to sell a specific bond that the entity issues for its face value.
85
 
When the above-mentioned event happens, the purchaser receives a compensation for 
his loss (by hypothesis) resulting from that particular credit event.
86
 
 
The CDO can be created by founding either a SPE
87
 or a SIV
88
, able to purchase assets 
and to issue bonds guaranteed by the  cash flows of the assets. These relations can be 
divided into several sections with various requirements on the principal but also 
interest
89
 brought into being by the CDO’s assets. Hence, the person who issues them 
needs to repackage (corporate or sovereign) debt securities or capital taken as a loan 
under the form of reference portfolios generally known as “collaterals”. Their proceeds 
will further on be part of a sale dedicated to the investors as debt securities with various 
degrees of senior requirements on the above-mentioned “collaterals.”90 
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As far as the ABS transactions are concerned, they represent particular financial goods 
originally developed based on uniform reference portfolios
91
, helping issuing persons to 
increase the profits they make by off-balance-sheet financing and also longer-term 
securities.
92
 It is securitised for driving balance sheet liquidity, which attracts funding 
sources for many financial organisations and firms.  
 
All the above-mentioned hedge funds practices create market return or profitability, 
generating significant benefits for their investors, managers and service providers 
(including prime brokers) and generally improving the quality and performance of 
markets. 
 
Accordingly, hedge funds can perform several useful functions and services with regard 
to market operation, growth and development, making markets more liquid and stable in 
time while continuous re-engineering and innovation can improve product selection, 
quality and efficiency in general. Thus, hedge funds carry out relevant functions and do 
have value, if all corresponding exposures and sources of instability are entirely 
identified and addressed.  
 
1.7  Hedge fund structures 
 
Funds can be established under various forms. The most commonly used vehicles are 
“limited partnerships or limited liability companies in the US”93 and offshore 
investment companies elsewhere. Nevertheless, the funds are only a vehicle for 
attracting external investment and participation. The raw returns evidence for the hedge 
funds indicate that this is an attractive investment instrument for many types of 
investors.
94
 “All funds’ operations will be carried out externally with all essential 
services being outsourced”95.This function outsourcing itself is considered to improve 
efficiency, service quality and returns.
96
 Today, funds are generally regarded as 
investment vehicles assumed to generate an absolute return measure regardless of the 
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market conditions. By their loose regulations and flexible investment strategies, hedge 
funds may use many investment strategies like short positions, leveraging and 
derivatives. This enables them to profit of all the market conditions and to generate 
favourable returns, to promote and induce confidence in investor. Fund managers 
usually hold a strong position in their fund.
97
 The understanding of structures of hedge 
funds from a lawful angle is important in order to further comprehend how law applies 
to them. 
Hedge funds operate within extended management and legal structures. The fund itself 
will include investors (also known as limited partners), sponsors (also known as general 
partners) and a board of directors, as well as a registrar and a transfer agent. A separate 
team will set up and implement the particular investment strategy to be adopted. This 
team will be composed of investment advisors, managers, prime brokers and clearing 
brokers.
98
 Another team of legal advisors, accountants and auditors, custodians and 
administrators will be formed. Many of these parties will also operate in separate 
jurisdictions and in compliance with various laws. The fund will only work effectively 
where the activities of all of these parties can be operated together within a single 
effective business operation or model. 
Various sub-organisational structures can also be used for portfolio management 
purposes. Managers can be responsible for up to 14 separate funds under US 
restrictions.
99
 Thus, in the 1990s, a hedge fund in the US was allowed to have up to 499 
investors. Each of these investors was required to have more than USD5 million in 
assets, otherwise it would be subjected to the Investment Company Act 1940.”100  
Separate funds or sub-funds could then be held under different management structures.  
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1.8  Investment strategies of hedge funds 
The various organisations collections comprising hedge funds involved in exchange 
activities are best classified by employment issues “of mark-to-market discipline, 
leverage, and active trading.”101 
From a regulatory perspective, it is relevant to understand the strategies used by hedge 
funds in order to invest the money and determine whether their strategies are consistent 
and low-risk. As seen before, hedge funds are acknowledged more and more as 
significant factors in the financial markets field. Even if the hedge funds regulatory 
regime is considered to be light, these funds are however forced to comply with the 
regulations governing the decision-making process of the companies, and related 
financial activities in the market. Hedge funds use certain legal strategies to limit the 
restrictive nature of these norms. These legal strategies prove to be a very profitable 
manipulation generator in terms of rules.
102
 Hedge funds’ legal strategies and regulation 
cannot, however, be viewed in isolation. On the contrary, the author of this thesis thinks 
that they should be considered in the context of a more developed programme as to 
integrate global financial services markets, particularly because the recent instability of 
global financial markets urges legislators and regulators, to call for global regulation of 
hedge funds in the author’s point of view. As a consequence, the author firmly believes 
that the research lens should be pushed forward to perceive hedge fund regulation in the 
context of a wider, international policy regulatory regime in financial services. 
 
 
1.9  Hedge fund parties 
 
As stated above, “hedge funds are legal creations”. The fund vehicles themselves do not 
have any staff, except for their non-executive directors. Consequently, another 
individual executes all the activities performed by a hedge fund. Funds rely not only on 
their daily existence but also on their long-run achievements, and on the professional 
expertise of the service providers assisting them. If the above-mentioned providers did 
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not exist, funds would not exist either. In fact, the service providers make the fund 
possible.
103
 
 
Therefore, the high significance of hedge funds composition to their connection with 
different third parties should not be surprising. The fund will be asked to employ a 
certain number of specialist service providers, so that it may take advantage from the 
supporting taxation and regulatory treatment of the fund, in order to ease its smooth 
organisation and transaction, and to maximise returns. 
This section explains the significance of each major service supplier, his or her 
contribution to fund activities, and their terms of employment. The main service 
suppliers for a hedge fund are the following: “(a) the investment manager; (b) the 
administrator and; (c) the prime broker.”104 
 
One should remember that funds have a board of directors. While the hedge funds 
management is generally assigned to the funds’ investment manager, the daily operation 
of funds is assigned to the funds’ administrator. At the same time, the board of directors 
responds for the appointment and supervision of the service providers retained by the 
fund and for the provision of oversight and corporate governance. This board is usually 
the only personnel engaged directly by the fund.
105
 
 
The daily role of the fund’s board of managers is minimal, but they still have a 
significant function. The directors can make decisions and therefore end the contracts of 
the service providers, including that of the investment manager. This circumstance 
might sound a bit radical if one takes into consideration that the investment manager 
typically established the fund. Instead, this is a function of the funds structure, splitting 
the vehicle holding the assets (the fund) from the staff managing then (the principals 
and employees of the investment manager).
106
  
 
The aim of this section was to identify and describe the roles played by the key service 
providers who “make the fund happen” and work together to make sure that the fund 
runs smoothly and successfully and to depict their role from a regulatory and 
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supervisory perspective. In addition to the aspects analysed above, the fund may also 
use, inter alia, other providers such as: placement agents/distributors to solicit 
subscriptions; listing sponsors (if any of the interests in the fund are to be listed), 
auditors and lawyers (often in a number of jurisdictions).
107
 
 
1.10  Concluding remarks 
 
This first chapter aims at providing a critical examination on the modern framework of 
hedge funds. To achieve this, first the definition of hedge funds and then an overview of 
their history are provided. The structure of hedge funds and the parties involved 
together in the investment strategies are analysed in order to offer a common ground for 
understanding hedge funds. The author considered that the detailed explanation of the 
hedge fund framework was necessary to achieve a better comprehension of the reasons 
leading to the situation of non-regulation of the fund himself but the regulation of the 
manager, and as a consequence, the investor protection concept emerged. 
 
From the author’s perspective, in agreement with the remarks of this chapter, until now, 
no widely accepted definition of the “hedge fund” concept was provided. This lack of a 
general definition might be interpreted as an indication of the insuperable difficulties 
inherent in delineating the hedge fund collecting area in a comprehensive manner. In 
this respect, another question arises: if struggling to regulate (one might even use the 
term: “re-regulate”), do hedge funds represent a realistic objective? Meanwhile, such 
argument seems right prima facie. Yet, this line of argument may, after careful 
consideration, unnecessarily focus on reaching a definition of hedge funds before 
submitting them to a fundamental regulatory structure, simultaneously overstating the 
imminent challenges in designing a practicable definition thereof.  
 
In fact, the author’s debate in this chapter concerning the definition of the term “hedge 
fund” advocates the fact that the achievement of this type of definition is not at all 
impossible. In addition, as it is going to be apparent from the debate that is going to be 
carried on later in this thesis, in the fourth chapter, addressing the Member States hedge 
fund regulatory frameworks, there are many examples of this type of frameworks in the 
EU. Therefore, a global definition of hedge funds is urgently needed. The strengths and 
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weaknesses of these regimes come neither from the distinguishing quality nor from the 
comprehensiveness of their definition of “hedge funds” (definition which is, most of the 
times, absent). 
 
Last but not least, the authenticity of this rationale stating that hedge fund regulation 
definitely relies on a previous definition of its topic matter critically arouses the de facto 
aim and the scope of an individual’s regulatory perspective. For example, those 
pleading in favour of the indirect regulation (performed by its managers/brokers) might 
want to challenge the real necessity of an extremely exact definition of “hedge funds”, 
considering this a sine qua non precondition for the endorsement of their 
recommendations.
108
 
 
Apart from the definition issue regarding hedge funds, this chapter argues that there are 
increasing empirical proofs in favour of the increasing challenge that the complexity of 
financial markets poses to regulators, managers and investors. Overall changes 
occurring within the regulatory framework centred on prudential regulation and investor 
and consumer protection make it even more difficult for all the above-mentioned 
parties. The re-thinking of the entire hedge funds’ regulation and disclosure policy is 
therefore considered necessary in order to increase the protection of investors’ interests.  
 
The hedge fund market development so far implies the fact that hedge funds will 
continue to play a significant role within the overall market, even with the ability to 
grow despite the emergence of the financial crisis, the major condition for this being re-
assurance of investor confidence through their increased protection. There are few 
factors certifying the constant asset influx within this industry in the future. Among 
these factors, one can mention: larger profits ensured by hedge funds managers; 
increased availability within pension funds together with various organisational 
investors to make investments within the funds, and the gradual expansion of the 
industry, to retail investors. 
 
Speaking from the client’s profile perspective, which became more and more diversified 
in time, several scholars even depicted hedge funds as the prospective/next “active 
                                                 
108
 Indeed, a much too persistent quest for a conclusive definition might, especially if successful, prove 
counterproductive if it leads to a situation where different types of hedge funds would be homogeneously 
regulated, irrespective of their individual characteristics and, more notably, of their risks and benefits. 
48 
management”109 or, to a lower extent, as the future major issue occurring in the 
investment management.
110
 Starting from this active management, the author of the 
thesis considers that regulators must develop their registration rules and reporting 
requirements, by obtaining from all of these advisers/managers a substantial collection 
of data that needs to help investors and assist the regulatory and examination efforts of 
both the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and the European 
Parliament, in prompting investor-centric regulation and in enhancing the investors’ 
rights protection, by diminishing some of the higher risk behaviour of hedge funds. 
Similarly, the hedge funds industry lost part of the distinguishing details classically 
counting for its light regulation because of the crawling “retailisation” tendency 
together with the industry’s step-by-step institutionalisation. This occurred due to the 
junction between the investment strategies of hedge funds and those of mutual or 
private equity funds. In addition, logical concerns have been expressed about the impact 
of the hedge funds industry increase firstly the overall financial markets, particularly in 
a period affected by high insecurity doubled by disruption, and secondly the many 
potential conflicts of interest and risk factors that are uniquely applicable to hedge funds 
and that affect especially investors. 
 
After reviewing major features of the hedge fund industry, the author of the thesis also 
identified major problems and circumstances that make this field a real threat to 
financial stability, it should be mentioned that although hedge funds contributed to the 
development of the crisis, they cannot be held responsible for it. 
 
As one can notice in this chapter while analysing the hard work associated to risks 
mitigation by means of regulation, the facts gravitate mainly around jurisdiction. At the 
same time, there are duplicated concerns regarding hedge funds: small charges 
connected to zero advertisement. On the one hand, funds are able to select the best area 
of authority so that managers may relocate without problems if a state changes its laws, 
charges or disclosure requests. On the other hand, since the hedge fund market 
represents a source of return for countries, it becomes obvious that no country wants the 
market to shift its jurisdiction, as this actually decreases the regulators’ impact on risks 
mitigation and therefore, investors’ interests protection.  
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This chapter has also reviewed a major dissimilitude between hedge funds and various 
financial institutions, namely the degree of hedge fund failure, which tends to be 
constantly higher. Despite the deficiencies emerging from the lack of accurate data 
regarding the percentage of hedge funds failure, the author argues that these successive 
failures of hedge funds were not those leading to the development of the financial crisis. 
 
Indeed, over the past ten years, the emergence of globalisation, financial innovation, and 
that of deregulation tended to increase the systemic risk potential. Uprising financial 
globalisation offered assistance for financial institutions together with investors in 
trading assets without being conditioned by time zones or national boundaries. All these 
factors should enable risk sharing while increasing market liquidity. Still, the rapidity 
and the horizon that the problems within this market have spread globally emphasise the 
extent to which globalisation, financial innovation, together with deregulation have 
lately increased the systemic risk potential. 
 
However, the author has to acknowledge that the knowledge on hedge funds is still very 
limited. Even if this overview of hedge funds has been revealing, conclusions are 
however relatively delicate to draw because hedge fund managers continue to work in a 
confusing environment, where they are not asked to make their return performance 
systematically available to the public, while being able to potentially manipulate their 
returns for some periods and thus communicate low risk doubled by consistent 
performance. This is one of the reasons why, further on, this thesis will thoroughly 
review each of these rationales and will argue that, from a legislative perspective, the 
protection against systemic risk and the concern for investor protection should be the 
primary goals of any regulatory policy regarding hedge funds. 
 
All in all, direct regulation of hedge funds appears as an unsuitable, inappropriate 
solution, possibly ineffective due to two main reasons: on the one hand, the constant 
delays emerging from reporting and processing the data and, on the other hand, the 
opportunity of hedge funds to move offshore if their purpose is to avoid regulation. In 
this regard, position reporting to withdraw from crowded exchanges could lead to the 
encouragement of moral hazards. Meanwhile, increased transparency regarding 
positions might unintentionally lead to a liquidity decrease, making markets 
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increasingly volatile and at the same time expanding financial insecurity during stress 
periods. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
THE RATIONALES OF HEDGE FUND REGULATION 
 
2.1 Rationales of financial regulation applicable to hedge funds 
 
The vast literature
111
 on the issue suggests that there are three objectives that provide the 
rationale for financial regulation in general and for hedge fund regulation in particular. 
These objectives are: (a) protection of investors, (b) promotion of market integrity, but 
also (c) preservation of financial stability
112
. 
 
As remarked by various observers, such as Sander Van Berkel, Peter Cartwight, Niamh 
Moloney, Phoebus Athanassiou, the above-mentioned aims are connected and overlap, 
in certain aspects. For instance, the provision and insurance of fair, efficient and 
transparent markets need some requirements, which are also used for investor protection  
and mitigation of systemic risk. Similarly, some of the systemic risk mitigation 
measures afford investor protection.
113
 All the above-mentioned principles are being 
addressed in the current chapter, in relation to the apparent validity of their application 
to hedge funds, not only within European borders but also outside Europe. The chapter 
makes a clear organisation of the different sets of regulation applicable to hedge funds 
aiming to protect investors, market integrity and financial system stability. 
 
2.1.1  Investor protection as rationale of hedge fund regulation 
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Investor protection concerns the strand of regulatory attention directed towards making 
sure that investors’ interests are conducted against market failure or unfavourable 
behaviour within institutions possessing investors’ funds. Non-compliance to “investor 
rights” may have so far-reaching results that the investor protection-based law has 
consistently featured amongst the main components of most capital market regulatory 
schemes, with national arrangements differing from one another only in terms of 
pointing out the specific investments that best suit them, based on the information that 
product providers are mandated to disclose by law
114
. There are some factors that turned 
the protection of investors into one of the most visible objectives pursued by financial 
market supervisors and lawmakers worldwide.
115
 Among these, one needs to mention: 
the non-economic
116
, paternal
117
 basis of many of the current financial market 
regulatory frameworks, the public desire for outer (governmental) regulation, together 
with the supervision of private self-regulation (mainly in crucial times of crisis), the 
prejudicial economic results emerging from the “loss of investor confidence in the 
aftermath of market failures”118, but also from the high amount of empirical proof or 
researches stating that there is a causal connection between tighter investor protection 
regulation and financial market increase
119
. This is even more relevant in the context of 
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“institutional investment vehicles”, where, as Franklin Edwards emphasized, investor 
protection represents the top-priority goal of public policy underlying regulation.
120
 
 
Many aspects need to be considered regarding the meaning of hedge fund-specific legal 
transparency requirements for the investor protection-related data. This is because there 
is a lack of a realistic comprehension by (several) investors (mainly less-experienced 
ones) of hedge fund investment strategies and imminent conflict of interests that emerge 
between managers of the fund and individuals investing capital in it. This is to be 
performed even in the EU Member States where hedge fund-specific legal transparency 
requirements are applied. 
 
One must consider the case of single-manager hedge funds regulation based on investor  
protection rights claiming that this premise is highly unrealistic and that the existence of 
relevant barriers might go a long path to approaching whatever legitimate investors 
risks a realistic regulator might have wanted to keep against in this area.
121
 Following 
the example of the US hedge fund situation, despite the huge dimension and the 
absolute relevance of its onshore industry (which surpasses by far the European 
industry), the compulsory transparency actions aiming to protect the investor were not 
considered necessary. This impressive “exempted status” that the American hedge funds 
take advantage relies on the general apprehension that the so-called “accredited” (also 
known under the name of qualified) investors, who owned most of the hedge funds 
industry established somewhere on the Atlantic shore, tend to be highly sophisticated 
and therefore they afford to make professional investment options and bear their costs. 
This makes the protection through regulations pointless. Meanwhile, retail investors are 
protected by the very fact that they denied the access to hedge funds.
122
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However, in some cases, qualified investors may need protective guaranty as well, 
where there is an objective leverage deficiency in setting up their investing conditions 
and in assessing their risk outline.
123
 The promoters of transparency regulations inspired 
by investor protection still have to prove that real investor transparency safeguards can 
be implemented. They have to identify the costs and benefits and their practical 
purpose, taking into consideration the complex framework of hedge fund strategies and 
the flexibility of their investments capable of making sound antique even the most 
comprehensive, mandatory investor transparency data in a de facto short period.
124
  
In addition, good incentives are offered to hedge fund investors to gather the necessary 
information for their self-protection. If they assess the information to be inadequate, 
they have all the rights and power to withdraw their assets and redeem their investments 
(with the exception, maybe, of an extremely long “lock-up” time).125 
 
Public concerns have been expressed as additional grounds for investor protection-
based regulation, regarding the major increase of capital allocations of institutional 
investors in alternative investment products. All the above represent legitimate concerns 
attributed inter alia to the indirect retail investor exposure produced by the 
organisational investor allotments. However, the fact that hedge fund regulation is 
justified or not by these concerns is a different matter.
126
  
 
Despite the numerical increase of organisational investors who assign parts of their own 
liquid assets to hedge funds (they can do this either directly or indirectly, by means of 
the FoHF
127
), increasing pension funds into an international hedge fund industry major 
financial suppliers, institutional investor allocations to hedge funds continued to be 
limited and did not change lately. 
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Without damaging the quantitative dimension of recent institutional investor interest in 
hedge fund investments, at first glance, it seems that however useful the inclusion in the 
regulatory arsenal of basic conflict of interest prevention safeguards might be, a feasible 
solution for the investor protection connected concerns brought about by institutional 
investor allotments to hedge funds stands in their own hands. There is a very relevant 
conflict of interests between pension fund managers, who are ready to take risks in 
order to increase their funds’ returns (and their own compensation, too) and their 
beneficiaries, who have an interest in funds, adopting more conservative investment 
policies. This is an effective institutional oversight and governance mechanism to 
rectify the noticed conflict of interest arising between the managers of a fund and its 
beneficiaries.
128
  
 
This contrast is more an issue for pension fund regulation (or, more properly, for the 
enforcement of existing pension fund-related corporate governance rules) than it is for 
hedge fund regulation. As Franklin Edwards has competently observed “…hedge funds 
are not the source of this conflict, only its latest manifestation.”129 If the problem is 
more relevant to the relationship between pension fund managers (as agents) and 
beneficiaries (as principals), then the appropriate answer is in terms of tighter 
institutional investor governance, so that fund beneficiaries may control fund managers 
more efficiently. 
 
2.1.2  Market integrity and hedge fund fraud as rationales for hedge fund regulation 
 
The protection of market integrity represents the second aspect of regulatory interest in 
the field of financial investments. This occurs as one major determinant concerning 
each investor’s capability to transact the business he/she manages in a transparent, fair 
background, and in the absence of discrimination, manipulative market conduct, secret 
agreements and different abusive conducts.
130
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One cannot underestimate the ramifications of market integrity infringements. Factors 
like the misuse of insider information, “the misevaluation of complex instruments” or 
the predilection manifested by brokers towards specific funds may reduce the investors’ 
confidence but may also lead to the deterring of the business, since either “bona fide 
investors” are deprived of their money or their costs are increased. This can have a 
knock-on effect on market activity.
131
  
 
As the economic relevance of these results might be significant and wide-ranging, 
financial market regulators have issued and enforced scores that are inspired from 
market integrity norms, which focus on the interdiction of insider exchanging together 
with market manipulation, on management of business problems, as well as on the 
governance together with fiduciary assignments of financial intermediaries. Resources 
and initiatives of regulated markets also contribute to maintain market integrity.
132
 
 
The need to make sure that hedge funds cannot control or manipulate markets is, 
undoubtedly, pertinent. The suggestion that market integrity breaches are widespread to 
the hedge fund industry is nevertheless, misleading. Some of the real issues across 
markets are insider information, wrongful appraisals regarding either profit or loss (or 
both), and the incomplete exchange records. These tend to be mainly concentrated in the 
hedge fund industry and consequently, need to be removed from other, tighter regulated 
industries.
133
 
 
Hedge funds have undoubtedly highlighted some shortcomings in the existing market 
integrity protective framework and their operation has added to the urgency of revising 
monitoring mechanisms. However, recent literature states that the occurrence of “insider 
trading and market manipulation” within hedge fund managers tends to be extravagantly 
prominent lately if we consider recent US cases which have resulted in convictions and 
have shown a clear involvement in market manipulation and insider dealing of hedge 
funds.
134
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Also, it seems less probable that hedge funds could include the market integrity threat 
that some appear to believe that they do, if only because, despite the higher incidence, 
amongst hedge funds of more concentrated portfolios, a large part of them are not that 
powerful so that to manipulate prices.  
 
The large hedge funds managers’ tendency for manipulative behaviour towards the 
markets cannot be assumed to be stronger than that of other financial market 
professionals to do so. This is both because the generous financial rewards received by 
the hedge fund administrators capable of generating abusive behaviour represent no 
monopoly of this industry, but also because hedge fund managers cannot simply and 
spontaneously be expected to appreciate their prestige to a lesser extent than their 
counterparts from other financial organisations.
135
  
 
Also, it is worth remembering that laws like those governing insider trading, notifiable 
holdings and share registers are already implemented to all market participants, 
especially to hedge funds and their managers. This means that hedge fund-specific 
market integrity issues can be solved using common tools such as those applied to fraud 
or collusion in the banking or securities field, despite the relative difficulty of providing, 
in the case of hedge funds, evidence to substantiate unlawful conduct, due to the 
insufficient transparency or regulation within the sector and the complexity of its 
trading strategies.
136
  
 
Regarding specifically hedge funds, dealings in tools accepted to enlist in regulated 
markets in the EU, these would fall under the MAD
137
, regardless of the inexistence of 
homogenous hedge fund regulation framework in other respects, they would be 
subjected squarely to the Community law security guarantee together with their 
managers and would be conditioned by very much alike conformity responsibilities just 
like the other industry participants, inter alia regarding market manipulation.
138
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The solution of market integrity problems raised by hedge fund market activities should 
be searched in: (a) the effective implementation of the existing rules rather than in the 
introduction of new ones, devised with hedge funds and their operations in mind and (b) 
the investors’ accomplishment of the regular due diligence checklist suggested by sound 
investing procedures and constant precaution.
139
 
Due to the financial crisis, systemic risk and its importance for stability and economy 
has been re-viewed. Nevertheless, neither systemic risk, nor the intentions to mitigate 
are new. This is the main reason why quite a lot of the reform recommendations 
underline this need for macro-prudential orientation of classical micro-prudential 
regimes. Otherwise said, such new regulatory regimes would not only focus on the 
solvency and other elements (in banking CAMEL) of commercial banks and other 
individual financial institutions (micro-prudential), but would also take into 
consideration the impact of financial institutions’ activities on the financial system and 
real economy (macro-prudential).
140
 
 
In addition, one should take into consideration that at least some of the abuses 
associated with “hedge funds” imply leaks of internal information attributable to 
investment banks, making the receiving hedge fund managers “accomplices rather than 
the chief offenders.”141 After the financial crisis, all financial newspapers pointed 
fingers towards hedge funds, although the crisis must not be attributed to the hedge 
funds sector. They may have contributed to spread the chaos on the financial market, 
but they are not the ones to blame. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, all 
international organisations called for more regulation towards the shadow banking 
sector. Only if hedge funds continue to rely on investment banks for data related to 
market conditions and for the purpose of placing their trades, the “front running”142 
threat to market integrity often associated to these funds is still unapproachable, except 
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through the wider use of electronic trading which becomes accessible only in the 
context of assets, when trade depends on exchanges.
143
 
 
2.1.3  Financial stability as rationale for hedge fund regulation 
 
The protection of the financial system stability
144
, by means of ongoing systemic risk 
mitigation represents the third major motivation concerning financial market regulation 
and its primary objective, as some commentators, such as Phoebus Athanassiou, would 
say.
145
  
 
Generally, active industry participants like hedge funds offer advantages for securities 
industries through liquidity promotion, but also through performance. In addition, they 
can be relevant for financial new products and for the reshuffle of fiscal risk. 
Nevertheless, there are several funds, which just like various highly leveraged 
organisations can throw into confusion or even worse, rupture every financial markets 
operation. Hedge funds were indeed considered causative of excessive but also, at 
certain times, turbulent industry processes emerging within vulnerable financial 
systems.
146
 Many academic researchers considered that hedge funds did not have a 
major significance for the propagation of the financial market crises during the last 
several years.
147
 
 
“Systemic risk” is an ambiguous concept of particular major importance to the financial 
stability rationale. This term has been clearly defined as the occurrence ability of one 
crucial systemic event leading to several connected failures within financial entities, 
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capable to adversely affect most operations of financial markets as systems (and not at 
the level of each of their participants). This capacity may also lead to the deterioration 
of the real economy
148
 by, inter alia, the abruption of payments, the collapse of 
financial markets, the insufficiency of credit supply (market liquidity) and, ultimately, 
the occurrence of conditions favourable to deflation and recession.
149
 
 
A recent report to the G 20 by the IMF
150
, BIS
151
, and FSB
152
, describes the systemic 
risk concept in terms of “the disruption to the flow of financial services as (a) generated 
by a distortion of all parts of the financial system; and (b) capable of causing serious 
negative consequences for the real economy.”153 
 
The following definition of “systemic events” was provided: situations in which 
“…shocks to one part of the financial system lead to shocks elsewhere, impinging in 
turn upon the stability of the real economy.”154 Emphasizing the role of a loss for the 
real economy as a key feature of the economic crisis concept, the CRMPG
155
 identified 
a financial event, which differed from a “systemic event” according to whether or not its 
consequences entail significant damages which hit not only financial systems but also 
real economies
156
. They defined the term as a drop occurring within productive 
investments, subsequent to the decrease in credit provisions, and the loss of balance as 
far as the financial, but also economic activities are concerned.
157
 
 
Some aspects were considered very important in terms of financial stability: recurring 
financial crises during the last two decades, in association with the progressive 
liberalisation (“deregulation”) and increasing integration and interdependence of global 
capital markets. These have progressively shifted the focus of the contemporary 
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regulatory policy debate from micro-prudential (investor-related) to macro-prudential 
(systemic stability-related) issues.  
 
One of most important lessons to be learnt from the economic depression consists of the 
fact that previous financial regulation took exaggerated measures to preserve the 
integrity of private corporations, while it reduced the interdependence between financial 
organisations, not focusing at all on what this interdependence really symbolised in 
terms of systematic security. Essential causes creating systematic insecurity imply: 
“counterparty risk, the risk of default on the part of counterparties to OTC transactions, 
and fire-sale risk.”158 
 
It was Brunnermeier et al. who have asserted the measurement of systemic risks with a 
variable named Co VaR . This is composed of “the value at risk” (VaR ) of financial 
entities depending on other entities which are at risk. A growth of Co VaR  relative to 
VaR  reveals the growth in systemic risks.159 Another group160 proposes that credit 
institutions receive the authority to oversee systemic security. This delegation completes 
the already enforced responsibilities regarding inflation constancy and (for instance, if 
one refers to “the US Federal Reserve”) unemployment mitigation. Several issues must 
be considered in terms of supervising: the analysis of data and information collection 
regarding the asset positions but also risk vulnerability in a standardised form enabling 
the contrast between entities; the public issue of information, subjected to periodic 
intervals which provide a balance between disclosure and transparency goals, but also 
rightful concerns regarding financial innovative techniques, and proprietary business 
models protection; and last but not least, the elaboration of a yearly report on systemic 
security and risk.
161
 
 
Issues involving systemic stability produced a major regulatory impact to date
162
 and 
are likely to provide an ongoing focus of regulatory attention with the increase of 
financial risks within the banking sector.
163
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Hedge fund operations and entities also need to have financial stability, as this is the 
main reason for their coming under the spotlight in much the same way as the other 
financial market participants because of the fact that their operations might have 
undermining effects. The other way around, comparing a hedge fund with an investment 
credit institution, the first one is probably by far the most changing of comparable 
leverage because it may fight the whole financial market by means of its strong 
advantages. Moreover, some funds with an incontestable record of actual performance 
comprising 30% up to 40% returns yearly, most of the time use their managers’ honour 
but also charisma in planning copycat and crowd behaviour.
164
 
 
When addressing the systemic stability risk usually generated by hedge funds, the main 
scenario considered by policy-makers is failure. Instead of the downfall of an individual 
large fund, the collapse of several funds might be more credible and pertinent; 
regardless of their form or features, breaking down during the same period, 
disseminating confusion and alarm throughout the economy, and involving systemic 
risk. The former situation described is called “contagion”. The issues directly related to 
the latter consist of “liquidity risk” (the request of cutting loose investments after some 
important deficit), “risk to counterparties”, and “herding” (possibly unsuccessful 
various funds investing in similar areas). Concerns regarding the fact that market might 
fail from contagion are mainly hypothetical. Only few academic studies on hedge funds 
address systemic risk directly, and neither of them concludes the gravity of the threat, 
nor even provides a definitive measure or assessment.
165
 
 
The previously mentioned so-called “direct” channel which can result in systemic 
contagion has also an “indirect” channel. This channel represents another way for hedge 
funds to affect financial stability, characterised by: “…a forced hedge fund liquidation 
[that] exacerbates market volatility and reduces liquidity in key markets (especially 
where the hedge fund under threat was the prime provider of liquidity).” Systemic 
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correlations between asset classes increase in times of stress and market movements 
amplified by the potential for herding.
166
 
 
The transmission mechanisms of systemic risk are one of the issues debated in a recent 
article by Professor Rosa Lastra
167
 describing how “the channels of contagion or 
transmission mechanisms can be classified into at least four categories [...]: a) the inter-
bank, inter-institution, inter-instrument channel; b) the payment systems channel; c) the 
information channel; and d) the psychological channel.”168 These transmission channels 
contribute to disseminate the systemic risk across the financial markets globally. As 
Professor Lastra explains, “what makes a crisis of a systemic nature is not so much the 
trigger event (causa proxima) but these transmission mechanisms, domestically and 
internationally. If the linkages are strong, the potential for systemic instability increases. 
If the connections are weak, there is less of a threat of systemic risk.”169  
 
The systemic implications of the industry’s operation and its potential to generate, 
precipitate or propagate systemically relevant shocks include three main reasons which 
have recently stepped forward. These are: (a) the public prominence hedge fund failure 
experiences starting with 1998 and the possibility that they reoccur within the next 
future, (b) the ongoing increase of the hedge funds’ segments of the asset management 
industry, together with the insufficiency of accessible data for the public reported in 
their balance sheets, but also the quite recent decrease of the industry profits in 
conjunction with (c) the function and impact of hedge funds within the credit risk 
transfer markets.
170
 This does not consider these guaranteed concerns and the relevance 
of hedge fund late developments for the determination of the applicability of the 
systemic stability rationale of financial regulation to hedge funds. 
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The recent financial crisis of 2007-2009 has led to an increase of regulation regarding 
hedge funds. All international organisations pointed the fingers towards the shadow-
banking sector as being the one to blame for the recent financial crisis. For the reasons 
illustrated above, hedge funds were not to blame, as they spread systemic risk, but they 
did not create it. Thus, two major arguments support this affirmation. On the one hand, 
they were not involved in the forming of the toxic securities at the centre of the crisis 
since they had nothing to do with nonconforming mortgages, as their repackage into 
securities, the bundle of these securities along with other securities as collateral for yet 
other securities, have provided a rating to the structured credit securities or have 
distributed the above-mentioned securities.
171
 On the other hand, there were many 
others that bought the high yield bearing subprime-backed securities and among these 
one can find: pension and mutual funds, insurance corporations, as well as European 
and Asian banks, all having been similarly convinced into buying them.
172
 It is the view 
of the author of this thesis that an increase of regulation towards the hedge fund sector 
will not be the right answer of the shadow-banking problem. Hedge funds should be 
more regulated, but according to certain criteria, more transparency and disclosure 
should be asked to hedge fund managers bearing in mind that the risk of over-regulation 
is high. Private investors will find alternative ways to invest their money. A recent 
example of this statement belongs to the renowned George Soros, who has decided to 
gradually diminish his hedge fund on claims that in the aftermath of “the Dodd-Frank 
Act” there is too much regulation affecting the hedge fund sector in the US. What Soros 
did was to give back money to his investors and establish a family office. According to 
the new “provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act” in the US, a family office will not incur the 
risk of being supervised by the Federal Reserve as the large hedge funds currently may 
incur this risk in the event of being considered a systemically important financial 
institution.
173
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2.2  Regulatory response at international level 
 
A number of official papers have been published in this area. Many of these are 
nevertheless selective or only issue-specific. Not a single comprehensive statement of 
effective regulatory response has yet been produced, as it is still difficult to form any 
overall opinion on the value of the recommendations made to date. 
 
In 1999, in the US, immediately after the 1998 LTCM collapse, “the President’s 
Working Group on Financial Markets” (which has become the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council) released an initial study.
174
 The Working Group issued subsequent 
premises, but also guidance on private pools of capital starting with 2007.
175
 “The Basel 
Committee” had released its first study on credit institution and “Highly Leveraged 
Institutions” (HLIs) in 1999 with a support paper on sound practices and a follow-up 
paper in January 2000
176
. IOSCO issued an initial paper in November 1999, comparing 
work of the Basel Committee with a joint Basel/IOSCO report in 2001.
177
 IOSCO 
issued subsequent surveys in 2006 and 2007 on hedge funds.
178
 In 2005, the “Banking 
Supervision Committee“(BSC)179 issued a separate paper on the vulnerability of EU 
credit institutions “to hedge funds.”180 
 
Similarly, the “Financial Stability Board” (FSB) issued an important document on HLIs 
in 2000, which was updated seven years later. The 2000 report was mainly concerned 
with systemic risk and leverage following the collapse of LTCM in 1998.
181
 The FSB 
recommended mainly a market discipline rather than a direct regulation based approach. 
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Specific recommendations were made on risk management, oversight, disclosure and 
surveillance.
182
  
 
While the 2007 report accepted that substantial improvements had been made in 
prudential supervision and risk management capacity, a number of changes had arisen 
within the hedge fund system a short time ago, while further specific factors increased 
the threat of systemic exposure.  
 
The year 2008 represents a run out period in terms of several strategies involving 
investing, generally strategies which have been exposed to “liquidity risk, high yield or 
equity risk.”183 In terms of regulations, there are two major events: in 2006 the 
“Statement of Financial Accounting Standards” (SFAS) 157 (Fair Value 
Measurements)” was disclosed, enacted one year later in November although it had 
been entirely implemented only another year later (2008). SFAS 157 governs two major 
standards. The first is the fair valuation and norms on the corresponding marking to 
market of illiquid assets. This offers a definition of the fair value, but also of the future 
management regarding fair valuation performances. These require extended disclosure 
regarding fair valuation quantifications.
184
 
 
The implementation of SFAS 157 was postponed mainly due to the 2008 depression. 
The secondary cause of this situation was the decrease of house values, sales decrease, 
Bear Stearns’ incapacity to pay the debts and the wreck of Lehman Brothers at the end 
of 2008. During the last days of September, SEC and the “Financial Accounting 
Standards Board” (FASB) made one collective declaration elucidating “the 
implementation of fair value accounting”, when the securities industries tend to be 
either passive or disorganised. At the same time, they explained that forced liquidations 
do not reflect fair values or an orderly transaction. In addition, in April 2009, the FASB 
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published a certified SFAS 157 update to facilitate mark-to-market norms in cases when 
markets become unreliable or passive.
185
 
 
After the 2008 depression, the discoveries related to Madoff Ponzi scheme and the 
discoveries regarding plenty of declared frauds brought to trial by SEC, it is not difficult 
at all to comprehend the active, increasing the attention of regulators, legislators and 
investors. While the industry press and academic literature have well covered some 
specific features of the Madoff saga, it is of no use to observe that those alleged 
operational risks and their evaluation have been and continue to be a major item within 
the hedge funds sector. At the same time, it will continue to receive scholars’ and other 
stakeholders’ attention.186  
 
Regulation of hedge funds apart from straighter reinforcement for existing laws will 
progress in either one or two directions. Primary, legislators and regulators need to 
continue to directly address hedge fund regulations. “The Dodd-Frank Act” for the US 
and the AIFM Directive for Europe are recently adopted more uptight regulations on 
hedge fund industry. 
 
Other national and industry initiatives have also been continued. The FSA in the UK has 
published several studies regarding hedge funds, prime brokers, retail sales, engagement 
and managers.
187
 A number of speeches have also been given by senior FSA staff on 
hedge funds and hedge funds risks.
188
 The FSA has identified 11 key exposures.
189
 The 
FSA chose not to respond to all exposures as they were not material. An adequate 
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industry response may be available and a further regulatory review was required. The 
FSA would rely on its current risk mitigation response with further immediate action to 
be taken. Over time, further risk mitigation action would be considered. 
 
In the wake of the still ongoing depression, the IMF
190
 argued in its March 2009 GFSR 
that a new and broader perimeter for prudential regulation was needed in order to better 
capture systemic risks and supervision necessary to be extended to previously 
unregulated financial institutions. The IMF also noted that the elements of the “shadow 
banking system”191 would be captured as variables used to proxy systematic risk in 
global financial markets.
192
 
 
Considerable work has been undertaken in order to address financial system stability. 
The “IMF/Bank for International Settlements/Financial Stability Board” Report 
released in October 2009 provides guidelines for the assessment and approach of 
systemic relevance within financial entities, markets but also tools, and moral hazards 
induced.
193
 
 
The interconnectedness issue amongst financial system players is to be addressed 
mainly through broader macro-prudential coverage, and reinforcement of the capital and 
liquidity requirements for the global banking industry. As the financial crisis was 
caused not by the lack of capital, but rather by a liquidity crisis induced by concerns 
about asset quality and transparency, the “Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision”(BCBS) is developing enhanced risk-weighted capital adequacy standards 
(the “Basel III” framework). To strengthen the resilience of banks to loan losses, hybrid 
“Tier 1” capital is to be phased out for more conventional forms of permanent equity 
capital (that is, common shares and retained earnings). More capital will be needed for 
contingent calls on capital arising from derivative instruments. Additionally, the capital 
adequacy framework will incorporate a non-risk weighted (or “simple”) leverage ratio 
intended to identify leverage build-up from any gaming of the capital adequacy rules, 
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and minimum liquidity standards (both short and long-term coverage ratios). 
Considerable attention was paid to pro-cyclicality in bank lending and provisioning 
practices. There are proposals to introduce counter-cyclical capital buffers (building up 
capital requirements under favourable circumstances and dynamic provisioning (relying 
on expectations of losses, rather than on already incurred losses).
194
 
 
Executive remuneration practices which have been blamed for reckless lending and 
excessive risk-taking within financial institutions which precipitated the financial crisis 
have received considerable scrutiny. The FSB Thematic Review on Compensation 
published on 30 March 2010 reviewed the compensation practices (for example, in 
November 2008, UBS (a Swiss bank) introduced a “malus policy” providing for the 
claw-back of bonuses).
195
 
 
Even before the crisis, the operational complexity and potential for fraudulent dealing 
within the burgeoning hedge fund segment had led to increased regulation.
196
 
 
At the inaugural 2008 summit of the “Group of Twenty”, leaders called for the 
development of best practices to enhance transparency, both at market and counterparty 
levels, for hedge funds and other systemically significant financial institutions. The G-
20’s subsequent declaration of the 2nd of April 2009 also favoured increased regulatory 
oversight for hedge funds, and for other private capital pools to improve investor 
protection but also systemic risks management.
197
 
 
IOSCO’s Technical Committee was established in November 2008 and released its final 
report outlining six principles for regulation of hedge funds in June 2009.
198
 Generally, 
hedge fund managers must be registered intermediaries and provide regulators with 
increased disclosure of product leverage, portfolio bets and systemic risk potential. 
Significantly, prime brokers and credit institutions providing finance to hedge funds are 
also ask to provide details of credit exposures to the sector, giving regulators early 
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warnings of systemic risks build-ups and institutional linkages. The requirement for 
lenders to disclose their hedge fund exposures should constrain leverage, and this factor 
(rather than increased transparency of hedge fund bets) is most likely to alter their 
capacity to move markets. However, recent media reports reveal that regulators are 
taking a more aggressive attitude in monitoring their activities.
199
 
 
From an European point of view, the author has to mention that at the end of October 
(29) 2008, the EC implemented a Communication entitled “From financial crisis to 
recovery: A European framework for action”200. The action plan is structured into three 
essential elements, notably an innovative financial market construction as far as the EU 
level is concerned, having to do with the manner in which it affects real economies, an 
international reply to the ongoing crisis.
201
 The above-mentioned Communication was 
followed by a second one sent by the EC to the European Council on November 26, 
2008, “A European Economic Recovery Plan”202. The major aim of this recovery 
scheme is to rebuild the trust of clients, but also that of business, so that to encourage 
them to take loans again, increase foreign investments with the help of the EU 
countries, “create jobs” by hiring the unemployed. The focus of the plan is quite 
naturally on the macroeconomic situation, but it also sets out action at the EU level in 
order to increase infrastructure and major industries investments. The entire package 
equals approximately EUR200 billion, representing 1.5% of the total GDP
203
 of the 
EU.
204
 
 
Regarding more specifically the issue of financial markets and their appropriate 
supervision, the EC created in October 2008 the “Group of high level experts” chaired 
by Mr. de Larosière. The Group was mandated to consider, inter alia, the structure of 
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European financial organisations to guarantee prudential integrity, precise operation of 
industries, and solid European co-partnership regarding financial stability overlook, 
instant alert device, but also crisis management, comprising the management of 
transnational, but also cross-sector risks. The Group presented its Report on February 
25
th
, 2009.
205
 The Report includes thirty-one Recommendations on dealing with the 
causes and effects of the financial crisis at the EU, and at global level. With regard to 
financial supervision in particular, the Report suggests the establishment of a new body 
guided by the “European Central Bank” (ECB), which should identify systemic risks 
and issue binding risk warnings. Regarding the micro-prudential supervision, the Report 
anticipates a two-stage approach. During the first phase, both the role of the existing 
Level 3 Committees, and that of national supervisors must be reinforced. During the 
second phase, the three Level 3 Committees must be changed into the so-called 
Authorities with highly important goals and far-reaching powers as regards cross-border 
financial institutions in the EU. 
 
In addition to the actions outlined above, the EC has initiated a general in-depth 
examination and analysis of the supervising and regulatory set of rules applicable for 
each important actor and participant in the financial markets, comprising hedge funds 
and private equity, concentrating mainly on financial requests, risk management, and 
visibility. The aim of this work is to assess the adequacy of such proposals for the 
guarantee of financial stability within the EU. The results of these primary reflections 
were set out in the Communication towards the “Spring European Council”, entitled 
“Driving European Recovery”, adopted by the EC on March the 4th, 2009. This 
Communication provides the next investigation to the “European Economic Recovery 
Plan” of December (2008), addressing a number of measures in the context of the 
global down-turn of the real economy and the inevitable effects on employment. Under 
the heading “Restoring and maintaining a stable and reliable financial system”, the 
Communication refers to main conclusions withdrawn by De Larosière Group and 
outlines an ambitious time schedule for the adoption by the EC of some legislative 
proposals within the area of financial services, involving the set up of the necessary 
legal framework for a new architecture of the EU financial supervisory system.
206
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It remains to be seen whether future solution will take the form of mere regulatory 
reforms, such as adaptations to and reinforcement of the current framework while 
respecting the existing principles, or regulatory revolution, eventually necessary 
changes to the Treaty. In any case, whatever the legal form and details of the new 
supervisory approach, all actors involved will have to make one compromise or another, 
and they have to manifest a willingness to find rapid solutions to the obvious political 
difficulties that any attempt to move in the direction of more integrated supervision and 
more shared powers at the Community level can be expected to entail. 
 
2.3  Concluding remarks 
 
In this chapter different sets of regulations applicable to hedge funds aiming the 
protection of investors, the market integrity and the financial system stability are well-
grouped and illustrated. 
 
The relevance of economic activities regulation can only be highlighted if the process 
takes into account the risks of market failure, which can be limited by regulation 
without excessively interfering with the associated legitimate advantages. The decision-
making process implies whether (and the manner in which) certain given economic 
activities are supposed to be regulated. During this process, one must also assess not 
only its risks and advantages, how they correspond to one or more of the financial 
regulation rationales, but also whether there is any empirical evidence and a wider, lato 
sensu “philosophical” disagreement regarding the regulation. 
 
Disagreement evidently exists; the question is where does it emerge from? According to 
analyses performed throughout this chapter, this emerges mainly from the highly 
ambiguous role of hedge funds in the financial crisis. Following the crash of LTCM in 
1998, many dealer-banks requested overall collateralisation of hedge fund undertakings. 
In agreement with this, hedge funds used to be less levered as compared to credit 
institutions. Afterwards, the collapse of significant hedge funds, among which one can 
mention Amaranth in 2006, and the major redemptions by investors during but also 
after the crisis which did not lead to systemic problems. Furthermore, hedge funds have 
fewer assets and less leverage as compared to credit institutions. This could diminish 
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the probability that hedge funds might be a causal agent of any future crisis. In the 
absence of the systemic risk threat and of an exact delineation of social externalities 
brought about by hedge funds, the aim of direct hedge fund regulation is not so clear. 
However, in the light of the above-mentioned events, requests for a tighter regulation 
start to make sense, as the supervisors started to face four major issues: investors’ 
protection, transparency, market integrity and risk mitigation. 
 
Regarding the present crisis, the author does not attribute it to the hedge funds. 
However, the blame belongs to hedge funds in terms of their involvement and 
responsibility during the crisis, having turned into a whim for the problems that affect 
many issues regarding financial markets. International regulators examined hedge funds 
closely and to a great extent, and consequently implemented, alongside other measures, 
registration requests, limitations on leverage, and increasing disclosure and transparency 
for protecting  investors. 
 
So far, there has been harsh criticism regarding the new regulation in the Dodd-Frank 
Act due to the fact that it is reactive, but also narrow-minded. Similar criticisms 
emerged also about the AIFM Directive. As already seen, scholars have suggested a 
wide range of possible solutions to address the concerns in the debate on hedge funds 
and hedge fund regulation. Some favour regulatory arbitrage as a measure against 
systemic failure. Other scholars state that the pre-Dodd-Frank Act approach dealing 
with allowing advisers to voluntarily register would be the most effective in this respect, 
proposing an approach based on trust that would let funds having previously earned 
general trust from the public to develop on the grounds of that trust, with less or no 
interference of regulation.  
 
The author argues that this debate on the most suitable type of hedge fund regulation 
appears to be very controversial. The shift of the criteria dealing with hedge funds 
investments, the appointment of one self-regulatory authority, the application of higher 
disclosure criteria to counterparties and the increase of leverage limitation as well as of 
the transparency disclosure are some of the recommendations discussed in this chapter. 
The author continues her argumentation as regarding the benefit of fees from hedge 
funds, regulation of hedge fund creditors and the moderation of the mutual funds 
regulation for the increase of the competitiveness between hedge funds. 
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Thus, the author of this thesis states that hedge funds regulators worldwide face an 
increasing dichotomy. The major concern of the regulators is the investors’ protection in 
conjunction with making sure that the industry is operating properly. With this in mind, 
regulators try not to tightly regulate the industry while tailoring measures and 
recommendations for avoiding systemic risks.  
 
One very frequently mentioned argument of individuals against each type of external 
intervention in the industry processes is that not all types of regulation are compatible 
with the hedge fund industry basic role and characteristics. This is the main reason to 
presume that regulation would be bound to affect negatively their development and 
performance, not in terms of the imminent growth in compliance costs entailed by its 
introduction. 
 
Other often cited argument opposing to regulation of the industry consists of the fact 
that normative compulsion might dissuade hedge funds or their managers from locating 
in the EU, forcing them to leave Europe in order to find locations that are more 
“favourable”. In the event that this might happen, the argument further develops as 
follows: regulatory arbitrage
207
 would be reinforced and the sector’s effective 
supervision diminished. Finally, the argument continues as regulating the industry 
would not serve a meaningful function, as the purpose of each normative initiative 
would prove unsuccessful in covering offshore hedge fund jurisdictions, regardless of 
the “extra-territorial” nature of its consequence. 
 
On the other side, a professor experienced in financial law notes that: “We should also 
beware of the excesses of regulation and the dangers of over-regulating a given sector or 
type of institutions, creating incentives for businesses to move outside the regulatory 
framework. Any regulatory perimeter brings its own shadows and loopholes”208. 
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Considering the arguments stated above in this chapter, hedge fund regulation appears 
not only as a necessity, but also as a wise issue. From the author’s point of view, 
moderation and good sense should prevail, and therefore, nothing would come to 
indicate that this kind of implementation could prove unfeasible. There is one major 
aspect that should not be overseen: if this emerging chance to eventually implement 
harmonised norms applicable to on-shore hedge funds had been offered as a 
consequence of an important European or global financial crisis a priori their operation 
and if its norms had not been the result of observation but rather, the outcome of 
extreme hurry, together with urgency in the aftermath of the disorderly unwinding of 
the positions of one or more hedge funds, it is likely that moderation or sound 
judgement would not prevail within their structure. Moreover, the regulatory process 
could become a scapegoat to the caprices of political tensions, together with the 
vagaries of public perceptions regarding the image of ideal hedge fund regulatory 
overview.
209
 
 
Current efforts aiming at regulating hedge funds through their registration with 
regulators together with requesting disclosure of pertinent data might aid minimizing 
moral hazard, social externalities, and systemic risk that the hedge fund industry is 
generating, making all the efforts to improve investor protection. So far, hedge funds’ 
involvement in the ongoing financial crisis is still not clear. In this respect, 
dissymmetric hedge fund regulation emerging from the Dodd-Frank Act together with 
the AIFM Directive becomes in the author’s perspective disadvantageous and even 
undermining, this requiring a global regulation of hedge funds with major attention on 
investor protection.  
 
From a global point of view, the AIFM Directive might develop incentives for 
regulatory arbitrage, might lead to retaliatory action by states from outside the EU and 
might lead to the achieving of an appropriate level of investor protection. In the long 
term, this might prove counterproductive for the competitiveness of the EU alternative 
investment community in conjunction with financial markets in Europe, while keeping 
an adequate standard of protection of investors’ interests. In this regard, the author of 
the thesis considers that investors would benefit in terms of protection from the AIFM 
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Directive mainly because of the disclosure and operational requirements that it 
stipulates. Thus, this disclosure would not only provide investors with up-to-date 
material data about their funds, but at the same time would also offer features of the 
potential conflicts of interests and risk factors the investors could be subjected to. 
 
In the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC received the authorisation from the Congress to adopt 
norms in order to interpret the exemptions for hedge funds. The SEC needs to use its 
discretion to provide the vital-needed guiding. In the author’s opinion, many of the 
regulatory dilemmas in the AIFM Directive, but also in the Dodd-Frank Act might have 
been prevented or even entirely avoided if the Basel Committee had introduced a fee for 
credit institutions’ lending exposure to hedge funds. Basel III capital requests that credit 
institutions implement a fee for banks’ assets according to their systemic risk 
contribution. The Basel III measure for hedge fund lending exposure could have been 
associated with a focus on the exposure of credit institutions to complex financial 
products. This might prove of great benefit in addressing the connection between 
market failure in terms of financial instruments, and in augmenting the significance of 
hedge funds within the market for financial instruments.  
 
Due to these reasons, the author acknowledges the cross-border nature of the hedge 
funds sector and therefore the need to create a harmonised international hedge funds 
regulation regime. 
 
As a concluding remark, the governments, central banks, but also every regulating 
authority need to choose between the effectiveness of a regulation, on the one hand and 
the price implied in complying with it, on the other hand. As far as the hedge funds 
sector is concerned, an investment area careful to watchdogs after decades of being 
unregulated, regulators will have to convince fund managers that a continuous free 
in/out data flow, together with open communication are of major importance, and that 
active intervention will occur if market stability and investor protection are at risk. 
 
Therefore, the greatest challenge that regulators will have to face is finding an ideal 
suitable manner to increase compliance in conjunction with investors’ protection 
without forcing hedge fund managers to move to unregulated jurisdictions. 
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In the author’s opinion, the trend towards the new architecture of financial regulation 
has three similar ways with important different characteristics referring to the US, the 
UK and the EU financial regulatory frameworks. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
REGULATION OF HEDGE FUNDS IN THE EU 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
As the primary source of harmonised rules relevant to hedge funds, the current 
European regulatory framework representing comprises: the “Undertakings for 
Collective Investment in Transferable Securities” (UCITS) Directives and the “Markets 
in Financial Instruments Directive” (MiFID) together with the “Alternative Investment 
Fund Managers” (AIFM Directive). The following sections examine how the 
contemporary UCITS Directives from the first until its last version UCITS V, and the 
MiFID and AIFM Directives together with a number of other Community legal acts, 
could affect first of all, investor protection, then, the marketing and distribution of 
hedge fund shares and units and the activities of their managers and last, the shaping of 
the European hedge fund industry’s regulatory future as a result of their evolution and 
implementation. Hence, the major aim of this chapter is to study the latest evolutions in 
terms of regulatory integration of the EU economic market analyzing mainly the 
protection  of investors’ rights. 
 
This chapter is organised as follows: first, it explains the dynamics of the financial 
security structure within the EU in connection to the European regulatory framework, 
more precisely, an overview of the UCITS Directives, focusing on investor protection. 
This section also explains the European law evolution from the single market concept, 
the Single European Act, to the Lamfalussy framework and De Larosière Report. 
 
The next section deals with valuable information learned from the financial crisis, it 
addresses the main recent regulatory reforming trends and assesses investor’s interests 
protection, but also the UCITS Directives. The third part presents the UCITS IV 
Directive and the proposed UCITS V Directive. The fourth section presents a critical 
overview of “the AIFM Directive”. The fifth and the sixth parts focus generally on the 
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MiFID Directive components in relation with funds regulation. The analysis of the 
AIFM Directive approved in the turmoil of the recent financial crisis is valuable in order 
to comprehend the new rules regarding hedge funds in the European market. The impact 
of this Directive on the hedge fund sector and particularly on investor protection is the 
main reason for the author’s decision to provide an overview of the critical evaluation of 
the Directive. This review includes also several critical analyses, which exceed the mere 
presentation of the legislative integration operation. After examining other sources of 
Community legal rules regarding the protection of investing parties within the 
regulation of hedge funds, the chapter ends with some concluding remarks. Due to the 
fact that the progressing depression is most likely to govern the future rounds of 
regulatory integration, several major compulsory challenges will be outlined in the last 
part.  
 
The chapter points out that the major objective of the reform is in line with that of the 
thesis theme, namely the creation of uniform market conditions across the EU (although 
the thesis addresses the making of uniform market conditions at the international level), 
by increasing investor protection, investor confidence and the safeguard of the UCITS 
market integrity worldwide. 
 
3.2 The European regulatory framework: an overview of the UCITS Directives 
 
The regulatory integration includes several phases. The first lasts until 2001, and this is 
the single market phase, followed by the harmonisation process and afterwards by the 
shift to a collective admission procedure. Still, during the same year, the Lamfalussy 
process occurred, which represented a significant “institutional innovation within the 
EU”210.  
 
Secondly, until the adoption of the Lamfalussy procedure, the EU policy focused on the 
adoption of directives stipulating regulatory rules, but the supervision necessity 
appeared with the Lamfalussy procedure. The Lamfalussy committees set up a 
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regulatory framework and engaged in the supervisory practices process that would 
ensure the consistent enforcement of EU regulations in all EU Member States.
211
 
 
Thirdly, the thesis also considered the crisis management. “A High Level Group” 
presided by Jacques De Larosière was established by the “European Commission” (EC) 
in October 2008. This group had the power to propose recommendations to improve the 
EU financial supervision arrangements in the context of the financial crisis.
212
 
 
This subsection is structured chronologically and follows the phases presented above. 
For the general overview of each regulatory phase, relevant regulatory policy contexts 
were summarised and the most important directives approved during the given period 
were noted. Exclusive consideration was given to the Lamfalussy procedure and to the 
De Larosière Report. 
 
The author starts her analysis with the single market concept, initiated in 1985, when 
the EC’s White Paper introduced the single market approach to financial services213. 
This document included political availability to undertake economic reformation, in the 
sense of market liberalisation, and additional market integration in the EU.
214
 Later on, 
the framework for EMU
215
 and the single currency framework were developed by the 
Maastricht Treaty of 1992. This also involved the establishment of the ECB and the 
“European System of Central Banks” (ESCB).216 
 
In the summer of 2000, the Lamfalussy Committee issued several assessments 
regarding the regulatory adoption for securities as “mechanisms for regulating securities 
markets and practices to ensure: timely adjustments, faster convergence and better 
cooperation.”217 
 
The Lamfalussy Committee distinguished between the legislation framework and its 
enforcing rules and the reallocated responsibility for each of them, by a four-level 
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governance mechanism. They include old and new bodies, which would eventually 
determine the implementation of better communication between the EU and the national 
bodies dealing with financial regulations. This process was introduced in 2001 in the 
securities field. Four years later, it expanded to banking and insurance.
218
 Due to “the 
Lamfalussy” report, a new European regulatory framework regarding the single 
financial market was set up in 2003. The current organisational framework would 
represent the basis of this regulatory system and this would not involve any abilities 
transfer or any Treaty alteration.  
 
The High-Level Group
219
 appointed by the EC, issued a report on the 25
th
 of February 
2009
220
, recommending 31 measures necessary to establish the “European Financial 
Supervisory Architecture.” Accordingly, EC221 (2009) proposed the reform of “the 
European financial supervisory” framework, with the implementation of two pillars: 
Pillar I – “European Systemic Risk Council” (ESRC)” and Pillar II – the “European 
System of Financial Supervisors” (ESFS). 
 
Even nowadays, EU Member States have a decentralised prudential monitoring, based 
on the home-country supervision key element, combined with prior regulatory 
harmonisation-related mutual recognition.
222
 
 
The 4
th
 Framework Directives of the Lamfalussy Process represented one step forward 
in pledging for an effective and active operation of the EU’s securities sector. Several 
directives and regulations have been enacted since and further shifts have been proposed 
by now.  
 
“The UCITS”223 represents a group of “European Directives” whose purpose is to let 
“Collective Investment Schemes” function within the EU without restriction due to one 
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“authorisation” provided by a Member State. Indeed, several Member States have 
introduced secondary regulatory requirements limiting the independent process of hedge 
funds so that to ensure the protection of local asset managers.
224
  
 
This subsection of the chapter provides an overview of the UCITS Directives 
framework as the author will first explain its origins and evolution until the UCITS IV 
version of the directive. UCITS II refers to the UCITS reform from the ‘90s that was 
never adopted. Several scholars considered “that the management company directive 
was UCITS II with the product directive as UCITS III
225”. A separate subsection is 
dedicated to the latest version of the directive, the proposed UCITS V Directive now, 
promoting significant changes to the UCITS framework. 
 
The original UCITS I Directive aimed to integrate the European sector for investment 
funds, with advantages for investors, and expansive entrepreneurial advantages for asset 
managers. One main priority was to enable the distribution of a previously authorised 
fund within an EU country in another country. A “product passport” was 
implemented.
226
 The regulation of investment services would be dominated by the 
regulatory passport in the securities regulation field, using the UCITS I Directive as a 
model.
227
 
 
Three main ideas influence the financial governance of the EU: “harmonisation of rules, 
mutual recognition and national supervision.”228 Home country control and the single 
passport are the key pillars accompanying harmonisation and mutual recognition.   
 
From an organisational point of view, some academicians pointed out that supervisory 
authorities’ collaboration represented a normal repercussion after the establishment of 
similar norms at the EU level. This is mainly due to the existence of a necessity to 
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implement EC
229
 norms uniformly, and secondary, to the growing number of 
transnational exchanges motivations for cross-border mutual actions to prevent 
undertaking from breaking away of prudential surveillance.
230
 
 
Theory proved different from practice because of the particular marketing standards 
from every EU state, leading to impediments for UCITS cross-border marketing. 
Moreover, the restrictive manner of defining investments enabled UCITS to reduce their 
overall marketing possibilities. New proposals were released in the 1990s to correct the 
1985 Directive in harmonisation of European regulations. Although they lead towards 
the making of a draft UCITS II Directive, these debates were not continued because 
they were excessively ambitious at that moment when the Council of Ministers could 
not reach a common viewpoint.
231
 
 
In the summer of 1998, more precisely in July, the EC released an innovative 
recommendation, which included two sections (a product and a service provider 
recommendation), meant to rectify “the 1985 Directive”, adopted in December 2001 
(“UCITS III”). This is composed of: 
 “Directive 2001/107/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of Europe” (also known as “the Management Directive”); 
  “Directive 2001/108/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of Europe (also known as “the Product Directive”). 
 
The first intends to offer “the European passport” to the fund corporations, in order to 
provide them the ability to freely perform inside the EU, thus expanding previously 
permitted processes. Similarly, it introduces another concept: that of a “simplified 
prospectus”, defined as a form made easier for assisting the transnational selling of 
UCITS all over Europe.”232 
 
Both the above-mentioned directives were designed to improve investor protection by 
regulating the management companies managing UCITS and by enhancing the 
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regulation of UCITS, under the form of investment entities designating the same 
management entity. Based on Article 47(2), its primary purpose, however, was the 
implementation of management company market access conditions, operating controls 
and prudential safeguards.
233
 
 
The core scope of the “Product Directive” consists in removing transnational limitations 
for the exchange of collective investment funds units by enabling them to invest in a 
larger system of financial tools.  
 
Currently, products similar to hedge funds have the possibility to acquire pan-European 
passports. This is available now through the adoption of UCITS III among the EU’s 
regulations. This simple fact that such passport is available ought to diminish 
significantly all impediments towards cost-effectiveness retail transnational distribution 
of these products.
234
 
 
The UCITS III Directive aims to promote the free movement of collective investment 
schemes and to make it easier for a CIS
235
 located in an EU country to trade its units in 
other EU countries. Article 47(2) EC (former Article 57(2) EC), setting the basis of the 
Directive is part of the Treaty’s free-movement structure and it is designated to facilitate 
the freedom of establishment. 
 
The Directive stipulates that UCITS can be established in two forms: investment 
companies or unit trusts
236
, depending on whether they are in a corporate form. Three 
entirely individual entities compose a unit trust under the Directive: the capital rose 
from unit-holders; the management company administering the trust’s assets and 
marketing the trust; and the depositary with custody of the trust’s assets.  
 
Greater inter-relations of securities markets are fostered by the Directive, by granting a 
UCITS regulatory passport to act cross-border in the EU (in host Member States), 
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without further regulations except the local marketing rules, if authorised by the 
Member State of its location (home of the EU Member) according to the Directive. 
Article 4(1) provides that a UCITS is unable to perform any activities without previous 
authorisation from the EU country where it is located. Once the authorisation is granted, 
it is available for all Member States.  
 
3.3  Regulation of hedge funds and the UCITS regime 
 
The main goal established by “the UCITS Directive” resides in providing an universal 
regulatory context capable of enabling harmonised and open-ended CIS, hence 
facilitating the “free” pursuance of business within the EU and the marketing of their 
shares or units. This can be performed based on a single authorisation issued by the 
competent “home” Member States authorities. This effect of the UCITS “product 
passport” was undermined through the diverging interpretation and implementation by 
its addressees with regard to several of its provisions on the one hand, and through the 
lack of a unified marketing regime, on the other hand, with severe restrictions pertaining 
the type of assets that UCITS could invest in the diverse Member State and tax regimes 
for retail funds. As a result, the ensemble of such provisions has led to the obstruction 
of the establishment of an effective Single Market for designated asset management 
products.  
 
In the early 1990s, the proposals issued by the EC to help overcome these 
shortcomings
237
 did not reach their scope until January 2002, when the European 
Council finally approved two modernising directives: “the Product Directive”238 and 
“the Management Directive”239 (jointly, “UCITS III”).  
 
A major effect of the Product Directive has been the extended scale of eligible UCITS 
investments, and consequently of those UCITS funds marketed on a cross-border basis. 
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The introduction of the Management Directive, on the other side, has brought about a 
single “European passport” providing the UCITS management companies the 
possibility to expand activities in EU countries, others than those of their establishment, 
subject to conditions similar to those applicable to investment services firms under the 
Investment Service Directive.
240
 
 
Notwithstanding the increase in the list of UCITS investments, the combination of 
individual strategic mechanisms pursued by alternative investment vehicles under the 
UCITS roof, the theoretical similarities between UCITS and non-harmonised funds, and 
the gradual convergence of their respective investment strategies
241
, hedge funds 
continue to be excluded from the harmonised funds’ framework. 
 
The present version of the UCITS III discipline does not allow genuine short 
positions
242
, preventing the establishment of onshore, UCITS - compliant hedge fund-
type vehicles. Consequently, the UCITS framework might influence the European 
hedge funds in light of its evolution impetus and subsequent indirect 
“institutionalisation” of investments in onshore hedge funds. The main implication of 
the UCITS funds investment discretion widening is indirect, with the lately regulatory 
modifications having brought within the reach of UCITS fund managers derivatives 
trading and, indirectly, leverage, enabling them to offer retail investors partial benefits 
of sophisticated portfolio diversification (through funds of hedge funds investing) and 
higher returns promises (through recourse to derivatives)
243
. 
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Recent surveys regarding definition of UCITS “eligible assets”, further to Article 2 of 
the product Directive, outlined an insertion opportunity of additional hedge fund-related 
features in the revised UCITS framework.
244
 Moreover, they highlighted ways to 
distribute indirectly non-harmonised products, like hedge funds, on an EU-wide basis, 
as eligible UCITS assets. One must also specify that the definition of eligible assets was 
considered one of the most problematic part of UCITS III
245
, this being the main reason 
for the adoption of a Commission implementing directive to address this weak point of 
the revised harmonised funds’ framework.246  
 
Although the original scope did not relate to hedge funds, the “Committee of European 
Securities Regulators” CESR) (now substituted by the newly created “European 
Banking Authority” (EBA) operating as of the 1st of January 2011) – already involved in 
the Directive implementation process of the EC – examined the issue of the inclusion of 
credit derivatives in the amended UCITS framework
247
 and, more significantly for the 
purpose of the present research, of hedge fund indices (HFIs)
248
. Despite the fact that 
the Product Directive acknowledged “index tracking” as a legitimate investment 
management option for UCITS funds
249
, in its last recommendation on the 
understanding of concepts regarding “eligible assets for UCITS” investments, CESR 
reserved its viewpoint on the issue of their eligibility as UCITS-compliant “financial 
indices.”250 Such instance was subsequently approached in a CESR “issues paper”251, 
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whose publication has led to a consultation addressing the criteria under which HFIs 
might be subjected to UCITS III definition regarding “financial indices.” However, in 
its feedback statement, CESR did confirm HFIs as eligible assets in case they fulfil the 
common criteria specified by Article 9 of the Directive 2007/16/EC
252
, with several 
secondary requirements concerning index methodology and information disclosure. The 
implications of the increase of the HFIs from UCITS funds must be understood by the 
remainder of the analysis, first for the investing policy of harmonised funds and second, 
for the larger acceptability of the onshore hedge fund industry. 
 
3.4  The UCITS IV Directive 
 
UCITS IV stands as a major step forward to the achievement of a single market for 
financial products. This might change the asset management industry in a manner 
similar to that of MiFID changing the broker-dealers and investment credit 
institutions.
253
 Since 1985 when they appeared, until their later modifications six years 
later, UCITS funds have turned into an international brand, as they became well known 
for their adjustability and reliability.  
 
Today, the organisational structure of the European fund market is sub-optimal. For 
instance, there were 36,935 UCITS funds in Europe in 2009 (according to EFAMA
254
). 
Still, the medium size of the European fund market reached USD183 million, this being 
very little compared to American mutual funds, which was USD1,269 million according 
to the Investment Company Institute. Similarly, more than 65% of the net assets of the 
European funds/sub-funds reached maximum EUR50 million. This amount represented 
less than a third of the medium worth held by an American fund.
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The new measures included in the UCITS IV Directive will enable the freely operation 
of asset managers within Europe based on a single authorisation received from an EU 
Member State. Accordingly, the aim of the UCITS IV is the increase of the 
efficiency/investor protection as well as of the flexibility of the European fund industry, 
reducing administrative burden at lower total costs.
256
 The figure below presents the 
three objectives and five topics of UCITS IV: 
 
Figure 3.Objectives and topics of UCITS IV 
 
By its five essential measures, the Directive will favour fund mergers and master-feeder 
structures on the one hand, and will enable centralised fund management throughout 
Europe on the other hand. At the same time, this will also shorten the time available for 
asset managers to inform regulators of new products.  
 
Since 2005, market conditions have significantly changed. Due to the serious ongoing 
crisis, the worth of equities and of other asset structures greatly decreased. Complicated 
financial products became clearer, risk was avoided and opportunistic alternative 
investments were much looked for. Currently, pressure is placed on asset managers who 
earn less as subscriptions slow down, assets perform inappropriately, while expenses 
increase. An expenses-cut simulation alone is not enough. Asset managers are forced to 
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reposition themselves strategically, but they must also restructure their expenditure 
base.
257
 They have to consider the best practices of using the new legislation.  
 
UCITS IV provides support to asset managers in reshaping their fund strategy. The 
Directive provides not only the reduction of costs, but also “new business opportunities: 
in cross-border fund distribution and leveraging the UCITS vehicle for fresh investment 
strategies.”258 Asset managers have to make important decisions regarding the classes of 
investors they should pay attention to, either within or outside the EU.
259
 
 
The definition of the new UCITS Directive’s depositary importance does not change 
from that of UCITS III, as this still remains in the fund’s domicile. Additionally, their 
role has been emphasized in the light of current considerable credit institution failure 
and fraudulent activities. Hence, the EC’s AIFM Directive tends to impose that a 
depositary employment for every particular fund is necessary, not only for UCITS. 
Those debates can lead to an increase of the degree of the depositaries’ liabilities, which 
might further result in higher costs. The “AIFM Directive’s depositary returns create at 
present intense debate in the alternatives industry.”260 
 
As stated above, the forth version of the UCITS Directive represents a courageous move 
to a single market for financial products from Europe. Every measure gathered in the 
provisions of the Directive under debate has been meant for the reinforcement of the 
competitiveness of the hedge funds industry in Europe.
261
 The buy-side is going to 
change, in a similar manner as the “MiFID” made for the sell-side. The transnational 
distribution of funds and activities represents the Directive’s key concept. This should 
enable the transnational distribution of funds
262
, and it should also ensure higher 
protection to the investor. 
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3.4.1  The management company passport 
 
Another important measure to increase efficiency enforced by the UCITS IV Directive 
refers to the asset management entity Pan-European passport. This passport enables a 
management company to provide the UCITS funds a wide variety of collective portfolio 
services, while these funds are registered in a different EU country, without necessarily 
being entirely set up in another EU country. There are two ways to do this. The first is 
on a full/remote basis. The second is through setting up a secondary office where the 
UCITS are domiciled. Regardless of the chosen option, the management company will 
be forced to move not only the managerial, but also the accounting departments to the 
UCITS domicile location. 
 
The controlling responsibilities need to split between the home regulator of the 
management firm and that of the fund, as below: 
 
(i) The regulator in the UCITS fund home location will control all facets 
related to the authorisation, and operation of the fund; 
 
(ii) The compliance of the management entity to all rules of its EU home 
country is compulsory;  
 
(iii) The compliance of the management company regarding all facets from the 
administrative and accounting tasks to the regulations of the fund’s 
domicile, comprising those related to the net asset valuation is 
compulsory.
263
 
 
3.4.2  “Master-feeder fund structures” – pooling 
 
“Master-feeder structures” are meant to bring an increase to the performance of the 
sector, by reducing the products selling cost made possible by the large size of the 
business. The performance is also increased by pooling of master as well as feeder fund 
assets. A secondary advantage resides in fostering cross-border funds trade. The feeder 
fund is forced to invest minimum 85% of its assets in entities of a single master UCITS 
fund, while the rest of 15% must be placed in other current assets or derivative 
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instruments, excepting the case when the derivatives tend to be employed for hedging. 
In addition, it is compulsory that master funds are UCITS funds, as these do not have 
permission to be another feeder funds. Similarly, master funds do not have permission 
to invest in/hold units in feeder funds. Besides, “the investors in the master fund can be 
feeder funds and/or direct unit holders of the master fund.”264 
 
3.4.3  Key investor information 
 
The simplified prospectus needs to be replaced for the improvement of investor 
protection through better cost disclosures. 
The new proposal stipulates that the asset management company has not only to 
disclose a paper of two pages containing “Key Investor Information”(KII) expressed in a 
nontechnical manner, in the specific language employed by the distribution state, but 
this needs to be intelligible so that the investors are enabled to draw comparisons. 
Therefore, this KII needs to be “clear, understandable and not misleading.”265 
 
3.4.4  UCITS supervision 
 
Wishing to eliminate administrative barriers and interruptions, and to make sure that all 
instruments are applicable, this new Directive brings around complex proposals to 
increase collaboration between national and overseas authorities. For instance, they are 
adopting proposals such as instant examinations, but also checks and a process for 
transferring data between regulators. Therefore, regulators are able to exercise 
surveillance but also examine powers, in cooperation with other officials, through 
delegation or via the regulatory system. The author’s firm opinion is that, if nothing 
were done on harmonising the regulation of hedge funds, investor confidence in the 
safety of assets invested through a collective investment vehicle would remain 
shattered. 
 
The UCITS supervision aims to address lessons learned from the financial crisis , 
relating mainly to the Madoff incident which highlighted several issues dealing with the 
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inconsistency of regulation existing between “Member States” in enforcing the 
provisions of the UCITS Directive. 
 
 
3.4.5  Conclusions 
 
The UCITS IV Directive is meant to lead to the performance development of the asset 
management industry for the increase of EU competitiveness. Undoubtedly, the 
Directive will lead to a change of the present situation of asset management firms, as 
these are structured in vertical set-ups to a structure where the set-ups are rather pan-
European, centralised but also horizontal. Currently, asset managers distributing in six 
EU states, are forced to have six different management firms, administer six different 
funds and employ six various depositaries. According to UCITS IV, this situation 
changes as for the same distribution coverage, a single management entity, two funds, 
two feeder funds or four depositaries may be owned by the same asset manager.
266
 
 
Advantages for asset managers will differ from one state to another in terms of asset 
manager entrepreneurial standard and dimension. Alternatives will flourish coming 
from different markets influenced by the local community and tax system. Asset 
managers need to know how to consider their investors’ needs and their own 
organisations’ features when approaching each country. Each country will continue to 
have specific accounting rules, tax treatment and regulatory reporting and that is exactly 
why the regional monitoring of asset-servicing providers is going to be highly 
pursued.
267
 
 
Asset managers need to take advantages from the UCITS IV Directive, and therefore 
they need to approach it from a strategic point of view. First, if they deal not only with 
UCITS but also with non-UCITS, they need to focus on resemblances as well as on 
dissimilarities brought forth by the AIFM Directive and the UCITS Directives, in order 
to enable regulatory arbitrage. Besides, local knowledge should not be underrated. Most 
of the time, a global view but also a local expertise is needed in order to choose the 
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adoption of the best strategy, no matter if the asset manager is developing across - or 
rationalising in – Europe. 
 
Further on, the Legislative framework of UCITS IV will be presented as a timeline:
95 
 
 
Figure 4. Legislative framework UCITS IV 
Source: ALFI, 2012, author's analysis  
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The EC newly published consultation document dating from 26 of July 2012, “Product 
Rules, Liquidity Management, Depositary, Money Market Funds, Long-term 
Investments”, recognises that there were several measures introduced under UCITS IV 
that do not operate as expected. In this respect, through this consultation paper, the EC 
emphasizes some specific areas where further enhancement may be appropriate, inter 
alia: (a) recommending more detailed organisational norms for self-managed 
organisations; (b) some modifications to the dynamics of operating master feeder 
structures;(c) certain changes to the mechanics of operating fund mergers; and (d) 
several improvement revisions of the transnational notification procedures. 
 
3.5  The proposed UCITS V Directive 
 
Towards the middle of the year 2012, more precisely in July, a recommendation for 
reviewing the UCITS regime was published by the EC concerning depositary functions, 
payment principles but also penalties concerning the UCITS (UCITS V). 
 
Overall recommended proposals in addition to the already existing UCITS regime are 
directed towards the lessons learned from the financial crises, especially connected to 
the Madoff’s fraud, which revealed several problems concerning lack of consistency 
between the Member States regarding the application of the UCITS Directive 
provisions. The main goal related to the reform consists in creating uniform market 
facilities within the EU, thus generating the increase of the investors’ protection, which 
leads to the increase of the investors’ reliability but also to the UCITS sector’s integrity 
protection at international level. 
 
The UCITS V Directive has the purpose to adapt the UCITS to the depositary and the 
AIFM Directive provisions regarding the remuneration and to contain a harmonised 
clearance framework. The harmonised UCITS policy overlooked the fundamentals of 
remuneration and sanctions compatible with other financial services fields. 
 
Thus, there are several main objectives of the UCITS V Directive, respectively: (a) clear 
understanding of the “UCITS depositary’s functions” and “liability in circumstances 
where assets are lost in custody, (b) rules governing remuneration policies which 
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UCITS will be obliged to introduce and (c) the harmonisation of the minimum 
administrative sanctions regime across the Member States.”268 
 
The UCITS V legislative timeline is as it follows: 
 
Figure 5. UCITS V legislative timeline 
Source: author’s analysis 
 
During the summer of 2012, on the 26
th
 of July, the EC issued a consultation paper 
under the name of “Product Rules, Liquidity Management, Depositary, Money Market 
Funds, Long-term Investments”. This paper would improve, by means of adjustment, 
every further amendment to the UCITS regime forming at the same time the basis of 
“UCITS VI” to build on and revise the newly introduced UCITS IV, as well as the 
forthcoming UCITS V. 
 
The above-mentioned consultation represents the beginning of a process for UCITS 
regime shifts whose process of becoming effective would last at least two years (or even 
more). However, one should take into account that there is a certain disillusion in the 
industry regarding the forthcoming changes to the UCITS regulation recommended by 
the EC before the completion of the UCITS V Directive. Nevertheless, a positive part of 
this initiative consists of the fact that the EC formulated this initial stage of UCITS VI 
as a consultation, asking questions on ways of enhancing the present model. Still, the 
industry participants are presumably inclined to judge severely and find faults. On the 
other hand, the result might indeed produce positive outcomes that favour the industry 
in conjunction with investors. 
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3.5.1  Depositaries 
Eligibility Criteria 
The present UCITS overview does not offer much clarity regarding those entities which 
are allowed to behave like UCITS depositaries and therefore gives a certain degree of 
discretion to the Member States in this regard. This has led to divergent approaches 
across the EU. The UCITS V Directive draft provides that only two types of companies 
are going to be capable of acting as UCITS depositaries, respectively:  
(i) EU certified banks; 
(ii) investment entities authorised by MiFID, which provide safekeeping and 
administration services. The draft contains a two-year grandfathering period 
during which UCITS will be allowed to use a non-compliant depositary. 
However, these provisions are not final and the funds industry intends to 
propose additional eligible depositaries categories to be included as per the 
AIFM Directive and the Irish Central Bank’s rules for UCITS and non-
UCITS. 
 
3.5.2  Delegation of custody 
 
Nowadays, UCITS invest by far in more states using also more elaborated instruments 
as compared to 1985. This increases the obligation of appointing sub-custodians in 
various jurisdictions. The EC notes that the current UCITS framework lacks clarity in 
relation to the conditions that apply to the delegation of custody to sub-custodians. In 
this context, new due diligence and current controlling requirements are introduced. 
Consequently, the draft of the Directive stipulates the concepts upon which the 
assurance obligations of the depositary may be entrusted to a tutor. Moreover, the 
UCITS depositaries can hand over their safekeeping obligations to third parties under 
certain conditions and requirements compliant with those applicable to the AIFM 
Directive.
269
 Similarly, one needs to mention that, in case of the securities held by a 
delegate in a state of insolvency of a safekeeping, it will not be available for distribution 
to their creditors. According to the UCITS V Directive draft, the EC holds the power to 
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further define the first but also continuous due diligence obligations of the depositary. 
The above-mentioned duties include also the aspects related to the selection and 
appointment of a sub-custodian.
270
   
 
3.5.3  Liability 
 
The existing loss commitment standard of a monetary tool under custodianship resides 
in its emergence in cases of failure justification impossibility in performing duties or 
performances related to unsuitable obligations. These norms have been interpreted 
differently in various Member States, which has lead to diverging levels of investor 
protection. The draft UCITS V Directive implements a rigorous liability criterion 
forcing depositaries to give back financial tools lost in custody, regardless of the fact 
they were lost due to fault or neglect, except those losses caused by an outsider event 
beyond the depositary’s rational supervising.271 Depositaries will remain liable for the 
loss of assets in cases where safekeeping duties have been entrusted to third parties. 
Accordingly, the draft UCITS V Directive, in contrast to the AIFM Directive, makes the 
depositary responsible for the return of the financial tool, despite the loss occurred to 
the sub-custodian, without the possibility to discharge the liability by contract.  
 
3.5.4  Prospectus disclosure 
 
The inclusion of a characterisation of any safekeeping functions that the depositary 
entrusted in favour of a third party within the UCITS prospectus was proposed. Such 
disclosure will be required to identify the representative but also additional “conflicts of 
interest” which might occur due to the delegation. While this provision corresponds to 
the disclosure requirement included in the AIFM Directive in terms of the required 
disclosure level, it goes further in requiring that this information be provided in the 
prospectus of a UCITS, not that it simply be provided to investors, as stated in the 
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AIFM Directive. This provision will pose both practical and operational challenges and, 
as such, will be the subject of intense lobbying by industry bodies, such as the IFIA
272
. 
 
3.5.5  Remuneration of UCITS Managers 
 
The EC proposes the introduction of a requirement for UCITS management companies 
to adopt “remuneration policies consistent with sound risk management”273, which 
discourages disproportionate exposure to risk. Increased risk exposes investors to 
greater possible losses, which could be presumed due to the risk profile disclosed to the 
investors. These policies and practices will apply not only to senior management, but 
also to those persons who affect the risk profile of the Management Company or UCITS 
through their services. These provisions of the draft Directive correspond to the relevant 
provisions of the AIFM Directive. The EC has not confirmed if the requirement to 
implement the remuneration policies described in the draft Directive will be applicable 
when a self-managed UCITS or UCITS management entity receives no asset-based tax.  
 
3.5.6  Administrative Sanctions   
 
After investigating the national norms regarding penalties for infringements of the 
UCITS Directive, the EC has concluded that there is a significant divergence between 
jurisdictions, both regarding the criteria applied to issuing sanctions and the level of 
sanctions applied to specific breaches. The draft UCITS V Directive requires that 
Member States of the EU invest their regulatory bodies with power, as well with the 
diversified inspecting powers but also administrative penalties set out in the draft 
Directive covering a range of breaches of regulatory provisions. The draft proposes 
harmonisation of the sanctioning regimes by requiring the national regulators to 
introduce catalogues of sanctions and other punitive measures, and lists of sanctioning 
criteria. 
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3.5.7  Implementation 
 
Currently, the draft Directive is presented to the European Parliament, but also to the 
European Council thus being submitted to the co-decision process. When an agreement 
is reached on the text, the EU Member States will be obliged to implement all 
recommendations in their internal regulations within 24 months. Thus, these laws will 
become effective in 2014.  
 
3.6  The Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive 
 
The AIFM Directive was enacted on the 21
st
 of July 2012 (level I). The AIFM Directive 
timeline can be seen below, and this will be discussed further on: 
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Figure 6. The AIFM Directive timeline 
Source: author's analysis 
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This AIFM Directive implements harmonised requirements for financial intermediaries 
involved in the management of AIFs
274
 in the EU. The Directive defines an AIF as any 
collective investment scheme that requires no authorisation in compliance with the 
UCITS Directive.
275
 This extended definition was meant to include institutional vehicles 
which previously did not fit the perimeter of the EU financial regulation, among which 
one can mention “hedge funds/absolute return' funds, private equity funds/collective 
investment schemes, real estate funds/fixed property funds”276 and others. AIFs 
management and administration experience certain limited exceptions, especially for the 
EU-domiciled AIFMs
277
 authorised as per the Directive.
278
 
 
The purpose of the AIFM Directive is to regulate all major risk sources in the 
alternative investment value chain by guaranteeing that AIFMs are authorised and 
undergo periodical and continuous governing and that robust regulatory standards 
govern the key service providers, including depositaries and administrators. The 
Directive seeks to attain also the improvement of the transparency of AIFMs and their 
managed funds in front of supervisors, investors and other key stakeholders. In addition, 
the Directive needs to guarantee that all governed bodies comply with the appropriate 
governance standards and benefit of robust systems for the risk, liquidity and conflicts 
of interest management. The Directive also intends to enable AIFMs to market funds to 
professional investors throughout the EU, subjected to compliance with imperative 
regulatory standards. 
 
The authorisation received from the responsible authorities in its EU home Member 
State is compulsory to every AIFM intending to manage or market an AIF, according to 
the provisions of the Directive.
279
 The Directive contains a de minimus exemption for 
managers who directly or indirectly manage AIF portfolios holding minimum EUR100 
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million integral assets.
280
 This threshold is raised to EUR500 million for managers who 
(a) only manage AIFs without employing any leverage, and (b) do not assure investors 
the right to redemption for minimum five years from the day of a fund’s inception.281 
One of the preconditions of authorisation is that an AIFM should provide all officials in 
charge, detailed information observing, inter alia, ownerships’ details, features of the 
AIFs the company intends to trade, all adjustments for the delegation of management 
functions and the appraisal, as well as safekeeping of portfolio assets.
282
 More broadly, 
the AIFM has to assure the competent authorities that it is able to observe all the basic 
requests of this Directive.
283
 After receiving the authorisation, the AIFM is enabled to 
provide management activities to AIFs settled in any Member States
284
, but also to 
market the securities of the AIFs managed to professional investors
285
 within the EU.
286
 
In the short term, this passport will only be accessible to EU-domiciled AIFs and 
AIFMs. However, it is carefully considered at present that the passport extends to the 
non-EU-domiciled managers and funds in 2013.
287
 
 
Once an AIFM receives authorisation under the Directive, it must provide full 
compliance with substantive requirements observing, inter alia, (a) conduct of business, 
governance and risk management, (b) third party appraisal and safekeeping, but also (c) 
open, periodical and event-driven disclosure to investors, competent official bodies. but 
also to some third parties stakeholders.
288
 The Directive also empowers the EC and, if 
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absolutely necessary, official representatives from EU Member States, so that they can 
act for the restriction of the use of leverage by AIFs. 
 
The Directive causes controversy at various levels. The uniform regime that the 
Directive intends to enforce on a wide range of distinct AIFs is one of the controversial 
issues. This implies purely national funds without any evident systemic security 
relevance. Many of these are regulated at national level by now. However, credit 
institutions or insurance companies are excluded.
289
  
 
Another major source of concern is the similarity of the draft directive and other 
previous European directives. Thus, an example could be “the Prospectus”, “the 
Transparency”, and “the Market Abuse Directives”. As an alternative, the other way 
round, MiFID already regulates “open-ended and listed, closed-ended investment 
funds”. In addition, the assertion of the necessity to require a double license on 
management firms operating simultaneously UCITS and non-UCITS funds
290
, the 
directive brings forth arguable issues in the regulation of such sectors where clearness is 
an essential element.  
 
The intent of the AIMF Directive to regulate both authorisation and advertising across 
the EU, as well as the funds located outside the EU is disturbing and to some point even 
offensive, from a double perspective. The requirements, according to which the 
competent Member State official bodies issue this authorisation, and the activation of 
the foreign funds’ exchanging capability three years after the enactment of the directive, 
reduce the chances for non-EU AIFM to achieve such authorisation.
291
 If this approach 
has the slight chance of being defended prima facie due to its possible consideration in 
compliance with the objective of the “G-20 Pittsburgh Summit”, which is to offer 
“transparency” around overseas areas, the limitations imposed to third state funds and to 
administrators represent a major issue. The first restriction is upon the investors’ choice. 
To this, one might add the fact that they tend to contradict the “G-20 London Summit’s” 
demand that both regulators and supervising persons must reduce their aim for 
regulatory arbitrage while promoting international trade and investment and rejecting 
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protectionism. The legitimacy of the internal market regulation objective of the 
“passport-driven opening of the European fund market to offshore funds and their 
managers”292 is questioned.  
 
One major problem revealed by the AIFM Directive resides in its chaotic and confused 
regulatory framework. The emphasised concept is hardly understood: either “financial 
stability” (individuals tend to consider this as target point) or investor protection. In this 
case, investor protection seems to be to some point improper under the AIFs 
circumstances due to the fact that the aim of the proposal tends to be limited to the 
funds marketing and AIFM’s services offering only to professional investors. Also, 
financial stability seems to provide a more compelling basis for regulation in this area. 
The parallel pursuit of these two mutually exclusive regulatory rationales is capable of 
reducing the chances of the directive to fulfil any of these rationales.
293
  
 
On the one hand, if “the Directive” would mainly focus on financial stability, this would 
be more than enough for the limitation of the scope of the Directive to transnational, 
very high leveraged funds with significant AUMs, so that systemically relevant funds 
are accessed.
294
 On the other hand, if its fundamental focus was the protection of 
investors, then it would definitely need the revision of some investor disclosure rules, 
which are not tailored to professional investors, but rather to the needs of retail.
295
 
 
The Directive includes the following requirements on transparency: yearly reporting 
(Article 22), disclosure to investors (Articles 23 and 43) and reporting to competent 
authorities (Article 24). 
 
Currently, the final AIFM Directive covers over 100 fields where EC or ESMA were 
asked to enlarge to “Level 1”. The process began in December 2010 when EC requested 
the advice of ESMA and would finally end when the EC publishes its implementing 
regulation. During the first months of 2012, ESMA’s technical advice had been put 
through the political mangle in the lack of a suitable technical discussion. This was the 
main reason why everybody impatiently awaits the publication of the implementing 
regulation. One should also carefully consider ESMA’s Discussion paper regarding the 
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“Key concepts of the AIFM Directive and types of AIFM”, from 23.02.2012, together 
with the “Consultation paper on Guidelines on sound remuneration policies under the 
AIFM Directive” published on 28 of July 2012. All the above-mentioned documents 
from ESMA will facilitate the shaping of the types of organisations under the purpose of 
the AIFM Directive, and the extent to which the Level 1 remuneration provisions will 
be applied.  
 
To conclude, the AIFM Directive is an important piece of legislation and needs to be 
carefully analysed because of its relevance and especially because of its effects. After 
the financial crisis, it became clear that rushing regulation not only does not help or 
serve any public interest, but it might even be more dangerous or damaging than no 
action at all. Therefore, the author of this thesis considers that further negotiations and 
debates could be needed when transposing it into national law, in order to achieve the 
correct equilibrium between the two main parties involved: the international or global 
nature of this market, on the one hand and the local nature of the investors, on the other 
hand. The AIFM Directive, will definitely: (a) diminish systemic risks and the leverage 
use; (b) improve investor protection while increasing the transparency, too; (c) enhance 
the integrity and the efficiency of the sector; (d) promote the sector for the supervision 
of corporations. 
 
3.6.1  Conduct of business, governance and risk management requirements 
 
The Directive imposes uniform care and loyalty duties upon authorised AIFMs. 
Specifically, it mandates AIFMs to: “(i) act honestly, with due skill, care and diligence 
and fairly in conducting its activities, (ii) act in the best interest of the AIFs it manages, 
the investors in those AIFs and the integrity of the market, and (iii) ensure that all AIF 
investors are treated fairly.”296   
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An AIFM must also take all acceptable actions in order to identify “conflicts of 
interest”297 but also, thereafter keep and operate efficient institutional and administrative 
adjustments to stop these conflicts from negatively affecting the interests of an AIF or 
its investors.
298
 When an AIFM identifies material conflict of interest within its 
operations – or when it determines that its conflict arrangements do not have enough 
power to ensure the adversely impact of AIF investors interests in a reasonable and 
confident manner – it must disclose this fact to AIF investors.299 
 
The Directive stipulates that an AIFM should adopt risk management systems designed 
to measure and supervise overall risks induced to the AIFs it manages by virtue of their 
investment strategies.
300
 This requirement contemplates, inter alia, (a) the 
implementation of an appropriate, highly informed, but also regularly updated due 
diligence process for investments, (b) accurately identification, measurement and 
monitoring of risks by means of appropriate stress testing procedures, (c) the 
compatibility between the risk profile of each AIF and its size, structure, investment 
strategies and objectives
301
, and (d) the implementation of risk management procedures 
to an AIF engaged in short selling.
302
 The Directive also requires an AIFM to 
implement systems designed to manage liquidity risk and to conduct regular “stress tests 
of these systems under both normal and exceptional market conditions.”303 It further 
asks for the separation of portfolio and risk management functions – along with their 
respective review process – within the operational environment of an AIFM.304 These 
risk management requirements are augmented by a requirement that an AIFM should 
                                                 
297
 This includes conflicts (a) between an AIFM (including its managers, employees and those able to 
exercise direct or indirect control) and AIF investors, and (b) between different AIF investors; Article 10, 
s. 1. 
298
 Article 10, s. 1. This is in fact a purpositive interpretation of what, it must be said, is a tortured piece of 
legislative drafting which contemplates the maintenance of “effective” adjustments “with a view to taking 
all reasonable steps designed to prevent conflicts of interest”. It remains to be seen how authorities will 
interpret the interplay between the requirement of effectiveness, the subsequent reasonable qualifier and 
the notion that the arrangements need only be “designed” for preventing “conflicts of interest.” 
299
 Article 10, s. 1-2. This is once again, a purposive interpretation of an ambiguously drafted provision. 
Specifically, the Directive contemplates disclosure where an AIFM’s conflict arrangements are “not 
sufficient to ensure, with reasonable confidence, that the risks of damage to investors’ interests will be 
prevented”. However, if one acknowledges that preventing the risk of damage is not the same thing as 
preventing the damage itself, this language is potentially inconsistent with the “adverse effects” standards 
articulated in the same Article. 
300
 Article 11, s. 2. 
301
 Article 11, s. 3 (a)-(c). 
302
 Article 11, s. 4. The Directive further provides that EU States shall guarantee that an AIFM has in 
place “procedures which provide its access to securities/financial instruments on the date” it is required to 
deliver them pursuant to any short selling arrangement. 
303
 Article 12, s. 1. As a corollary, an AIFM must ensure that the redemption policy of each AIF it 
manages is appropriate given the liquidity profile of its portfolio assets; Article 12, s. 2. 
304
 Article 11, s. 1. 
109 
adopt payment policies which tend to be compatible with and to encourage sound risk 
management.
305
 
 
Lastly, the AIFM Directive institutes simple incipient and evolving capital 
requirements. All AIFMs are required to keep their own funds of minimum 
EUR125,000.
306
 Additionally, when the AIFs’ aggregate portfolio worth exceeds 
EUR250 million, an AIFM must set aside an extra amount of 0.02% of the total 
surpassing the quarter million EUR threshold of the portfolio value.
307
 Accordingly, for 
an AIF with a EUR1 billion worth portfolio value, an AIFM would be required to put 
aside capital totalling EUR275,000. The capital requirements mentioned above 
according to any very important duties comply with Article 21 of the Capital 
Requirements Directive governing the money ability of investment companies but also 
of banks.
308
 
 
Perhaps not surprisingly, given the broad nature of many of these requirements – to say 
nothing of the wide diversity of investment strategies, business models, conflicts of 
interest and other risks typically encountered in connection with different types of AIF – 
the Directive contemplates that the EC will advance to second level adopting clauses, 
besides specifying the precise substance “of these requirements”309 as they are intended 
to apply to each species of AIF. Accordingly, it is too early to evaluate the precise 
impact of these requirements in terms of the AIFMs’ daily conduct and practices. 
 
3.6.2  Third party valuation and safekeeping requirements 
 
The Directive requires that “an AIFM appoints an independent third party to value both 
the portfolio assets of the AIFs it manages and their issued securities.”310 This valuation 
exercise must be undertaken at least once a year and every time the securities of an AIF 
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are traded or redeemed.
311
 An AIFM must also appoint a depositary for the purposes of, 
inter alia, “(i) receiving subscription proceeds from AIF investors and depositing them 
into a segregated account, and (ii) safekeeping AIF portfolio assets.”312 The depositary 
shall be a credit institution whose registered office must be in the EU
313
 The depositary 
is obliged to act freely and only in support and on behalf of “AIF investors”. He will be 
responsible to the AIF investors for any damages inflicted upon them due to its failure 
to perform its obligations according to the Directive.
314
 
 
3.6.3  Disclosure requirements 
 
The Directive sets up a series of initial, periodic and event-driven disclosure 
requirements designed to increase the transparency of AIF activities to investors, 
competent authorities and certain other stakeholder constituencies. “MiFID requires 
investment firms to provide”315, inter alia, a description of the relevant AIF’s (a) 
investment strategy and objectives
316
, (b) valuation and redemption policies, (c) 
custody, valuation, administration and risk management activities, but also (d) 
investment taxes, charges and costs.
317
 Thereafter, an AIFM will be required to provide 
the investors a yearly audited report comprising the AIF’s balance sheet, income 
statement, activity report and auditor’s report.318 The AIFM should also submit these 
annual reports to the empowered officials from its home EU country.
319
 
 
The Directive contemplates additional periodic disclosure to both investors and 
competent officials with respect to: (a) the special arrangements percentage of AIF 
portfolio assets emerging from their illiquid type, (b) every new liquidity management 
settlements, and (c) the current risk profile of each AIF and the AIFM’s risk 
management systems.
320
 An AIFM will be required to provide aggregated data for 
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empowered officials according to a certain pattern, observing not only main markets 
and tools of AIFs’ trade, but also their fundamental vulnerabilities, and significant risk 
concentration.
321
  
 
In addition, an AIFM must report to the competent officials the main forms of assets 
where its AIFs are invested but also, when important, the employment of short 
selling.
322
 The Directive contemplates that the EC is going to adopt implementing 
measures which ensure the adaptation of the nature and frequency of these periodic 
disclosures – or at least those targeted at investors – to every AIF species.323 
 
Finally, the Directive imposes event-driven and subsequent periodic disclosure 
obligations on an AIFM related to the acquisition of “a controlling interest in a company 
domiciled in the EU which employs more than 250 persons, has an annual turnover 
exceeding EUR50 million”324, but also a balance sheet surpassing EUR43 million. An 
AIFM will be thought to have acquired a “controlling interest” if either it or any of the 
AIFs it manages holds either separately or totally “30% of the voting rights”325 of the 
target corporation. In case an AIFM acquires a controlling interest, this shall offer 
certain prescribed data
326
 to the corporation, its shareholders and employees (or their 
representatives). In addition, the yearly report of an AIFM is going to contain data 
regarding every entity where it holds a controlling interest. More specifically, the report 
must include information observing, inter alia: “(i) its operational and financial affairs, 
(ii) any financial risks associated with its capital structure, (iii) employee turnover, 
termination and recruitment, and (iv) any significant divestment of assets.”327 
 
3.6.4  Leverage requirements 
 
The Directive empowers the EC to establish leverage requirements for AIFs where these 
are considered imperative for guaranteeing security and “integrity of the financial 
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system.”328 It further empowers national officials to prevent the use of leverage for 
individual AIFMs and AIFs in exceptional circumstances
329
. The Directive mandates 
that an AIFM is evaluated once every four months if any of the AIFs it manages uses 
“high levels of leverage on a systematic basis.”330 An AIF is considered to have passed 
this test if its merged leverage from overall elements exceeds its amount of “equity 
capital in two out of the past four quarters.”331 When an AIF transcends this threshold, 
its manager must make prescribed disclosures to both AIF investors
332
 and the properly 
qualified officials in its EU residence countries.
333
 
 
3.7  The MiFID Directive: an overview of the framework 
 
The “Markets in Financial Instruments Directive” (MiFID)”334 was enforced in 2004, 
being the earliest in the financial services area, or the so-called “Lamfalussy-formatted”, 
which cleared the way for several thoroughly implemented Directives or Regulations. 
MiFID relates to securities that are still under implementation nowadays in the credit 
institutions and insurance area in particular. The MiFID represents the most exhaustive 
exemplification of the “Lamfalussy approach” up to now. 
 
The European supervisory architecture has changed in the aftermath of 2007-2009 
financial crisis. In terms of financial supervising, a simultaneously accomplishment of 
single financial market and financial stability is very difficult, maintaining at the same 
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time a higher supervision level at the national position.
335
 Schoenmaker called these 
inconsistent goals “trilemma”, as far as the financial monitoring is concerned: the 
security of the financial system, the harmonised financial sector and the national 
financial monitoring.
336
  
 
Within the EU, prudential supervising is decentralised in each Member State, due to the 
home country control principle combined with prior regulatory harmonisation-based 
mutual recognition
337
. As a consequence of regulatory harmonisation, the EU banking 
policy presents a rather unified picture. This is one of the reasons why Tommaso Padoa-
Schioppa considered that the current approach was based on national supervision 
European regulation. The Lamfalussy framework set up many committees, while the 
new supervisory structure was established by the De Larosière Report. 
 
The following framework sets the grounds for the new European Supervisory 
Authorities: five regulations approved by the European Parliament and the European 
Council on 22 September 2010, each of them establishing the following new bodies
338
: 
the “European Systemic Risk Board” (ESRB), assigning tasks to the ECB in relation to 
the ESRB, establishing EBA and the “European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Authority” (EIOPA), but also, finally setting up the “European Securities and Markets 
Authority” (ESMA).” 
 
The new objectives of the ESFS are: the adequate implementation of the rules to the 
financial sector, the maintenance of financial stability and of confidence in the financial 
system, but also the financial services consumers’ protection. This shall account for to 
the European Parliament and the European Council (ECOFIN).
339
 
 
The ESRB will perform inter alia the following tasks: (a) define, access and collect the 
relevant data supporting “the systemic risk” assessment at European level, (b) identify 
and assess the risks to financial security within the EU, relating to developments within 
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“the financial system” focusing on its interaction with “the real economy”, (c) prioritise 
the risks and insurance of risks warning to be considered by public authorities (central 
banks, supervisors, Ministers of Finance), or made available to the public, (d) issue 
recommendations (including in the legislative field) or advice on identified risks to 
stability, (e) “supervising of follow-ups to warnings as well as suggestions” (“comply or 
explain”), (f) connection with international bodies (“IMF, FSB”) and third country 
counterparties. 
The EBA was founded on the 1
st
 of January 2011. It was entrusted overall tasks and 
duties of the CEBS.
340
 EBA’s role is to guard and preserve the financial system 
stability, the markets and financial products transparency and the depositor and investor 
protection, acting as a hub and spoke network of the EU and national bodies.
341
 
Also, among its core abilities, the author mentions: prevention of regulatory arbitrage, 
promise of a level playing sector, reinforcement of global surveillance coordination, 
promotion of surveillance convergence and provision of advice to the EU authorities in 
the credit institutions, remuneration and e-money legal fields
342
, but also on matters 
concerning corporation governance, control and “financial reporting.” 
 
3.7.1  The Lamfalussy approach 
 
At the beginning of 2000, Al. Lamfalussy presided several “Wise Men” under the EC’s 
protection and started working on the best procedural approach for the European 
institutions to reach the most appropriate financial services action strategy.
343
 Actually, 
the Group was trying to find a solution for the compliance guarantee of two different 
goals. The first goal was that of increasing the harmonisation between Member States 
when European directives were transposed. The second goal was to speed up the 
implementation of – and to subsequently amend – such European directives (or 
regulations).
344
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The analysis of these four levels concludes that the major principle is the difference 
between the main policies from Level 1 but also the technical adopting issues from 
Level 2. Baron Lamfalussy asserts that governance change by means of the bottom-up 
approach might apply to different fields of European integration.
345
 
 
In 2001, “the Group work” issued some conclusions examined within the recommended 
organisational approach. The “Wise Men” decided upon “a four-level approach to 
European institutions and Member States”346, influenced by the existing and currently 
named commitology activities, adapted to financial sectors: 
 
The first scale consists of “European framework directives or regulations”, which means 
that similar law documents must be confined by important standards. Level 1 refers to 
EU framework legislation. The Stockholm Resolution invites EC to use regulations 
instead of directives, when “legally possible”. The integration of financial markets has 
often obstructed different national transposition processes. That is why the new 
approach needs to be reconciled with the status quo in banking and insurance, where the 
directives set the norm. The directives seem to be preferred due to their consistent use 
with the minimum harmonisation and mutual recognition principles, which have always 
been the driving force of the EU’s strategy. Unlike the directives, regulations are 
consistent with the full or detailed harmonisation principle and leave no freedom to 
Member States in terms of their national transposition.
347
 
 
Level 2 consists “of directives or regulations implementing the technical details of the 
essential principles set up by the Level 1 directives or regulations”348, implemented by 
“the European Commission” following several modifications made under the close 
observation of “a special Committee.” The EC would propose the “implementing 
measures” of the Second Level as recommendations, after sending a prior “technical 
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advice” which would be supposedly presented to the EC through the CESR, made up of 
overall national securities regulatory bodies.
349
 
 
The third Level consists of guidelines that will be promoted through “CESR” according 
to First and Second Level directives or regulations. “Level 1 and 2” represent the 
fundament for the first Level. The objective of the third Level management reside in 
assuring that authorities implement the established measures without any differences to 
achieve an upper integration level in the EU. 
 
The fourth level represents the enactment level, which must be performed by “the EC”. 
A major objective resides in becoming aware of whether EU Member States manifest 
delays while enacting, or even worse, abandon the implementation of first and second 
Level measures. Then, “the EC” may act before going to the ECJ350. 
 
All the above-mentioned Levels are presented in the scheme below: 
 
Figure 7. Lamfalussy Framework at Work 
Source: author’s analysis 
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In 2001, “the ECOFIN Council” has authorised the four-step “Lamfalussy approach”. 
This has later resulted in a settlement with the European Parliament.
351
 MiFID is among 
the primary European directives emerging after the Lamfalussy approach. Apart from 
this, the MiFID represents essentially the most all-embracing Directive of Lamfalussy 
approach up to now.
352
 
 
The major “impact of the MiFID is that targeted though significant provisions of the 
MiFID will apply to management companies managing UCITS funds.”353 
At first sight, only some articles of MiFID refer to the management firms regulated by 
the UCITS. These rules cannot apply to “the management of collective portfolios”. 
Instead, they apply only to “the investment services” empowered “to be provided by 
UCITS management companies according to Article 5(3) of the UCITS Directive, i.e. 
individual portfolio management and non-core services (investment advice and 
safekeeping/administration of funds’ units).”354 
 
The quantifiable constraint implemented via MiFID available for “UCITS management 
firms” could be considered very narrow. Nevertheless, many details were provided to 
the important amendments of the Level 1 MiFID, almost “40 articles of the Level 2 
MiFID”355 (for instance Articles 5-43, 45, 47-49). 
 
The UCITS Directive cannot be applied to the management companies dealing only 
with non-UCITS funds. On the contrary, the entire MiFID can be potentially applied, 
except for their non-UCITS funds management activity, as this is tackled neither by the 
UCITS Directive nor by the MiFID Directive. Thus, this is only monitored nationally.
356
  
 
Nevertheless, the practical benefit for such non-UCITS management firms is that they 
are not in the middle of two various Directives: the status looks relatively similar in 
terms of organisation and operation. 
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One needs to mention that in October 2008, the EC implemented a Communication 
entitled: “From Financial Crisis to Recovery: An European framework for action.”357  
 
Three main elements set the basis of this action plan: the EU level new financial market 
structure, the actions dealing with the manner in which it affects not only the real 
economy but also global co-operations to obtain an international answer to the 
economic crisis. On November 26
th, 2008, “An European Economic Recovery Plan”358 
was released. While the focus of the plan is on the macroeconomic situation, it also 
illustrates activities at the European level for the increase of the financing for 
infrastructure and sectors like cars, construction, and green technologies.
359
 The total 
package amount is approximately EUR200 billion, representing 1.5 per cent of total 
GDP of the EU.
360
 
 
Regarding the issue of financial markets and their appropriate supervision, in October 
2008, the EC created a “Group of high level experts” conducted by Mr. De Larosière.361 
The Group had the responsibility, inter alia, to analyse the organisation of European 
financial authorities, to guarantee prudent soundness, markets performance, and tighter 
European collaboration regarding financial security overlook, rapid warning 
mechanism, and crisis management, comprising the management of transnational and 
cross-sector risks. The Group presented its Report on February 25
th
, 2009.
362
 The Report 
includes thirty-one Recommendations. With regard to financial supervision, the Report 
suggests the establishment of a new body supervised by the ECB, which should identify 
systemic risks and issue binding risk warnings. With regard to micro-prudential 
supervision, the Report foresees a two-stage approach: first, the role of the existing 
Level 3 Committees and national supervisors should be strengthened; second, the three 
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Level 3 Committees should become the so-called Authorities with significant tasks and 
far-reaching powers on cross-border financial institutions in the EU.
363
 
 
In addition to the actions outlined above, the EC has initiated a general in-depth analysis 
and careful overview “of the supervisory and regulatory framework” applicable for 
every fundamental individual participant to financial industries, to ensure financial 
stability within the EU. The results of these initial reflections were set out in the 
Communication entitled “Driving European Recovery”, addressed to the Spring 
European Council and adopted by the EC on March 4, 2009, providing an outcome of 
the “European Economic Recovery Plan of 2008”, December, and approaching several 
measures in the context of the global down-turn of the real economy and the inevitable 
effects on employment. Under the heading “Restoring and maintaining a stable and 
reliable financial system”, the Communications refer to main conclusions “of the De 
Larosière Group”, but also outline an ambitious time schedule for the adoption by the 
EC of several legislative proposals regarding financial services, incorporating the 
establishment of the necessary legal framework for a new architecture of the European 
financial supervisory system. 
 
It remains to see whether future solution will take the form of mere regulatory reforms, 
such as adaptations to and reinforcement of the current framework while observing the 
existing principles, or regulatory revolution, eventual necessary changes to the Treaty. 
So far, the intent to revise the MiFID is emerging, mainly on grounds of investor 
protection.  
 
In 2011, more precisely on October 20, the EC issued its expected formal legislative 
recommendations on the amendment of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
(MiFID II). However, deadlines for enacting MiFID II seem to occur in the far future, 
even if MiFID II is acknowledged as a major regulation in the broader regulatory reform 
perspective. 
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3.8  Regulation of hedge funds and the MiFID 
 
MiFID’s impact seems actual due to its passport far wider objective.364 The wide-range 
of changes to the status quo ante caused by the MiFID, due to the abolition of the 
“concentration rule”365 together with its ambitious desire to bring within its fold the 
widest available spectrum of organisations
366
, have led to uncertainty in relation to its 
accurate remit in conjunction with its interrelation with other Community legal 
documents (especially, UCITS III). From a broad perspective, whilst it is quite difficult 
to acknowledge MiFID’s degree of influence on the European framework in terms of 
the financial services provision, little uncertainty is associated to the significant changes 
the entire asset management industry will have to undergo. For a correct assessment of 
MiFID’s possible impact upon the unregulated vehicles together with products, which 
are not harmonised, having to do with hedge funds, the examination of several question 
marks raised by its stipulations becomes imperative. 
 
A major source of doubt concerning the MiFID implies its potential significance for the 
transnational promotion and distribution of products that are not harmonised.
367
 
 
Contrary to the UCITS Directive dealing only with harmonised funds, the MiFID’s 
requests are also concerned with investments in “units in collective investment 
undertakings”, regardless of the harmonised or non-harmonised nature of the entity 
involved.
368
 Also, opposite to the ISD, which cover mainly conditional on the 
stipulation of “investment services”, MiFID deals with investment advice and portfolio 
management and investment processes.
369
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On the one hand, the introduction of MiFID made the European asset management 
industry think that this was an excellent possibility for its non-harmonised products to 
take the benefits of novel, EU broad distribution potentiality, free of the duty to comply 
with the requirements of the national regulations, related either to their products or to 
their managers. On the other hand, both the CESR and several market associations and 
stakeholders
370
 have presented the so-called “diversion” of the MiFID as an opposite 
image within an indirect path in terms of non-harmonised products marketing. It was 
believed that the impact of this “liberal” perspective regarding its aim would be harmful 
for the effet utile of the UCITS scheme and that it would damage the interests of the 
European harmonised hedge funds industry. It is really difficult to see how the 
guarantees, together with protections built into the UCITS regime would be dismissed 
within the framework of frequently light regulated hedge funds in the absence of 
reasons for the existence of the harmonised funds regime which is currently under 
examination. Despite the fact that there is hardly no indication of MiFID providing 
intentional grounds for the transnational promotion of non-harmonised products, 
regardless of the host Member State where it had been registered or other various 
national distribution requirements
371
, an explanation of its interaction with UCITS III is 
a major objective. This objective was given particular interest by a 2006 European 
Parliament Resolution which emphasized that “the interaction between UCITS III and 
MiFID and its Level 2 implementing measures leave undesirable scope for 
interpretation and require clarification and consolidation.”372 
 
A second important issue to consider refers to the assessment of the regulatory 
treatment of particular functions related to hedge funds. The text of the provision does 
not clarify at all, for instance, if subscriptions, together with redemptions of hedge fund 
shares or units should be dealing with the “best execution” obligation of Article 21 of 
the MiFID Directive. When the process concerning the subscription and redemption of 
hedge fund shares or units differs qualitatively from that concerning the buying but also 
selling of financial tools, subjected to the best execution obligation, the subscription and 
redemption of the shares or units of the hedge fund could prove problematic regarding 
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its coverage by the aim of the MiFID’s definition of “execution of orders”373. This 
signifies that this limitation could not apply in the context of a hedge fund.
374
 Similarly, 
ambiguity encompasses the degree to which the subscription and the redemption of 
hedge fund shares/units might qualify as “reception and/or transmission of orders”375, 
whether hedge fund managers can be considered “investment firms”376 or what the 
MiFID’s definition of “investment activity” supposes (a major issue on which an 
undertaking’s exemption from the remit of some of the MiFID’s key provisions 
turns)
377. Considering the fact that “the definition of an investment activity is far from 
clear”378 and that it is not easy to establish the difference between the follow-up of an 
“investment activity” and the provision of an “investment service”379, there are 
ambiguities about the location of hedge fund activities on the “service” –“activity” 
sequence. The conclusive assessment of the MiFID’s rules on transparency, outsourcing 
and investor classification is difficult, despite the fact that the better view is that fund 
managers make investment advice and portfolio management functions falling within 
the scope of the MiFID.
380
  
 
For the moment, one cannot say much about the impact of the MiFID on hedge funds, at 
least not until some of these questions would have been answered. Also, little can be 
said of the extent to which its occurrence will eliminate the need to adopt EU-wide 
hedge fund-specific rules or, on the contrary, require their even more urgent 
implementation in order to cope with the “hedge fund exception” to harmonised EU 
financial regulatory framework. 
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Still, MiFID II will be far stricter than MiFID I. Three particular aims of MiFID II 
differentiate it from MiFID I. Thus, (a) MiFID II sets up more rigurous regulatory 
requirements, which would supervise the technological evolutions and market 
infrastructure in the financial industry; (b) MiFID II intends to enhance investor 
protection as a result of the major collapses occurred during the credit crisis; (c) the 
target of MiFID II is to increase transparency as much as possible, and at the same time 
decrease the fragmentation of information. Due to these three targets, the strategic, 
commercial and technological implications of the MiFID II will be wider than those of 
the MiFID I. Although the expected implementation time for MiFID II was 2012/2013 
MiFID II implementation date changed for the time being, and it is expected to be 
implemented around 2014/2015. 
 
3.9  The regulation of hedge funds and other sources of Community legal rules 
 
The UCITS Directives and MiFID are not the only European Directives with 
direct/indirect effects regarding the evolution of asset management business in the EU. 
The other Community legal acts significant to the market activities of hedge funds 
include the “E-Commerce Directive”381, the “Prospectus Directive”382 and the “Savings 
Tax Directive”.383 Considering the specific aspects of the cross-border provision of 
alternative asset management services addressed by these directives and the fact that 
they facilitate the hedge fund products marketing in the Member States which do not 
specifically regulate their public marketing, these acts need to be briefly described
384
. 
 
The rules employed for electronic cross-border consumer transactions have been 
adopted by means of the E-Commerce Directive. This adoption was explained by the 
EC’s intention to establish a set of basic rules to promote E-commerce activity and EU-
wide information society services. Based on mutual acknowledgment and on the home 
country norms, the E-Commerce Directive could prima facie seem at first sight to let 
the transnational marketing of domestic hedge fund shares/units on the internet based on 
the tenderer’s home country authorisation.  
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The application of the “E-Commerce Directive” to financial services has led to many 
concerns regarding both the account of their highly regulated nature and the risk that 
could be brought up by market players to surround host European Member State 
product regulations together with marketing norms (implying rules relevant for non-
harmonised products).
385
 Nevertheless, this “country of origin principle application” of 
“the E-Commerce Directive” is restricted by derogations concerning, in particular, 
obligations stipulated in a contract of a client, advertising the UCITS investments
386
, the 
act of issuing E-money through the “waived” electronic money institutions387 and other 
rules in the insurance field.  
 
From the point of view of the impact on hedge funds, it should be noted that the EU E-
Commerce Directive, once it has been completely adopted by the Member States, can 
highly impact on-line cross-border hedge funds marketing. However, the E-Commerce 
Directive imposes a "country of origin" approach to regulation, in the sense that, for 
instance, UK managers marketing funds in other EU Member States are to be subject to 
the applicable UK marketing rules instead of having to comply with the regulations of 
the other countries. Nevertheless, this is only going to apply to promotion via the 
Internet; other regulations, among which laws on tax and information protection or 
against unsolicited email, still need to be observed. 
 
The Prospectus, Market Abuse Directive and Savings Tax Directives represent other 
sources of Community legal rules relevant to the business activities of onshore 
alternative investment vehicles. As far as the MAD is concerned, it seems obvious that 
the insider handling with market manipulation interdictions enclosed therein could treat 
the dealings of onshore hedge funds in tools allowed to enlist in regulated markets 
functioning in the EU, “particularly with respect to potential market manipulation.”388 
This reform mirrors several recent cases and discussions both in the US and in Europe 
that will be analysed in the last chapter. In the US, for example, the conviction and 
sentencing of the hedge fund manager Raj Rajaratnam to eleven years in prison due to 
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insider dealing, as well as the payment of US $25 million by Moore Capital 
Management to settle charges of market manipulation were carefully considered. These 
cases concern the MAD
389
. Under MAD, regulators try to protect investors against 
market abuse and to expand supervisory and enforcement possibilities. 
 
In the end, regarding the Savings Tax Directive and considering that its scope is to make 
sure that where an “interest payment” is made to a particular “beneficial owner”390 
located in an EU country by a “paying agent”391 domiciled in a jurisdiction falling 
within the scope of the Directive, the paying agent is going to provide data on the 
interest payment towards the tax authorities from the jurisdiction in the tax residence 
place of the beneficial holder. The most desirable perspective is that this should not 
affect the payments received by hedge funds (the latter cannot qualify as “beneficial 
owners” since they are not individuals). It could continue to be important to payments 
made by funds investing in fixed interest instruments, where the involved funds are 
deemed to fall within the Directive’s rationae personae scope. Meanwhile, the largest 
part of hedge funds could not be apprehended through the Savings Tax Directive, due to 
their classification as non-UCITS or UCITS equivalent funds in most jurisdictions. It is 
still unclear how the competent authorities are going to investigate its provisions and 
how changes in the national categorisation of hedge funds could impact their treatment 
from the point of view of their (possible) interest payment duties.
392
 
 
3.10  Concluding remarks 
 
The current chapter presented a comprehensive overview of the European legislative 
framework regarding, inter alia, hedge funds: UCITS Directives (IV, V and VI), AIFM 
Directive and MiFID (Level I and II) and other major sources of Community Legal 
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Rules. The UCITS Directives, the AIFMD and the MiFID introduce a harmonised 
investment protection and product regulation framework, focusing on improved investor 
disclosure. 
 
In the author’s opinion, AIFM Directive has a great potential to overturn the alternative 
investment market within and beyond the borders of the EU, proposing a way to 
redesign the UCITS investor protection architecture. Currently, the statistics regarding 
the AIF market provided by the EC stated to have EUR2.2 trillion in AUM. Although 
this is merely a fraction of the almost EUR6 trillion in AUM held by the UCITS sector, 
it provides a great opportunity for the expansion of AIF industry in the EU. In fact, this 
represents the indirect purpose of the EU regulatory officials to encourage several 
“Newcits” strategies into moving out of UCITS within the legislative context of AIFM 
Directive exactly when it passed.  
 
The most attractive option in the author’s opinion, seen also as a quid pro quo in favour 
of the adhesion to the new coordinated standards, is that EU AIFMs would be provided 
the favourable circumstances to market their AIFs in the EU by means of a passport. 
New distribution channels will develop while providing their access to markets that 
found it invariably difficult and even impossible (at times) to enter. Similarly, non-EU 
AIFMs might have the opportunity to “opt-in” starting with 2015. At the same time, the 
previous phobia against the so-called European “fortress” barriers experienced by the 
non-public offering of third country AIFs – inter alia Cayman or British Virgin Islands 
– could be prevented due to the non-public offering regimes within Member States 
expected to last until 2018, the minimum, considering that the passport option could 
open up in 2015. The non-EU AIFM’s opting in to the AIFM Directive will be of great 
interest, as well as the use of the passport for their own benefit or the maintenance of 
privately located funds up to 2018.  
 
However, the author considers that both managers and investors welcome the option of 
allowing them to perform both tasks. The Directives are considered to become in time a 
brand for investor protection in relation to high-standards, in a similar manner the 
UCITS funds proved successfully not only inside, but also outside the EU. There is no 
doubt that the UCITS Directives are a successful instrument for facilitating cross-border 
investments in AUM schemes while offering at the same time a high level of investor 
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protection. However, when the industry and regulators refer to the success of UCITS in 
reaching a high standard of investors’ interests protection , they are mainly referring to a 
product that tightly regulates on the one hand the asset management company and on 
the other hand, the depositary in order to mitigate possible conflicts of interest, 
operational risk, as well as other risks connected to entrusting a person’s savings to a 
money manager. This does not exclude the fact that the AIFM Directive might pose 
several major challenges regarding the compliance costs that will affect especially the 
small managers.  
 
Meanwhile, Article 3 of the Directive establishes minimum AUM threshold norms 
regulating leverage calculation and the lack of certainty regarding the possibility for 
Member States to impose very exact limits for the small manager exemption – both 
situations lead to the opinion that these thresholds could not prove very efficient in 
practical applications. Ad consequentiam, negative impacts are expected under certain 
circumstances: costs related to the appointment of a depositary according to the new 
liability rules stipulated in Article 21, the lack of certainty over delegation, the lack of 
compatibility with MiFID, the remuneration controls together with the third country 
cooperation settlements issues. Overall, there are major concerns regarding an efficient 
and balanced implementation. In this respect, the successful implementation of AIFM 
Directive requires the maintenance of a level playing area between EU and non-EU 
organisations.  
 
The author of this thesis identified several important disadvantages so far: the AIFMs 
located in EU are already required to obtain authorisation according to the MiFID. 
Therefore, they are already subjected to registration, regulatory capital, compliance and 
reporting requests. At the same time, the AIFM Directive will apply similar standards 
and requests, even if this directive establishes by far more oppressive reporting requests. 
In this respect, the author would like to underline that the EU regulatory authorities 
from Brussels, including the EC, have explicitly inserted within the AIFM Directive 
many of the principles stipulated within the MiFID and overall UCITS Directives (IV, 
V and even VI), most of the times using exactly the same words. Positive and negative 
comments were provided as the above-mentioned approach proves the EU’s willingness 
to harmonise the norms in the financial services field, but at the same time proves, to a 
certain extent, its low comprehension level regarding the AIFs operation, requiring the 
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AIFMs to comply with the norms set up for the UCITS funds managers (fund tools 
particularly meant for retail investors), unlike the most part of AIFs.  
 
Further on, the author proposes a brief comparison of the three major directives 
analysed herein: UCITS Directive, MiFID Directive and AIFM Directive, all focused on 
ensuring investor protection. 
 
The convergences of these three directives represent major issues in addressing them. 
Therefore, overlaps regarding MiFID and the UCITS Directive imply the regulatory 
framework regarding the sales of UCITS, because the UCITS sale is included in the aim 
of MiFID’s conduct of business norms. So far, MiFID II, within the EC’s draft 
proposal, considers that the UCITS are either “complex” or “non-complex”. From this 
point of view, there are significant distinctions between MiFID II and UCITS Directive. 
Therefore, according to MiFID, only the non-complex particular financial instruments 
may be sold to clients based on an execution ground in the absence of the tool suitability 
control for the client. The above-mentioned issue contradicts the UCITS Directive, as 
UCITS tend to be particularly considered appropriate for retail investment, being also 
tightly regulated by the UCITS Directive. Conclusively, the conflict emerging between 
these two directives becomes very clear in this context. The author considers that these 
issues should be carefully considered and that the distinction between UCITS/non-
UCITS should be made. 
 
Nonetheless, while an AIFM is outside the aim of MiFID, one anticipates that similarly 
to UCITS, many of the investor management activities of alternative investment funds 
will occur in investment companies, subjected to the regulation of the MiFID. 
Consequently, managers will manage funds covered not only by MiFID, but also by 
AIFM Directive, and this implies the fact that they will be compelled to comply with 
both directives. This raises the significant question whether tracing refined 
differentiations between these two directives makes any sense. 
 
It is therefore necessary that several approaches be implemented when developing 
MiFID II: the prevention of the duplication between the two directives; in case the 
duplication cannot be avoided, the clarification of stipulation guides so that these are 
easily comprehended in terms of which directive should be followed or is going to 
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prevail, or at least a clear sign of the more rigorous requests observance; the notification 
of direct remarks to both UCITS and AIFM Directives where appropriate, as the major 
aim is to prevent the occurrence of overlaps between the two directives. 
 
As one could see, the UCITS Directives, AIFM Directive and MiFID have all negative 
and positive impacts. As a final concluding remark, the real advantages of these 
directives will be observed in the forthcoming future, as a follow-up of dust settlement 
and of the passport availability to a broader extent – if such be the case. 
 
The author considers that disclosure and operating provisions must be at the core of 
investor protection architecture, as they will ensure a gold standard applied worldwide. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
REGULATION OF HEDGE FUNDS IN THE UK AND SELECTED SINGLE 
EUROPEAN JURISDICTIONS: ITALY, FRANCE, IRELAND, LUXEMBOURG, 
MALTA AND SWITZERLAND. THE IMPACT OF THE AIFM DIRECTIVE 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a comparative overview of how different and diverse the hedge 
fund regulation throughout Europe is. Even if the author does not go into details when 
describing the laws identified in the different selected single European jurisdictions: 
UK, Italy, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta and Switzerland. The intention is to give 
the reader an idea of how diverse and dissimilar the different legislators’ approaches can 
be, instead of presenting a detailed description. Also, such a description would not 
correspond to the scope of this chapter that aims to focus on investor protection 
principles, not on the detailed international rules. 
 
4.2  Regulation of hedge funds in the UK 
 
Although after the recent financial crisis, the British regulatory system of the financial 
sector shares many common principles with the American and European systems, the 
particularities characterising each of them are still prominent. 
 
The FSA is still the main regulator in the UK, although this country has undertaken on a 
reforming plan resulting mainly in the subdivision of the FSA into two official bodies. 
The first is represented by the PRA
393
, and the second by the FCA.
394
 FSA is a non-
governmental body created in 2001 with “statutory powers by the Financial Services 
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and Markets Act 2000”395 to regulate hedge funds industry and all pyramid institutions. 
Therefore, the hedge funds regulations are issued according to this Act and are enforced 
and supervised by the FSA. This was the UK financial architecture before the 2007-
2009 financial crisis. 
 
On the 16
th
 of June 2010, the Chancellor of the Exchequer presented the Government’s 
projects in terms of reorganisation of the UK system of financial regulation. In July, a 
consultation followed this speech, named, “A new approach to financial regulation: 
judgement, focus and stability”, pointing out its recommendations in more details. 
According to this document, the next step of the Government’s recommendations is set 
out, according to the conclusions revealed by the examinations in July and carrying on 
the approaches started by the Treasury, “Bank of England”, but also FSA.  
 
In February 2011, “the Treasury” presented to the Parliament a consultation paper 
entitled “A new approach to financial regulation: building a stronger system.” The 
Government’s reform focuses on three major organisational modifications. First of all, a 
recent FPC
396
 is going to be set up inside the Bank of England, being in charge “with 
macro-prudential regulation”, supervising the financial security and flexibility of the 
entire economic structure. Secondly, the PRA intends to manage significant risks, 
ensuring “micro-prudential regulation” of financial organisations. PRA is an 
autonomous branch subordinated to “the Bank of England.” Thirdly, responsibility 
regarding corporation management regulation will be moved to a different professional 
regulator, previously called “Consumer Protection and Markets Authority”, authority 
whose name was changed, this one being already completed by Government as “the 
FCA”, further on in charge of the supervising problems emerging inside the entire series 
of financial processes. Under this organisation, the financial stability is the 
responsibility of the Bank of England, the Treasury and FSA. At the beginning of 2012, 
the “Financial Services Bill” to Parliament was implemented.  
 
“The Financial Services Bill” was adopted by Parliament, offering bigger transparency 
for the modern organisation of financial legislation on the territory of the UK. Not 
entirely unexpected, this Bill calls up the most important reforms of the Government to 
establish another new “twin peaks” organisation of the financial regulatory from UK. 
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This new organisation implies the replacement of the FSA with two new regulators, as 
mentioned above: the PRA and the FCA.
397
 Similarly, this Bill “also proposes to 
establish the Financial Policy Committee within the Bank of England as the UK’s 
macro-prudential authority.”398 
 
Thus, the legislative system will establish a FPC responsible with the identification and 
monitoring, but also acting for the removal or mitigation of systemic risk in order to 
protect and enhance the resilience of the British financial industry. At the beginning of 
the summer of 2012, it was communicated by the Chancellor “that the Government 
would amend the Bill to give the FPC a secondary objective to support the economic 
policy of the Government.”399 
  
According to the present governance authority, FPC will represent one Committee of 
the Bank of England’s Court of Directors. At the beginning of 2011, the same Court 
developed an interim FPC to undertake all forthcoming statutory macro-prudential roles 
of the FPC. Despite the fact that the interim FPC lacks the suggested statutory 
qualifications of Direction and Recommendation of the statutory FPC, this has a great 
contribution in maintaining the financial security. This is performed by identifying, 
surveying but also by advertising the risks to the security of the entire financial sector. 
Careful guidance activities for mitigation of risks are performed. At the same time, 
preparatory jobs but also studies are developed before the set up of the permanent FPC. 
The interim FPC had its first policy meeting in June 2011.
400
 
  
At the beginning of 2012, after the HM Treasury’s previous requirement, the interim 
FPC came to terms without dissent a declaration describing its recommendations 
regarding the possible powers to be attributed to the Direction for the statutory FPC. 
According to this, the FPC must search for powers of Direction over a countercyclical 
capital buffer, sectoral requests of capital, and a leverage rate. At the same time, this 
Committee apprehended secondary desirable possible tools, even if it made the decision 
to leave them out of its recommendations concerning the first powers of Direction.
401
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Setting up FPC represents only one small segment from a larger set of financial anti-
crisis measures. Therefore, one main focus is on mitigation of risk at global and 
individual firm level. In order to achieve this, the need for macro-prudential and micro-
prudential regulation was promoted. The set up of a “PRA within the Bank of England” 
is necessary for these purposes.  
 
Consequently, according to the governing groupthink report, the FPC meetings will be 
held minimum four times a year. One record from every official meeting needs to be 
made public. At the same time, another responsibility will be that of being in charge 
with the Bank’s bi-annual “Financial Stability Report”, covering the Committee’s 
appraisal of the security expectancy, but also of the resilience of the financial system as 
well as of the policy activities recommended to mitigate the risks to security.
402
  
 
The “ring-fencing” concept is a new and original element introduced by the Financial 
Services Bill. This concept tries to separate the more risky activities o the banks such as 
for instance “investment banking” and “proprietary trading” from those functions 
considered to be the “core-business” of banks such as: the payment systems, the 
deposits, the interbank market, the loans, considered to be the main activity of the 
commercial banks. The Vickers Report is in favour of this separation between the 
commercial and investment activities within the banks
403, but the creation of a “Chinese 
wall” between the two sectors would be artificial and might lead to assuming very high 
risks on behalf of the banks, and these risks might cause “moral hazard” in the financial 
system.  
 
Comparing the regulatory system of the financial and banking sector in the UK with the 
EU regulations in this field, one may notice a certain note of protest from London, the 
most important investment and banking financial centre in the world, towards some 
regulations in this field.  
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On 19 December 2012 the Financial Services Act 2012 received royal assent and came 
into force on the 1
st
 of April 2013. A major stipulation of this act is the making of a new 
regulator, the newly formed Financial Conduct Authority. The FCA takes over 
responsibility for investor protection as well as market oversight in the UK, marking the 
final dissolution of its widely-criticised predecessor, the FSA. The FCA is going to have 
an active role in shaping policies and driving the investor protection agenda in Europe 
and globally, not only in the development of broad standards but also of detailed 
regulations affecting UK investors and corporations. The FCA has three key operational 
objectives focusing on the integrity of the market, consumer protection and competition. 
Also, investor protection represents the first of three general objectives in securities 
regulation according to the International Organisation of Securities Commissions 
(“IOSCO”). As seen before, countries like the UK have adopted the three IOSCO 
objectives without modification, proving their increased attention towards this subject.  
 
The FCA adopts a renewed focus on wholesale conduct, with major attention paid to 
retail investors and conflicts of interest, both being concerned with investor protection. 
Thus, according to them, activities in retail and wholesale markets are related and risks 
due to poor wholesale conduct may be transmitted between them. The failure to 
adequately manage frequent inherent conflicts of interest in wholesale markets 
represents the major cause of risk for market integrity and consumer protection. In this 
context, for the enhancement of trust and confidence in the integrity of markets, FCA is 
planning on taking a more assertive and interventionist approach to risks which are a 
consequence to wholesale activities and, if needed, to protect a larger range. 
 
Two types of wholesale conducts are promoted by the FCA: the good and the bad 
conduct. The first one relies on effective policing of market abuse, but investors also 
must be safeguarded against activities exploiting differences in either expertise or 
market power. The second type of conduct is not a victimless action just due to the fact 
that it occurs between sophisticated market participants, and at the same time it is not 
limited to criminal behaviour among which fraud or market abuse can be mentioned.  
These types of conduct imply an ample range of activities that take advantage of 
varieties in expertise or market power with the purpose to undermine confidence in the 
integrity of markets or simply harm retail investors. 
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According to the policies of FCA, misconduct in wholesale markets can affect much 
more the integrity of, as well as confidence in markets as compared to a narrow 
interpretation of the principle of sophisticated market participants. FCA is planning on 
enhancing trust and confidence in the integrity of markets.  
 
The message they are trying to transmit is that FCA seeks to ensure that hedge funds 
financial markets are sound, stable, orderly and resilient and that investors, whether they 
are retail or wholesale, enjoy an appropriate degree of protection from risks arising from 
their exposure to wholesale activities, be it in a direct or indirect manner. 
 
Another major objective of the FCA is to direct an increasing part of their work towards 
adopting, supervising and enforcing EU, as well as international standards. The FCA is 
going to actively bring its expertise to international debates and rule-making, in order to 
make sure that the standards fixed on both investor protection and market integrity are 
deeply connected with their objectives. Accordingly, the FCA imposes itself a 
comprehensive understanding of consumers’ interests and on making sure that there is 
no dilution of consumer protection at domestic level. 
 
 
 
4.3 Hedge funds regulation in selected EU Member States jurisdictions  
4.3.1  Italy: overview of hedge funds regulatory regime  
4.3.1.1  The evolution of hedge funds regulatory regime in Italy  
 
Italy is the second largest European market for UCITS funds, amounting to more than 
EUR177 billion in AUM
404
, as it is amongst the first European jurisdictions to explicitly 
adopt, in 1999, specific regulations for hedge funds as well as FoHF.
405
  
 
“Hedge funds” represent “not a legally defined term under the Italian law”, known 
rather as “speculative funds” (“fondi speculativi”)406, a designation making no 
difference between single-manager funds or FoHF.
407
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The key norm is Treasury Decree n° 228, as amended (the “Treasury Decree”)408, 
further developed, mainly through the 1999 and 2005 Bank of Italy Regulations
409
 with 
the latter indicating the adoption of a somewhat more liberal approach to alternative 
investment fund regulation. There were several regulations acknowledging hedge funds, 
or for a better accuracy, their Italian synonym: fondi speculativi/speculative funds in 
compliance with the Italian regulatory system. These regulations were the Decree n° 
58/98 and the already mentioned Ministerial Decree n° 228
410
 . Therefore, it was only in 
2008, with the enactment of the Law Decree n° 185, that the international concept of 
hedge fund started to be acknowledged in Italy, too.
411
 These will be further approached 
in this chapter. The minimum initial investment or threshold for speculative funds was 
set at EUR500,000 while the Italian law also stipulated a maximum of 200 investors per 
fund
412
. Moreover, speculative funds could only be distributed on a private placement 
basis, with authorisation of CONSOB
413
 - the regulator for Italian securities.
414
 Hence, 
while Italian law did not statutorily restrict hedge funds to designated categories of 
professional investors – the Treasury Decree did not explicitly require that the 200 
investors should be “qualified investors” – its effect was to limit the marketing of 
speculative funds exclusively to those public or private investors having increased net 
value. 
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In terms of investment policy, speculative funds can invest freely, without any 
restrictions, adopting the investment strategy of their choice, without being subjected to 
the prudential supervision rules of the “Bank of Italy” (BoI), which apply to common 
collective investment schemes.
415
 Similarly, there are no restrictions regarding the 
portfolio diversification applicable to Italian speculative funds.  
 
However, Italy is the only EU jurisdiction examined herein, where the offer of hedge 
fund products is reserved to specialised asset management companies, appointed as 
“Società di gestione del risparmio speculative” (“speculative SGRs”), endowed with 
legal personality and established under the law of contract.
416
 
 
The fee rate levied for speculative funds reaches 12.5% in terms of the accumulated 
managerial outcomes towards the end of the year. According to the Italian main norms, 
the return acquired through any investment fund is levied before deductions by 
withholding fees at source or swap fees. Similarly, both the capital subjected to the 
deduction fee at source and the fee-exempted capital in Italy tend to be removed from 
the managerial outcome, falling under the 12.5% fee. Speculative SGRs fall under the 
corporate fee reaching 33%, and under the regional fee reaching 4.25%, based on 
regional regulations.
417
 
 
Italian law submits the distribution of foreign non-UCTIS funds in Italy to the same BoI 
prior authorisation requirement. The grant of an authorisation is explicitly made 
conditional.
418
 
 
Nowadays, “speculative funds are regulated by article 16 of the Ministry Decree n° 228 
of 24 May 1999, as amended by the Ministry Decree n° 256 of 14 October 2005 and the 
Ministry Decree n° 47 of 31 January 2003 (Decree n° 228) that implement article 37, 
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paragraph 1 of the Consolidated Finance Act.”419 Similarly, there are also secondary 
norms regulating speculative funds, namely: 
 “the BoI regulations of 14 April 2005, as amended by the BoI Order of 16 
December 2008 that provides the implementing rules of the EU Directive 
2007/16/EC on eligible assets.”420 These regulation contain typical norms 
with regard to SGRs and to the manner they are managed; 
 the “BoI Order of 21 June 2007, amending April 2005 BoI 
Regulations”421, with regard to scopes concerning SGRs but also the 
regulation of funds; 
 “the BoI and the CONSOB joint regulations of 29 October 2007 providing 
the MiFID Directive 2004/39/EC implementing rules; 
 the Decree n° 185 and the implementing December 2008 BoI 
Regulations.”422 
 
To ensure a very effective operation of Italian hedge funds on the financial industries’ 
liquidity crises but also, simultaneously, to guarantee similar interests and support for 
all invested individuals, the BoI issued Regulation 785/08
423
 on December 16, 2008, 
adopting “Section 14, paragraphs 6, 7, 8 and 9, of Law Decree n° 185 of November 29, 
2008.” 
 
In agreement with Law Decree n° 185
424, taking on Italy’s finances and coming up 
against this financial tumult,
425
 several recommendations were made by Italian 
regulatory texts, up to the end of 2009: 
(i) First, in case the SGRs receive overall redemption requirements higher 
than 15% of the NAV
426
, at some particular date or extent of time, then 
the SGRs will be able to perform partial redemptions. According to this, 
all units that were not repaid - surpassing all thresholds that were 
previously mentioned, also named entries/gates – are going to be seen 
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like reimbursement requirements that the investors newly submit during 
the first day following that above-mentioned partial redemptions;
427
  
 
(ii)  Second, if it is absolutely compulsory for SGRs to satisfy every 
redemption request, sell “the fund’s illiquid assets, and if this may 
adversely affect the interests of the investors, the SGR can solve a 
withdrawal thereof and transfer the illiquid assets in a new closed-end 
fund, whose units are assigned to each participant to the original fund 
proportionally to the amount of units owned in the latter.”428 These 
newly created funds, also named side-pockets, are not allowed to release 
new units, while the old ones are going to face reimbursement when the 
assets liquidation will occur.  
Provisions find that a SGR is able to face problems in the reimbursement of customers 
meaning that these are going to need to divest every illiquid asset.
429
 
 
The highest amount of participants in hedge funds is set at 200. In fact, the previously 
mentioned limit had led to the making of similar duplicates of hedge funds. Such 
innovation has been suggested in a recent study advanced by the Group responsible with 
the hedge funds reform in Italy, as this was also “established before the BoI.”430 
 
According to the previous statements, Regulation n° 785 of December 2008, adopted by 
BoI focuses generally on features regarding side-pockets, definition of illiquid assets, 
estimation of the manner in which new norms affect the industry, especially at the time 
the unitary worth is below half a million EUR and last but not least, regarding the 
approval act of “procedures for the amendments to the fund’s regulation.”431 
 
“Characteristics regarding side-pockets.” Art. 14432 of the above-mentioned Decree, 
considers that side-pockets represent closed-end funds. According to this, they focus on 
the disinvestment of their assets which are difficult to sell in compliance with a given 
disinvestment program previously confirmed by the managers of the SGR. Similarly, 
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they are forbidden to make a single transfer or to merge. However, they might ask for 
loans but not more than 10% of its net worth, while the allowed period is half a year, the 
most. Also, this “is entitled to cash holdings - other than those necessary for redemption 
– for hedging and ordinary administration only.”433 
 
The creation of a fund implies several conditions for SGR, which must first clarify the 
main motivation regarding the illiquid assets transfers. Secondly, this must acknowledge 
all norms imposed by side-pockets. Thirdly, the individualisation of those illiquid assets 
that need to be moved to the side-pockets is necessary. In the fourth place, the solving 
of the hedge fund separation and the transference concerning illiquid assets to side-
pockets shall be ensured. In the fifth place, one needs to establish fundamental appraisal 
standards regarding illiquid assets, and then to receive the approval of a controlling 
strategy regarding the illiquid assets transfer. Lastly, the approval of the study regarding 
the establishment of side-pockets will be forwarded towards the investors.
434
  
 
Defining “illiquid assets.” Several standards need to be promoted to assess the fund in 
terms of its financial tools liquidity: 
(i) Undertakings for UCITS or other similar financial tools: 
 long-term act of suspending regarding calculations of the shares’ worth; 
 sectional or overall act of suspending redemptions; 
 fund termination; 
 making side pockets/similar tools; 
 the act of amending regular buybacks of the shares;  
 worth rates instability due to assets difficult to sell, to whom this industry 
is not pointing out trustworthy costs.
435
 
(ii) Secondary financial tools. The following data are  considered: 
 size, regularity and trading firm; 
 a consistent price; 
 buying tendency as well as selling costs during a given interval;  
 distribution of costs by means of trustworthy materials.436 
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These recent rules affect the market for two reasons, especially when the unitary price 
exceeds EUR500,000: 
(i) The hedge fund can be separated. At that time, the investor, who is by no 
means guilty of the  unitary price decrease, cannot be forced to replace 
the minimal amount mentioned;  
(ii)  Adding a gate, when the redemption is verified, with regards to the 
subsequently expiration periods until the last redemption, the only 
exception accepted is when the investor subscribes for the amount 
requested to reinstate minimal thresholds.
437
  
 
The processes confirming all rectifications of the fund’s regulation to the hedge fund’s 
norms regarding the introduction of the so-called gate, regarding the set up of side-
pockets, but also/or regarding the cancellation of the norm lowering the upper limit of 
the amount of hedge funds investors tend to be similar to those for normal amendments 
to the fund’s norms.438 
 
Due to the financial crisis, as well as to the systemic generated risks bursting out 
generally due to low mastery instruments for alternative investments
439
, there is a 
general agreement about EU, which is expected to introduce an innovating system of 
rules. Therefore, the published “Directive 2011/61/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 8 June 2011 on Alternative Investment Fund Managers, as well as the  
amending Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC and Regulations (EC) n° 1060/2009 
and (EU) n° 1095/2010”440 focus on regulating managers of alternative investment 
funds. These imply the overall collective investment institutions that are not included in 
the UCITS directive, or in other words, that cannot be defined as harmonised 
investment funds.
441
 
 
4.3.1.2   The Italian regulatory regime: scope and objectives  
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It is important to point out that this Anti-Crisis Decree and the collapse of the BoI, as 
well as the subsequent implemented regulations have led to the measures recently 
adopted in Italy to ensure transparency, the orderly exchanging but also the investors’ 
protection.
442
 For instance, the latest limits on short selling presented by the Italian 
Listed Entities
443
 but also by CONSOB
444
 intend to keep away speculation in trading 
from causing an abnormal decrease of share prices. This also leads to the restriction of 
hedge funds processes. Still, two urgent costs of the short-selling ban, designed to 
reverse the decrease of financial assets prices, can supply additional decrement of 
prices.
445
 Firstly, many security companies tend to restrict alternatives for commercial 
dealings regarding clients, leading to unexpected “short positions upon exercise”, for 
example purchasing puts, exchanging calls. Secondly, a certain number of individuals 
taking part to the industry and coming from financial stocks tend to be hedge funds 
using “short-term long-short” exchanging tactics in important quantities. This group of 
active participants, usually providing high amounts of money for the industry, have 
reduced inventory, particularly nowadays. This decrease of liquidity will have an effect 
on the overall financial entities, particularly on smaller financial organisations.
446
 In 
return, they are going to affect the retreat of these stocks investors and further 
discourage their prices that will be facing liquidity deterioration. 
 
Outcomes are expected from the above-mentioned scenarios. Thus, on the one hand, the 
most recent regulations adopted by the BoI concerning hedge funds could be 
appreciated since these measures might be seen as a means of controlling the 
uncertainty caused by the financial crisis, by enhancing investor protection.
447
 
Additionally, this might mentally bring about an adverse consequence, a counteraction 
that could be leading to a speed-up in redemptions. Substantial redemption demands 
could affect their administration in a pessimistic manner, consequently restraining their 
contributors’ interests.  
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Furthermore, the BoI the lowest entry amount necessary for taking part in a hedge fund 
of EUR500,000 for each partner - despite a suggestion made by Assogestioni
448
 (Italian 
professional association for Italian investment management industry) in favour of 
diminishing this amount by half of it - further restricts any development or arbitration of 
this tool amid private investors.  
 
 
4.3.1.3  The advantages and disadvantages of the Italian regulatory regime 
 
Italy has a special treatment that is a quite flexible approach to hedge fund regulation. 
Italian hedge fund industry is certified as the topmost complete hedge fund regulatory 
administrations in the world.
449
 Hedge funds “have proved to be a useful instrument for 
diversifying investment portfolios.”450  
 
Nevertheless, the Report issued by the BoI, CONSOB and the Ministry of Finance in 
2008 concluded that the hedge funds Directive needs modifications for the time being, 
and this occurred 10 years after its enactment in Italy. The necessity of this shift comes 
from the need to allow new progresses on the part of this investment type, but, at the 
same time, it comes from the need to encourage competitiveness within the market of 
funds from Italy at the global level. Generally, these new regulations are expected to 
bring forth a double set of goals: (a) significant decrease of the minimum subscription 
amount of the hedge funds’ investments, which is currently half a million EUR; (b) 
diversification of regulation through FoHF, as well as hedge funds, with the major 
purpose of making the offer available to a more comprehensive public.
451
 
 
Nevertheless, this regulatory purpose stipulated or suggested in the above Report does 
not seem to be so simple, if we take into account the recent financial crisis. This idea is 
also supported by the speech of BoI Deputy General Manager, who said that the 
international hedge funds markets are subjected to extensive restructuring with 
unpredictable results for the time being. Under these circumstances, it seems rather 
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advantageous to clarify these tendencies at the global level before going on with these 
internal law changes.
452
 
 
A benefit is that, in Italy, hedge funds are not accessible to the public and the minimum 
subscription amount is half a million EUR.
453
 This indicates that the holders of Italian 
hedge funds shares are institutional investors. This also suggests that the protection 
regime already provided is sufficient to such investors. 
 
It is not the manager’s obligation to “publish a prospectus”454, though he has an 
obligation to distribute all the latest norms related to the fund to all subscribing 
investors. These hedge funds norms need, inter alia, to illustrate firstly the risks that 
arise (if they exist) in foreign hedge funds (for example if hedge funds are controlled 
from off-shore centres); secondly, they need to illustrate the highest quantity of 
mortgages but also leverages. Furthermore, overall bookkeeping records will be 
accessible both for investors and for the public in the manner prescribed in the hedge 
funds guiding norms.
455
 
 
The latest “crisis has shown that hedge funds may be subject to considerable systemic 
risk”456, and because of this, central banks, endowed with macro-prudential supervisory 
responsibilities look for information on their portfolios and their performance in the 
markets of at least the biggest of these funds. Hedge funds are obliged to inform the BoI 
about the structuring of their portfolio, every six months. The SGR discloses to BoI, 
with indication to each fund or sub-fund controlled only: a duplicate of the half-yearly 
report of the fund in 60 days from the end of the semester; a copy of the balance fund 
sheets, together with the information of the directors and the audit reports in the last 90 
days of the year.
457
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On the negative side, the Italian exchange market was at first regulated by the Italian 
Stock Exchange. It was only afterwards that the Market Abuse Directive came into 
force.
458
 At the same time, no actual file cases concerning market abuse were 
revealed.
459
 Alternatively, hedge funds have been blamed for damaging companies by 
excessive leverage. They also have been blamed for destroying jobs
460
, but despite an 
opinion in Italy which considers this a negative phenomenon for the market, the Italian 
Government is not aware of any specific employment cases or firms ruined by excessive 
leverage.
461
 In October 2011, the EC brought forward several regulatory 
recommendations: “Market Abuse Regulation” (MAR) and MAD.462 Their intention 
was to update but also to straighten the current construction regarding market integrity 
protection brought out by the 2003 MAD. Accordingly, the Italian market was forced to 
update all its internal regulations in compliance with the European ones, to cover, for 
instance, the widening of market abuse regulations so that it can comprise all new 
financial tools.
463
  
 
4.3.1.4  Could a more regulated hedge funds industry at European level lead to an 
increase of this sector? 
 
The general opinion is that, a more regulated industry at European level could turn into 
an obstacle to future development of the Italian hedge funds market. So far, foreign 
managers have increased complexity
464
 in setting up a presence in Italy, which will be 
further explained. First, planning an office there lasts longer and is more expensive than 
in most European countries. In the UK, for instance, the FSA makes available 
registration of funds within approximately four months. At the same time, the Italian 
manager registration process takes three months, while the funds’ authorisation takes 
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four extra months, which is also very expensive.
465
 The first application implies that the 
paid-up worth reaches at least EUR1,000,000
466
 while associated costs are generally a 
lot higher.
467
 Additionally, the more regulated the hedge funds industry will be, the less 
appealing hedge funds managers will find to settle their funds in Italy. 
 
4.3.1.5  The AIFM Directive impact on the Italian regulatory regime  
 
The AIFM Directive aims to prevent any negative consequences for “all financial 
market participants” as well as the underlying market security through specific rules 
regarding inter alia, own funds, gearing ratio, conduct of business rules, rules regarding 
manager’s remuneration, information and/or disclosure rules, financial accounts 
provisions. 
 
The Inconveniences of the Previous Fiscal Regime. “The previous tax system of Italian 
investment funds was based on the principle of taxation of the increase of the funds’ net 
asset worth during each year which was falling under a tax at the rate of 12.50% that 
had to be paid at fund level instead of by the investors.
468
 The income from foreign 
funds with EU passport falls under a withholding tax at a rate of 12.50%
469
 (20% for the 
income payable and realised starting from January 1, 2012), the investors being the ones 
paying this tax in accordance with a cash basis when they receive the income realised, 
through the periodic distributions by the fund or through the trade or redemption of their 
units.”470 There were several disadvantages associated to the application of this different 
tax regime for Italian investment funds. First, Italian investment funds presented the 
lowest performances even when their returns equalled those achieved by the other 
foreign funds with EU passport because they had to pay an yearly tax on the increase of 
their net asset worth and to indicate in their financial statements their net returns of this 
tax. Second, by paying the tax on the increase of their net asset value each year, Italian 
investment funds were unable to reinvest the money used for paying this tax. 
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Consequently, they obtained lower yields than those of the other foreign funds with EU 
passport not subjected to the tax in their location country.
471
 The factor with the greatest 
impact on the different investment market in Italy related to risks and opportunities is 
represented by the initiation of marketing of European passport products if tax 
harmonisation issues are solved. 
 
Giulio Tremonti
472
 best advocated the need for hedge fund regulation, also requesting 
the tighten of regulations in this industry. Similarly, he requested the supervision of 
funds by banks.
473
 Therefore, the threat to the domestic industry is evident: there will be 
no further need for Italian hedge funds and the path will be clear for the repositioning of 
management, and for UCITS products. There is another explicit risk (though for 
customers it may turn into a chance): the decrease of the number of domestic players in 
the industry, all to the advantage of global asset managers with centres of expertise 
positioned in other European capitals. By contrast, this process could be a benefit for the 
market, if its transparency, the interests and benefits of final customers are considered.  
 
According to the above-mentioned, the general opinion is that a more regulated industry 
at European level could become an obstacle for future development of the Italian hedge 
funds industry. Therefore, it seems that Italy will be on the same side with the UK and 
the US, as all three are in favour of an adjustable point of view on hedge fund 
regulation. 
 
4.3.2  France: overview of hedge funds regulatory framework 
4.3.2.1  The hedge funds regulatory framework evolution in France 
 
The COB
474
, the French securities regulatory authority that was to be incorporated in the 
“Autorité des Marchés Financier”(AMF) in 2004, regulated between the late 1980’s 
and the early 1990’s the set up of a number of specialised funds falling outside the 
framework of the UCTIS I Directive.
475
 Alternative management activity has increased 
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by the late 1990’s, mainly thanks to the French FoHF476, until the declining yields of 
low-risk fix income vehicles, in conjunction with the 2000-2003 bear equity markets, 
generated interest in alternative investments.
477
 
 
In 2003, the COB published a “position on multi-management”, specifying the 
conditions under which French investment managers could make “alternative 
investments”, either based on a discretionarily investment management settlement478 or 
through a new type of FoHF. In August 2003, the Financial Security Law
479
 was 
adopted. In November 2004, the new Réglement Général de l’AMF (AMF General 
Regulation) introduced detailed rules set up under the Financial Security Law.
480
 An 
AMF Instruction of January 2005
481
 formalised the description of the contents and 
procedures for the submission of the prospectus necessary for the authorisation of 
leveraged and contractual hedge funds. 
 
The newly introduced legal framework sets up two categories of authorised on-shore 
hedge funds, without providing a definition thereof: “ARIA funds” and “Contractual 
funds”. On-shore ARIA funds and FoHF 482 are established on different rules. They can 
be established as investment companies, typically “Société d’Investissement à Capital 
Variable” (SICAVs) or, more often, subject to law of contract (as – FCPs).483  
Contractual funds are the most flexible of the newly introduced alternative investment 
tools. Their purpose is to invest in any of the financial instruments listed “in Article L. 
211-1 of the Monetary and Financial Code”, as well as in bank deposits.484  
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In September 2007, ARIA FoHF was amended.
485
 Articles 313-54 and 411-34 of the 
AMF General Regulation were revised (as was Article 29 of Instruction n° 2005-02) to 
ensure that the eligibility of foreign target funds would be determined on the basis of 
applying a selection model founded on four fundamental principles covering the key 
operational/organisational procedures of the underlying funds, their legal status, the 
rules established for their segregation and value of their assets, as well as the 
certification of their financial statements by an external auditor. 
 
Hedge funds are taxed across France similarly to UCTIS “mutual funds.” The marketing 
and distribution of foreign non-UCTIS funds is subjected to the requirement of a prior 
AMF operational license like the domestic alternative investment vehicles. That licence 
will be issued under the achievement of AMF regarding the subjection of the applicant 
to prudential supervision and transparency rules similar to those used in France and to 
the existence of a mutual arrangement between AMF and the supervisory officials in 
charge of the applicant’s state of origin to facilitate the information exchange.486 
 
Hedge funds located outside France cannot be disseminated there unless they are 
authorised by the AMF, acknowledged by identification of some equal disclosure 
regimes and by the presence of a settlement for the entire data trade.
487
  
FCIMT, ARIA, and Contractual OPCVMs are allowed to be exchanged only for 
particularly sophisticated investors. The qualified investors are the only ones allowed to 
purchase and hold entity shares or stock, or other lawful firms/investors investing 
minimum half a million EUR. Still, the Financial Markets Authority can grant the 
shares or stock signed by different investors, according to the investors’ type but also 
according to the funds’ degree of risk.488 
 
After the French authorities took measures for tackling this ongoing financial crisis in 
order to stay aligned with the global agreement regarding absolute necessity of 
improving financial regulations for avoiding similar future crisis, a new regulation was 
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implemented by the French Parliament, namely, the “Banking and Financial Regulation 
Act n° 2010-1249
489
 of October 22, 2010 (the Act).”490 In many aspects, the Act may be 
seen as a “Dodd-Frank Act à la française.” 
 
4.3.2.2  The French regulatory framework: scope and objectives 
 
The advantages of hedge funds are widely recognised.
491
 In France, the 1990 - 2000 
period led to significant reforms for the financial industry, concerning deregulating 
matters, but also liberalising financial processes.
492
 The tendency to become highly 
diversified financial markets widely accessible for various investment vehicles, starting 
from a classical bank-fundamental standard, occurred together with different regulatory 
limitations regarding hedge funds. Besides, this issue resulted into major political 
debates in France concerning major risks associated to asset industries. Hence, these 
disputes focused mainly on the Tobin fee matter, which had been imposed on financial 
exchanges.
493
 Thus, France demanded for a tighter legal regime for hedge funds. 
 
France has introduced new legislation (legal instruments for hedge funds in 2003-2004) 
with the purpose of mitigating the prudential risks associated to extremely leveraged 
institutions. 
It is supposed that there are three basic subjects to be regulated in terms of hedge 
funds.
494
 Thus, the primary objective of the strategic plan established by France is the 
investor protection.
495
 The second objective is to reinforce their risk policy, and the 
third objective is to encourage Paris as a capital, but also France as a financial 
                                                 
489
 Published in the Journal Officiel on October 23, 2010. 
490
 http://www.complinet.com/Dodd-Frank Act/news/analysis/article/france-regulates-short-sales-and-
implements-a-new-reporting-regime-for-net-short-positions.html, accessed on 6.06.2012. 
491
 Mustier Jean-Pierre & Dubois, Alain, “Risks and Return of Banking Activities Related to Hedge 
Funds”, Banque de France, Financial Stability Review–Special Issue on Hedge Funds, 88-89, 2007. 
492
 O'Sullivan, M., “2007: Acting Out Institutional Change: Understanding the Recent Transformation of 
the French Financial System”, Socio-Economic Review 5/3, 389- 436. 
493
 Woll, C. (2011), “Beyond Ideological Battles: A Strategic Analysis of Hedge Fund Regulation in 
Europe”, Les Cahiers Européens de Sciences Politiques, n° 02, Paris: Centre d’études Européennes at 
Sciences Po., p. 9. 
494
 McCarthy, Callum, “Transparency Requirements and Hedge Funds”, Banque de France, Financial 
Stability Review – Special issue on hedge funds, no 10, 2007, p. 78. 
495
 Philipp M. Hildebrand, (2007), Op. Cit., p. 71. 
151 
crossroad
496
 develop a fine relation involving the investor security and a dynamic 
financial market.  
 
4.3.2.3   The advantages and disadvantages of French regulatory framework 
 
France has always been a regulated country with a fervent legislative agenda.
497
 
Establishing a hedge fund in France is difficult because France limited very much the 
establishment of hedge funds on its territory, while French taxation officials regarded 
with great disapproval offshore investments
498, but this can be applied to a manager’s 
advantage that investors are attracted by “super protective” regulatory regime. The 
Financial Markets Authority’s focus on tight regulatory systems but also transparent 
ones signifies that many hedge funds settled in France are developing easily accessible 
but also instructive homepages, especially as compared to their counterparts from 
UK.
499
 
 
Still, hedge fund managers acknowledge the fact that France is an atypical country to set 
up a hedge fund, but it can be a good idea as competition is not an issue, since hedge 
funds managers usually avoid France. On the one hand, AMF makes its presence felt 
through control rather than proactive attendance in encouraging new fund management 
business. In this respect, instead of being encouraging, the Financial Markets Authority 
behaves somewhat impartial while having to do with advancement and ambitious 
development of hedge fund managers but also it does not look like forthcoming with 
regard to supporting new arrivals. Thus, it will be extremely difficult for France to 
compete with major European alternative hubs. Therefore, the comparisons between 
France and other UK or Luxembourg located funds is useless. 
 
Nevertheless, the AMF’s reputation for being strict can be beneficial. Many investors, 
among which “the high net worth individuals” and private investor’s targets rely on the 
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French regulatory system and the sense of security that it provides. France also has a 
good reputation in terms of the quality of its service providers. It is true that France may 
not be able to compete with England and Luxembourg in terms of numbers, but it could 
develop a distinct competitive edge. 
 
4.3.2.4  Could a more regulated hedge fund industry at European level lead to an 
increase of this sector? 
 
The French regulations of hedge funds reduced their development. Nevertheless, if the 
last improvements were to be taken into account there would be indeed a major shift on 
behalf of the officials from France. In compliance with these improvements, significant 
progresses and numerical increases are expected in the future for the French hedge 
funds market. Accordingly, this particular market has the necessary resources but also 
professionalism to help customers create new funds.
500
 Nevertheless, a more regulated 
industry at European level could lead to a small increase of the sector in Europe, or even 
to stagnation. 
 
4.3.2.5  The impact of the AIFM Directive on the French regulatory framework 
 
France is somehow in the middle of a battle against the UK due to its over-zealous 
government controlled by beliefs and national concerns. Some British observers tend to 
appreciate that the AIFM Directive represents a straight assault on the UK, orchestrated 
by French officials.
501
 Since around “80% of the hedge fund industry is located in 
London or more generally in UK, while for France there remain few funds to settle in, it 
becomes clear why the French did not have too much to lose.
502
 At the same time, a 
French-German alliance (“for the single market in financial services they joined 
forces”503) in terms of regulation reform in global finance appeared to be crucial for the 
AIFM negotiations. If at first, the common concern in hedge fund regulation started in 
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“2007, in Heiligendamm, the city where the G8 summit took place”504, at the time the 
French request for a stricter regulatory approach had little impact. Later on, when the 
financial crisis became visible, French politicians understood this was their chance to 
proclaim their main goals. Nevertheless, in the end, France failed in casting offshore 
funds out of the European market. It has however acquired a regulatory frame of 
reference with regards to hedge funds looking very much alike to that which at first 
supported the structure of the retail mutual funds industry.
505
 Still, as the French 
government insisted, the main issue is not the origin of funds, if legislative requests 
imposed on “hedge fund managers” are being respected. Accordingly, any 
comprehensive regulatory framework is appealing, as they hold the minimum number of 
their industry’s financial interests at stake. 
 
The AIFM Directive should not significantly affect French managers because the 
French regulators already control investment managers. Since French regulatory 
framework is strict, an even stricter one will not affect managers that much. However, 
the French authorities are deeply aware of the improvement in the UCITS area, as this is 
the main cause that makes many French asset managers prefer to move their operations 
to Luxembourg. With the growing employment of the UCITS tools by alternatives 
managers, the development of Luxembourg as a major fund centre appears quite 
probable. Against this, France is keen to retain its very large and well developed funds 
sector. Several French asset managers are not only major players at home, but the 
owners of leading asset managers based elsewhere around the world. The interaction 
between the AFM and these global giants gives the regulator a uniquely well informed 
image on developments across the investment management sector. 
 
As a final comment, France will protect national benefits and current industry 
organisations. Also, the French government is deeply concerned with the industry 
claims and takes all possible actions to ensure the protection of important components 
of economy against the supervision recommendations. 
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4.3.3  Ireland: overview of hedge funds regulatory system 
4.3.3.1  The Irish hedge funds regulatory system evolution 
 
Ireland is an alternative asset management jurisdiction, with major global alternative 
investment administrators who have significant operations in Ireland.
506
 The legislation 
concerning the establishment of non-UCTIS collective investment schemes was 
introduced in this jurisdiction one year after the transposition of the UCTIS I Directive 
into the Irish law.
507
 The legal alternatives were extended in the middle of 1990’s with 
the enactment of a law regulation Irish non-UCTIS investment limited partnerships
508
 
and, more recently, through the adoption of a law regulating “Common Contractual 
Funds” (CCFs).509 
 
At the end of 2008, 10,855 Irish and non-Irish funds representing over EUR1.4 trillion 
in net assets were in aggregate. The total number of regulated investment funds 
(including sub-funds) established in Ireland set down their best performance ever 
attained also surpassing “EUR1 trillion mark.”510 In accordance with the statistical data 
provided by the Central Bank reports, the overall worth regarding funds located in 
Ireland increased by 40% since 2009, reaching the amount of EUR1,008 billion towards 
the end of 2011.
511
 Currently, the Irish funds total more than 11,000, while there are 
over 895 fund sponsors coming from more than 50 states using Ireland with the purpose 
of a global fund focal point.
512
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The Central Bank Reform Act 2010
513
 was enacted on the 1
st
 of October 2010. This 
document merged roles held by “the Central Bank and the IFSRA”514, setting the 
foundation for the Central Bank of Ireland. Accordingly, “IFSRA” is to be dissolved. 
The Irish alternative management legal framework is constantly updated through non-
UCTIS Notices (NUs) and Guidance Notices
515
 published by the “Irish Financial 
Services Regulatory Authority”(IFSRA).516 Ireland’s leading position as a hedge fund 
administration centre was consolidated by allowing the listing of hedge fund units in the 
Irish Stock Exchange.
517
 
 
Irish law acknowledges four different types of hedge fund-like non-UCTIS collective 
investment schemes: “Professional Investor Funds” (PIFs), “Qualifying Investor 
Funds” (QIFs), “Common Contractual Funds” (CCFs), but also “Retail Funds of 
Unregulated Funds” (Retail FoHF). The classification of non-UCITS is presented in the 
scheme below: 
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Figure 8. Non-UCITS investment structures in Ireland 
Source: Bank of Ireland and the author’s own interpretations, 
http://public.boiss.com/faq 
 
Non-UCTIS collective investment schemes can be constituted as unit trusts, open-ended 
“or closed-ended variable capital investment companies, investment limited 
partnerships or CCFs.” “Unit trusts”, as well as “investment companies” can develop 
“as single funds or as umbrella funds.” PIFs and QIFs are sophisticated investor funds 
that can be set up either as single-manager or as FoHFs. PIFs have “a minimum 
investment requirement of EUR125,000”518 and need to comply with investment 
restrictions (in regard to diversification and borrowing) which can be waived or relaxed 
by the IFSRA “on a case-by-case basis.”519 The QIFs used which have minimum 
investment requirement around the amount of EUR250,000, could market their shares 
or units to “qualifying investors” only520 and were not falling under some investments 
                                                 
518
 NU 12, paragraph 2.  
519
 NU 12, paragraph 1. 
520
 NU 24, paragraph 3. “Qualified investors means any natural person with a minimum net worth in 
excess of EUR1,250,000 (excluding main residence and household goods) or any institution which owns 
or invests on a discretionary basis at least EUR25 million or whose beneficial owners are qualified 
investors.” 
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or leverage limitations
521
. Therefore, these are the ideal hedge-fund vehicles. In 
accordance with these modifications, there have been some diminishments of the 
subscription, from EUR250,000 to EUR100,000.
522
 Similar reductions are expected. If 
these reductions are going to occur, reductions alike will conduct to the establishment of 
EUR50,000, representing the lowest subscription released by PIFs. 
 
PIFs and QIFs that are FoHFs can make investments around 100 percent of their net 
worth in unregulated schemes, subject to a maximum of 20% and 40% in any such 
unregulated
523
 scheme, respectively. It was in 2007 that a recently created authorisation 
action for QIFs was implemented by the FR. According to the new authorisation 
structure, depending on meeting the pre-arranged criterion, QIFs are currently able to be 
legitimated “by the FR on a filing only basis so that once a complete application for 
authorisation is received by the FR on Day X, a letter of authorisation for the QIF can 
be issued by the FR on Day X +1.”524 No further pre-examination will be made. 
 
Many alternative investment strategies may for the time being become fit as a product 
of UCITS III (receiving more elasticity as soon as UCITS IV new Directive is adopted) 
or within QIFs from Ireland.
525
 
 
Other model of new funds market from Ireland consisted in launching the so-called 
CCF, designated with the pooling of pension fund investments in mind and are defined 
in the 2005 Act as unincorporated collective investment schemes established by an 
                                                 
521
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executive firm, whose members share by contractual agreement in the undertaking’s 
assets as co-owners.
526
  
 
Until 2002, Irish retail FoHF that were neither PIFs nor QIFs, were allowed to invest 
maximum 10% of their “net assets” into unregulated funds, restriction removed once 
new rules on Retail FoHF were introduced.  
 
Tax-resident regulated funds from Ireland are exempt from charges on their revenues or 
earnings, regardless of investors’ residence. Similarly, “no Irish stamp, capital or other 
duties apply on the issue, transfer or redemption of shares or units”527. Withholding tax 
does not apply to distributions for individuals not residents of Ireland but it must be 
deducted by a fund on payment to Irish residents at the standard rate plus 3%. 
 
Third country investment funds wanting to market their shares or units to or from 
Ireland can only do so after obtaining a CFSAI authorisation. The process is conditional 
on the CBFSAI’s “approval of the funds’ promoter and of the fund itself”, including 
specificity in terms of service suppliers (mainly, its fund manager and custodian).  
 
QIFs cannot deliver for sale into other countries. However, this change in 2013, when 
the AIFM Directive will be introduced. New EU legislation in 2009 anticipated the 
adoption of the new UCITS IV Directive with a target implementation date of 1 July 
2011. Ireland is one of the first EU States to implement the AIFM Directive into the 
national regulation, as it implemented this Directive on time.
528
 This should deliver a 
number of benefits, including simplified cross-border distribution procedures, an 
European passport for UCITS management entities but also a framework for cross-
border consolidation of UCITS. In December, the legislation designed to provide an 
efficient framework for re-domiciling a fund to Ireland was passed by the parliament.
529
 
“The Companies (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2009” was enacted into law not long 
ago. Its main objective is to increase efficiency regarding the migration of funds to 
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Ireland, but also to reduce any burden caused by the regulations to the migrating 
entity
530
. This represents one major optimistic move forward to funds, which might 
therefore be attracted to re-domicile in Ireland in order to establish within a location 
where it will be much easier to treat all possible demands of the AIFM Directive.
531
 
This new process will be accessible additionally to anterior lawful practices, comprising 
assets transfers, and at the same time it is anticipated to precipitate the onshore move.
532
 
According to the statistics provided by the Central Bank of Ireland, barely two of the 
477 investment entities receiving authorisation (1,249 including sub-funds) were re-
domiciling in Ireland.
533
 
 
4.3.3.2  The Irish regulatory system: scope and objectives 
 
The hedge funds regulatory background in Ireland is essential in terms of the next 
dynamics of the funds market. Pragmatic regulation of hedge funds is vital if substitute 
investment products are to grow in the flexible environment in which they must work to 
achieve their objectives. “The IFSRA”, officially promoted clear expansion of the funds 
industry from Ireland and its success was unquestionably due mostly to the legal and 
regulatory framework which is in force and the reputation and integrity of the IFSRA. 
On this account, it should be noted that better regulation is the secret to find a balance 
between defending the investor and giving fund managers sufficient scope and 
flexibility to accomplish their job properly. In this context, there are several major 
objectives: first, to make sure that suitable but also efficient regulation will be enacted 
for financial entities but also for the entire industry; second, to minimise all risks that 
might lead to failure. This could be achieved by ensuring the observance of prudential 
conformation and other requests.
534
 The third will be to make sure that all actions will 
be taken for the well-being and best protection of clients involved in financial services. 
                                                 
530
 See http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2009/en/act/pub/0045/print.html, accessed on 4.03.2012. 
531
 See http://www.aima.org/en/document-summary/index.cfm/docid/234CC5A2-A424-49F3-
9CCD983A01CF17CC, accessed on 4.03.2012. 
532
 Dickinson, C., (2009) “Debate on Hedge Fund Domicile Continues as Managers Find Alternative 
Solutions”, HFM Week, Pageant Media Ltd. 
533
 Ibid. 
534
 Central Bank of Ireland, 2010, “Enforcement Strategy 2011 – 2012”, p. 8.  
http://www.centralbank.ie/regulation/processes/enforcement/documents/enforcement%20strategy%20201
1-2012.pdf, accessed on 04.03.2012. 
160 
The certain way to do this is by taking care of clients but also of investors through 
business norms conduct and other protective procedures.
535
 
 
4.3.3.3.  The advantages and disadvantages of the Irish regulatory system 
 
Ireland’s reputation of international leader in hedge funds and management centre for 
international alternative investment funds (AIFs) signifies that any legislation related to 
the management of funds will be analysed to determine whether it will convey negative 
costs for what has been a flourishing industry in Ireland. Also, “Ireland’s popularity as a 
fund domicile is no surprise
536
, given its robust regulatory and highly developed fund-
services environments. Its attractive tax regime, under which UCITS and other 
alternative funds remain entirely tax free, also offers it a key advantage over its 
competitors”537. 
 
Irish hedge funds structure alternatives, the present regulatory framework and also the 
strong management model represent an advantage for investors, to whom Irish 
regulation of hedge funds offer the necessary transparency
538
 and comfort levels. 
Ireland’s regulations offer structures that fit well the different investor profiles, various 
fund strategies and aims. 
The major issue in maintaining the confidence of hedge funds investors has to be 
Ireland’s ability to control the current wave of international regulatory reform. 
Currently, Ireland is experiencing what could be called a continuous regulatory change. 
 
4.3.3.4.  Could a more regulated hedge funds industry at European level lead to an 
increase of this sector? 
 
Lately, Ireland is apprehended in a positive manner, even “highly regarded and well 
regulated environment for investment funds”539, serving diverse forms of funds. It also 
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provides cautious regulatory not only for retail but also for refined funds. Accordingly, 
these are crucial reasons setting the basis of their prosperity in Ireland. Moreover, “the 
Irish Financial Regulator” tends to be acknowledged as adaptable, accessible but also as 
receiving ideas favourable for fixed time limits for exempting the funds. A wide range 
of persons wishing to invest seek exposure to alternative asset classes, still, they lack the 
desire to invest in lightly-regulated jurisdictions (for instance British Virgin Islands, 
Cayman). Apparently, they currently value their status of being under authorisation of 
the “Irish Financial Regulator.” In addition, this organisation becomes gradually used 
for hosting secondary tools, for example both CDOs and CLOs, since they encounter 
problems in their promotion as debt services, within this ongoing industry 
background.
540
 Therefore, a more regulated industry at European level could lead to a 
growth of the hedge funds sector in Europe. 
 
4.3.3.5.   The AIFM Directive impact on the Irish regulatory system 
 
The idea to harmonise the level of hedge funds regulation in Europe is generally 
acknowledged in Ireland. Particularly, the projected European passport and the 
appreciation of the meaning of using professional service providers are considered as 
positive aspects of the AIFM Directive by the IFIA.
541
 Yet, other aspects of the AIFM 
Directive have been met with suspicion.  
 
The AIFM Directive advances restrictions that exceed by far the regulatory level 
currently existing in Ireland. Provisions related to a “valuator” and “depositary” include 
particular problems identified by the Financial Regulator in Ireland, the IFIA and the 
Department of Finance. Nevertheless, the main concern in Ireland refers to the effects 
on the funds administration industry in Ireland. The possible protectionist 
interpretations of certain provisions referring to the third countries
542
 have caused great 
concern, mainly due to Ireland’s significant contribution to non-EU funds management. 
                                                                                                                                               
 http://download.pwc.com/ie/pubs/pwc_ireland_the_one_stop_shop_for_investment_funds.pdf, accessed 
on 04.03.2012. 
540
 McCann, Fitzgerald, (2010), “A Safe Harbour for Turbulent Times Regulated Funds in Ireland”, p. 2. 
http://www.mccannfitzgerald.ie/knowledge/client-briefings/item/3293/regulated-funds-in-ireland---a-
safe-harbour-f.aspx, accessed on 05.05.2012. 
541
 IFIA. 
542
 IFIA, “Irish Funds Industry Association’s Response to ESMA’s Draft Technical Recommendation to 
the European Commission on Likely Implementing Proposals of the AIFM Directive Concerning 
Supervision and Third Countries”, http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/7-IFIA.pdf, accessed on 
05.05.2012. 
162 
The IFIA considers the legislative burden charged on managers and service providers to 
be also disproportionate and likely to result in funds complete operation outside the EU, 
with negative impact on business and employment favourable circumstances of the 
industry here. 
 
Ireland is prepared and very well located for the implementation of the EU’s AIFM 
Directive. Most academics consider that this Directive will offer considerable increase 
for the thriving Irish investment funds market.
543
 In its position of essential midpoint for 
a substitute investment fund, Ireland connects more than 40% of total worldwide hedge 
fund capital, reaching the amount of EUR183 billion shares invested in non-UCITS 
funds located in Ireland. Out of this amount, EUR133 billion are invested in highly 
qualified QIFs. Under these circumstances, the alignment of the Irish regulations with 
major AIFM Directive requests becomes predictable. 
 
As mentioned before, “the Irish Funds Industry” received the AIFM Directive very well. 
Consequently, Ireland considers itself prepared for the AIFM Directive. At the same 
time, since it is an EU member and an onshore country, the QIFs inevitably meet all the 
requirements of the AIFM Directive. Also, the proceedings made by the Central Bank 
from Ireland and by the Regulatory bodies from Ireland will automatically guarantee 
that QIFs stay prepared for the AIFM Directive, proving to be a very attracting product 
and trying at the same time to benefit from the European passport starting with 2013. In 
this respect, it is expected that the AIFM Directive will be efficient and will highly 
impact the Irish alternative funds market.
544
 
4.3.4  Luxembourg: Overview of hedge funds regulatory framework 
4.3.4.1  The evolution of hedge funds regulatory framework in Luxembourg 
 
“Luxembourg is one of Europe’s leading financial centres and is second only to London 
in terms of concentration of financial and banking activity.”545 About 150 international 
banks are located in Luxembourg. 
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In 1983 the first complex “investment fund legislation in Luxembourg” was 
implemented. Ever since, investment funds developed thoroughly, under the name of 
“Undertakings for Collective Investment” (UCI). Net assets under management have 
reached EUR2,225,600 billion in Luxembourg investment funds at the end of April 
2012
546
. This represents an increase of 6.16% since the end of December 2011. 
Currently, there are minimum EUR143 billion in Luxembourg in AUM in minimum 
700 hedge funds, but also FoHF.
547
 In addition to the foregoing, Luxembourg has also 
considerable experience in administering non-Luxembourg domiciled hedge funds but 
also FoHF. The main aspects that attract the international promoters of Luxembourg 
investment funds are the favourable legal environment, the know-how of well-
established service providers and the pragmatism and reactivity of the supervisory 
authority. 
 
The establishment of on-shore non-UCTIS funds in Luxembourg was made possible 
with the enactment of the 1988 UCTIS law
548
, complemented soon thereafter by a law 
on non-publicly traded institutional investor funds (the “1991 Law”).549  
 
Luxembourg’s non-UCTIS legal framework was silence on a number of key issues 
handled on item-by-item by “the CSSF”550 (for example, prime brokerage and shore 
sales) and the discretionary nature of the approval of domestic non-UCTIS collective 
investment schemes launching. These prompted the “Commission de Surveillance du 
Secteur Financier” (CSSF), Luxembourg’s financial sector supervisor, to adopt a 
Circular in December 2002, laying down rules that apply to funds pursuing alternative 
investment strategies (the “2002 Circular”).551 
 
Luxembourg’s regulatory regime was complemented with the adoption, at the beginning 
of 2007, of a regulation regarding the specialised investment funds
552
, which repealed 
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“the Law of 19th of July 1991.” Other significant developments included the abrogation 
of the restrictions imposed by a 1991 Circular
553
 on the listing of offshore funds’ units 
on the “Luxembourg Stock Exchange” (LuSE) and the issuance of a Ministerial Order 
amending its internal regulations on the listing of foreign funds
554
, as well as the 
adoption of a subsequent CSSF Circular laying down the contents of the prospectus of 
foreign funds intending to become listed on the LuSE.
555
 
 
This being said, the Luxembourg regulator has created an innovative and flexible 
framework for qualified investors. The introduction of the new Law on “Specialised 
Investment Funds” (SIF) in Luxembourg means that there are now the following 
possibilities for launching an undertaking for collective investment structure: 
 
Figure 9. “The new Luxemburg Law on Specialised Investment Funds (SIF)” 
Source: KPMG, The new Luxemburg Law on SIF, 2007, p. 1. 
 
Luxembourg law acknowledges two different types of hedge fund-like non-UCTIS 
collective investment scheme: alternative funds and FoHF falling under 2002 Circular 
and “Specialised Investment Funds” under the SIF Law. While used in the preamble of 
the 2002 Circular, the “hedge fund” concept is hardly explained, being accepted as an 
                                                                                                                                               
introducing an alternative to established Luxembourg law vehicles (notably, hedge funds) and broadening 
the pool of investors eligible to invest in non-publicly traded UCTIS. 
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umbrella definition for funds subject to Part II of 2002 CIS regulation pursuing 
alternative investment strategies.
556
 The 2002 Circular does not expressly separate the 
“single-manager alternative funds” from FoHF. 
 
The 2002 Circular encompasses restrictions in terms of borrowing and asset transfers
557
, 
investment policy and short sales.
558
 Specialised investment funds, do not fit any 
quantitative investment limitations.
559
 The purpose of their eligible investors covers 
both institutional and qualified investors (within the meaning of the MiFID) and the so-
called “informed investors” (investisseur avertis). These are individual investors who 
formally adhere to the status of sophisticated investors. They either invest at least 
EUR125,000 in a Specialised Investment Fund or have received very promising 
assessments from a bank, an investment entity or maybe a management entity regarding 
their capacity to properly appraise SIF investments.
560
 Similarly, to ensure continuity 
according to the 1991 law, the SIF Law provides that institutional investors’ funds 
established under the 1991 Law are automatically forced falling under the objective 
imposed by the new rules as of the commencement of the SIF Law.
561
 
 
Investment funds from Luxembourg are subject to “subscription tax”562 levied on a 
quarterly basis on the fund’s “net assets on the final day of the relevant quarter at a rate 
of 0.05%. A reduced rate of 0.01% is applicable, inter alia”563, to those funds subject to 
Part II of the CIS Law adopted in 2002, including their umbrella funds and classes of 
shares, if products are traded only on behalf of institutional investors and SIFs. 
 
The Directive has been implemented in “the European Parliament” plenary session “on 
11 November 2010”, after almost one year and a half of controversial debates.564  
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The impact of the enactment of the Directive will be significant to Luxembourg, as it 
provides major proposals for present “AIFM business models.”565 
 
Hence, present SIF legislation in particular corresponds even at present to most 
forthcoming requests of the AIFM Directive. Another significant aspect is that SIFs 
gather now more than one third of the overall funds established in Luxembourg.
566
 
These statistics demonstrate that Luxembourg is not only an UCITS, but also an 
alternative fund centre. According to EFAMA, currently “Luxembourg is the second 
biggest European fund domicile for regulated non-UCITS funds.”567 
 
However, Luxembourg seems to be very well located to face the challenges brought by 
the AIFM Directive, as many of the requirements of the new Directive exist today in the 
Luxembourg legal and regulatory framework applicable to non-UCITS funds (e.g. the 
need for a depository). Besides, in agreement with Luxembourg’s banking assessment 
within the field of regulated alternative products, there is a general opinion that 
Luxembourg
568
 will be able to quickly but also efficiently respond to all implications of 
the AIFM Directive. 
 
In conclusion, the AIFM Directive could turn out to be a new and major opportunity for 
the Luxembourg financial sector. It will require investments and efforts but 
Luxembourg has all the key attributes to become the future global AIF platform. 
 
4.3.4.2  Luxembourg’s regulatory framework: scope and objectives 
 
Transparency, a never ending topic of discussion for hedge funds, received new but also 
heightened focus in “the wake of the credit crisis” and the Madoff fraud569. This will 
become a major issue for “the regulation of funds in Luxembourg.”570 At the same time, 
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a new regulation is critical for the defence and improvement of Luxembourg’s 
competing stand.
571
 
Also, another essential aim of the Luxembourg regulatory regime
572
 is to ensure 
adequate protection, in a similar manner as the European provisions of an investment 
fund’s assets for its investors. 
 
4.3.4.3  The advantages and disadvantages of Luxembourg’s regulatory framework 
 
 
In view of the alleged Madoff fraud
573
, the Stanford International Bank fraud
574
 and the 
ongoing financial crisis, the increasingly regulated funds will be considered by investors 
the best choice for hedge fund investment. Accordingly, several institutional investors 
decided to move to onshore vehicles and address the larger, more regulated industries, 
such as Luxembourg. In this particular situation, it seems that regulation is an 
advantage, mainly due to this ongoing trend in hedge funds to settle down to better 
regulated jurisdictions like Luxembourg. Still, even if the measurement of the force of 
trans-jurisdictional regulations is pursued, most of the time there are concerns regarding 
the failure to find out overall significant inputs of regulation.
575
 
 
The mixture of Luxembourg’s pragmatic regulatory expansions, strengthening of efforts 
between classical and alternative asset classes and new marketing favourable 
circumstances in areas such as the Middle East and Asia are all to the country’s 
advantage. 
 
4.3.4.4.  Could a more regulated hedge fund industry at European level lead to an 
increase of this sector? 
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Luxembourg is appealing because of its background on hedge funds and FoHFs since 
two models of law are used. The very first is tighter but also strictly controlled by 
regulations, and this enables their distribution them towards an unlimited public while 
the second, the SIF, “is a more flexible system open to qualified investors.”576  
 
Mainly due to the financial crisis, Luxembourg’s hedge funds framework and 
legislation, which used to be perceived by several investors and promoters as quite 
heavy, operates now to its advantage. At present, both the Luxembourg Government 
and the CSSF have a good record in implementing EU directives, by regulation and 
clear understanding, expressing optimism in supporting industry guidance and new best 
practices. Accordingly, a more regulated industry at European level could lead to an 
increase of the sector in Europe, particularly in Luxembourg. 
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4.3.4.5  The impact of the AIFM Directive on the hedge funds regulatory framework in 
Luxembourg 
 
Many French asset managers have already moved operations to Luxembourg due to the 
French authorities sensitiveness about the expansion in the UCITS space. With the 
growing use of the UCITS wrapper
577
 by alternatives managers, the development of 
Luxembourg as a fund centre gives this country a good opportunity to move forward. 
The AIFM Directive enactment has an essential effect on Luxembourg.
578
  
 
Most of the AIFM Directive proposals are not at all new, being quite familiar for hedge 
funds experts domiciled in Luxembourg. Currently, many are already integrated into 
their management, audit, or other processes. Part of them are designed for UCITS, while 
others are designed for “non-UCITS.”579 
 
At the same time, it circumscribes an across-the-board goal,
580
 applied for every EU 
manager handling either EU or non-EU domiciled funds. This Directive is applicable to 
all managers operating outside the EU but managing EU funds, as well as to managers 
marketing EU funds or funds not established in the EU, although marketed within the 
EU.
581
 
 
Similarly, it represents an across-the-board AIFM Directive in terms of asset types for 
investments. In this regard, it comprises “hedge funds, fund of hedge funds, private 
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equity funds, real estate funds, commodity funds, but also funds investing in traditional 
assets such as shares, bonds and money market instruments (if they are not UCITS).”582 
 
One particular easy registering system appears to be granted for all administrators 
holding “assets under management” which encompass either maximum EUR100 
million or maximum EUR500 million in connection with non-leveraged funds, situation 
when no redemption is allowed for investors within five years. Several exempting 
amendments are relevant for existing funds
583
 as well, which are not accepting extra 
registrations. 
 
Certain “investment vehicles” models have no goal because they are not considered 
proper “investment funds”, and the author mentions: retirement funds, “saving 
schemes”, holding companies, but also “securitisation vehicles.” 
 
AIFM Directive considers that AIF represents “Collective Investment Undertaking.” 
This takes finances out of several investors. Accordingly, those particular funds with 
only few individual investors do not fall under the amendments of the AIFM 
Directive.
584
 To illustrate this, the recommendations of the AIFM Directive bring up one 
case: “family office vehicles which invest the private wealth of investors without raising 
external capital.”585 
 
According to the above-mentioned items, this means that non-UCITS in Luxembourg 
and their administrators theoretically fall under the AIFM Directive – “Luxembourg 
Undertakings for Collective Investment” (UCIs),586 SIFs587 and “Investment Companies 
in Risk Capital.”588  
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One major goal of the AIFM Directive is to regulate managers, the AIFM but at the 
same time, although if not directly, their funds management (AIF).  
 
Most of the requests do not involve major changes “for Luxembourg UCIs, SIFs and 
SICAVs” since all need to comply requests alike in compliance with the present 
legislated situation. 
 
Although not only the “Group of Twenty” but also the EC had the primary focus of 
controlling the market of alternative investments and the main objective to manage and 
prevent the systemic risk
589
, currently, AIFM Directive imposes the European passport 
for AIFM. They will possibly get approved in an EU Member State to exchange their 
supervised AIFs to sophisticated investors from EU Members states.
590
 
 
Therefore, one may consider that Luxembourg paid attention to advantages that the 
passport offers and could further change into one major global authority “for retail 
cross-border distribution.”591  
 
A relevant topic of debate in the AIFM Directive’s drawing proposals was the mention 
regarding the third states, for example investment administrators but also investment 
funds registered within non-EU Members. The concessive opportunity presents mixed 
laws applicable both for “AIFM and AIF”592 located in EU non-member states: 
 During the first two years593, only “AIFM” located in EU and their 
administered “AIFs” shall conform to every provision stipulated by the 
AIFM Directive. Consequently, they benefit from “the European passport” 
used by experienced investors to sell across Europe; 
 During that 2 years period, administrators not residing in the EU are not 
allowed to benefit from the passport although they may, under positive 
auditing but also clear requirements, keep on handling the trading of the 
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funds on a non-public offering basis, in relation to private placement 
norms,
594
 because it can enter into force in every state within the EU; 
 As soon as the 24 months period has passed, on the one hand, funds non-
domiciled in the EU are allowed to benefit from this EU passport in case 
the requirements of the AIFM Directive are met. Thus, they convert AIFM 
under the Directive.
595
 On the other hand, they can keep on marketing 
based on “local private placement” systems up to 2018, when “the EC” 
intends to eliminate this type of regulations. 
 
In Luxembourg this signifies a clear advantage “of the European passport for selling to 
professional investors”596 for those AIFM located in EU and their AIFs, starting with 
the second half of 2013. 
 
At the same time, AIFM located outside EU (such as US, Switzerland) and their AIFs 
will confirm their ability to maintain the EU market based on “local private placement” 
norms (similar to the present example) restricted to complying to several requests 
contained within the AIFM Directive. If the private placement regulations seem 
excessively restrictive, the restructuring through introduction of Luxembourg AIFMs 
between the Luxembourg AIFs as well as the AIFMs located outside the EU may be 
considered.
597
  
 
In this case, the AIF could turn out to be managed by an AIFM, assigning the capital 
management operations to the AIFM located outside the EU.
598
 Therefore, AIF is going 
to benefit from the passport starting with the second half of 2013. 
 
According to the primary AIFM Directive draft, it was taken into consideration that the 
AIFM might entrust processes concerning investment administration to a sub-manager 
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although requested that the latter should receive himself authorisation as an AIFM.
599
 
Currently, these amendments are no longer stipulated. These two processes, investment 
but also risk controlling might be entrusted to a third party only if this third party is 
authorized to provide investment management products but also if this third party 
placed under the act of supervising.
600
 In case the funds are domiciled outside the EU, 
the need to cooperate is one of the main conditions. This collaboration must be 
established between regulatory officials of the AIFM but also between the supervising 
authorities within that particular state where investment managers are located.
601
 
 
According to the above-mentioned issues, AIFM comprising “UCITS management 
companies” enabled that (see also below). The administration of investment will be 
entrusted to those particular administrators who do not meet the criteria like AIFM, 
together with investment administrators
602
 acknowledged in states that are not EU 
Members. 
 
“UCITS” executive firms might also be permitted to act like “AIFMs”, if they comply 
with all of the requests of the AIFM Directive. Therefore, in that case, one executive 
corporation will be allowed to supervise not only “UCITS”, but also “AIF.” 
 
The aforementioned aspect offers an auspicious and supreme advantage for the fund 
managers in Luxembourg.
603
 There have been many cases of investors who developed 
individual proper “UCITS” executive firms, while professional suppliers of services 
organised “UCITS” executive firms so that they can provide professional executive 
services for “UCITS” established in Luxembourg by managers which do not have a 
physical attendance here. Continuing this idea, the managers mentioned above are able 
to extend their authorisation and run AIFs.
604
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According to all prior mentioned issues, many adopting proposals are going to be 
organised by ESMA while their adoption will be carried out by the EC. 
 
The preparation for the implementation of these proposals came together with a 
discussion activity where the Luxembourg investment fund market revealed itself as an 
active participant. 
 
Lately, the Luxembourg market has become a major global financial centre. It owns 
complex laws and regulators suit investors’ requirements for now, and it is undoubtedly 
expected to become even more adaptable while also putting into practice the AIFM 
Directive requirements. The Luxembourg market has a vast experience in investments 
services, advertisers and administrators. Acting proficiently in terms of services, it will 
add supplementary benefits due to its regulators, expected to support this particular 
market in developing one rigorous AIFMs and AIFs pattern. 
 
4.3.5  Malta: overview of hedge funds regulatory system  
4.3.5.1  The funds regulatory system evolution in Malta 
 
In Malta, ISA
605
 enacted in 1994 sets up a particularly regime regulating the approval of 
CIS, but also fund administrators, paving this road for the establishment of “retail funds 
and local fund managers.” Six years later, MFSA606 issued particular standards for the 
so-called “Professional Investors Funds” (PIF) with the purpose of putting Malta in the 
role of “European hedge fund location.”  
 
Three major symbols characterise the PIFs regime. The first is the obligation of “fund 
service providers to be established in Malta.”607 The second, PIFs can have every lawful 
structure at the same time taking advantage “from a full tax exemption at fund level and 
for non-resident shareholders.”608 The third and last symbol is that PIFs are forced to 
hire a locally resident individual compliance officer and a prevention of money 
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laundering reporting officer. These officers should monitor the observance of PIF with 
its licence conditions and with the money laundering obligations prevention.
609
 
 
The ISA’s definition of PIF is a CIS, namely a scheme or an arrangement whose object 
is the “collective investment of capital acquired by means of an offer of units for 
subscription, sale or exchange.”610  
 
The PIF regime makes reference to several categories of funds.
611
 If one refers to “an 
umbrella fund, the minimum investment thresholds below are applicable on a per 
scheme basis rather than on a per fund basis.”612 
 
The so-called “Experienced Investor” is a person with the necessary expertise, 
experience and knowledge who is in the position to make his own investment decisions 
and understand the associated risks.
613
 The minimal investment threshold is EUR10,000 
or USD10,000 or the equivalent, except for PIFs which has applied for a licence prior to 
the 1
st
 of January 2010. In this case, the threshold is EUR15,000 or USD15,000 or the 
equivalent. In case of joint holders, the minimum investment limit is still 
EUR10,000/EUR15,000 or USD10,000/USD15,000 (as applicable) or the equivalent in 
another currency.
614
  
 
“A Qualifying Investor” should either have more than EUR750,000/USD750,000 net 
assets 
615
 or should be a member of some individuals having more net assets than 
EUR750,000 or USD750,000.
616
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Other provisions must be met in order to become Extraordinary. These provisions 
include the fact that an investor should have net assets in excess of EUR7.5 million, he 
should be an employee or director of service providers to the PIF, or he should be a PIF 
promoted to Extraordinary Investors.
617
 In addition, there is a minimum primary 
investment set up at EUR 50,000.
618
 “In the case of joint holders, the minimum 
investment limit remains as before.”619 
 
Hedge fund administrators and individuals marketing assets outside or inside Malta 
must receive authorisation from the MFSA. In Malta, “the private limited liability 
company” represents the common organisation used by a fund management company, 
usually alongside a holding company for tax efficiency reasons.  
 
Article 6 of the ISA stipulates that MFSA is not allowed to grant “an Investment 
Services License unless it is satisfied that the applicant is a fit and proper person to 
provide the relevant Investment Services and that all the appropriate rules and 
regulations are applied and observed by the applicant.”620 The goal of this Act is very 
ample, and it covers a large range of domains. Still, in all situations “the MFSA” 
practices similar “standards relating to the fit and proper status to the applicant, his 
performance history, his associates’ history, as well as “the nature of the business.”621 
 
Currently, the management of the funds located in Malta from other locations is 
allowed. At the same time, Malta represents the only country worldwide which enables 
“funds to be self-managed in the same way as UCITS funds can be.”622 In addition, 
minimum two officers are compelled to always stay in Malta.
623
 They have no 
obligation in terms of management positions within the firm, although they are 
demanded to prove a sufficient level of professionalism.  
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MFSA’s ability to impose executive penalties is one of the powers given by the ISA. In 
2007, the MFSA, other laws, but also the 3
rd
 “level MFSA Rules” have been changed in 
order to bring Malta’s regulation in strict conformity with other EU laws.624 The 
secondary legislation falling into the ISA includes the “Investment Services Act 
(Control of Assets) Regulations, from 1998”625 which provide requests regarding 
customers’ protection, but also contractors’ CIS which need to be complied. 
 
The MFSA adopts a risk-based approach to supervision. According to this, a hedge fund 
manager shall be evaluated by reference to the risks that it represents to the MFSA’s 
statutory objectives. This assessment will develop when the fund manager is first 
authorised and periodically thereafter, depending on the risk assessment. Breach of the 
MFSA Rules may give rise to disciplinary action being taken against the offending 
licence holder. Furthermore, certain breaches may also constitute a criminal offence 
under the ISA. 
 
There are two types of collective investment schemes: “prescribed or non-prescribed 
funds.” Usually, the first type means that a Maltese-located fund, have declared their 
value of Maltese assets at minimum 85% of the “total assets value of the fund.”626 
Consequently, those funds that are not overexposed “to Maltese assets and all non-
resident funds are treated as being non-prescribed.”627 When “the MFSA” authorises 
one fund, the latter receives “a tax exemption”, regardless of the legal type of the fund. 
This represents an important advantage in certain structures vis-à-vis jurisdictions 
restricting the tax exemption to certain individual corporate types. 
 
According to the Banking Act of 1994, the fund is subject to “15% withholding tax on 
bank interest payable by licensed banks and a 10% final withholding tax on interest, 
discounts or premiums”628 from different sources like: Malta’s government; legal firms, 
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officials; firms, authorities “resident in Malta or otherwise (public issues)”629; firms, 
authorities “resident in Malta (private issues).”630 
 
4.3.5.2  The Maltese regulatory system: scope and objectives 
 
Malta’s law on hedge funds is complex and flexible. Most of the island states consider it 
a model for onshore directive of hedge funds and think international and European 
measures in regulation of industry would probably bring other countries closer to the 
Maltese model. Its major advantage is its bilingual legislation. All laws in Malta are 
issued both in English and in Maltese
631
, the official languages in the Maltese state.
632
 
This legislation provides clarity and simplicity of understanding, sometimes absent in 
some other onshore jurisdictions. An advantage resides in the fact that Malta melded the 
legal traditions of the Continent with the Anglo-Saxon model.
633
 
 
During the last decade and a half, the Maltese regulatory body was thoroughly 
modernized. This complex regulatory outcome was meant to attract investments from 
abroad and firms across Malta. 
 
The country has a single “financial services regulator, the MFSA.” In contrast to many 
of its counterparts, it can quickly modify the existing rules and change the old ones in 
order to make sure that regulation complies with industry innovations. The principal 
proposer and driver of new financial services legislative initiatives, MFSA succeeds in 
winning new business within the tough competition by ensuring “an efficient 
combination of a robust and yet highly flexible regulatory framework.”634 
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Generally, the legislation makes available a wide-ranging, flexible regulatory structure 
for the establishment, “licensing and marketing of all kinds of CIS and institutional 
funds and investment service providers.”635 The laws also provide a guideline for 
several selected financial processes of non-credit institutions and for the establishment, 
but also multinational identification. “Maltese company law”636 is side by side with all 
applicable EU corporation laws. The island state is well-known for the prompt adoption 
and harmonisation of EU directives. This means the state is fully compatible with all 
EU legislation and that it provides companies established in Malta many of the benefits 
these laws provide to companies thriving to develop in other EU Member States.
637
 
 
In addition to the adoption of EU directives, Malta’s laws also comply with OECD 
provisions on the control and stop of money laundering and insider dealing. 
 
The government considers that foreign investors are completely reassured by the 
consolidation of the various provisions in Maltese law on professional secrecy, without 
obstructing the supervision of fiscal and regulatory compliance or the investigation of 
serious crimes such as money laundering and insider dealing.
638
 
 
Malta encourages an environment that stimulates the development of investment in a 
professional and sound manner. The protection of investors’ interests is extremely 
important. This shows that MFSA has been given full powers to act. At the same time, 
the MFSA understands the importance of enabling the financial services, and especially 
the fund sector
639
 to autonomously innovate but also develop new products. 
 
Whenever pleased with a candidate or firm candidate, the MFSA offers a certificate, 
each of its principals and secondary connected parts are “fit and proper”. Generally, 
there are three criteria that need to be fulfilled: integrity, competence and solvency. 
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In spite of the minute legislation, the culture existing in Malta tends to make things 
happen rather than stop them. Combined with the accessibility and proactive 
development at the MFSA, this makes Malta an alternative jurisdiction by many funds, 
and particularly start-ups.
640
 
 
4.3.5.3  The advantages and disadvantages of the Maltese regulatory system  
 
Hedge funds managers consider that the regulation in Malta is very flexible and also 
knowledgeable. “Thus, Malta prepares itself to challenge the well-known hedge fund 
jurisdictions in Europe. The government is very cautious in stating its competition head-
on with the dominant players in the industry – Luxembourg and Dublin. However, the 
country has an advantageous position after the financial crisis”641. Its rivals do not look 
as good as Malta. Although Malta is a long way behind Luxembourg and Ireland, the 
jurisdiction is moving in the right direction and the country’s advantages of low cost 
and highly skilled workforce, together with an accessible and flexible regulator will 
attract more funds. 
 
Even if the cost advantage is transitory and will eventually disappear as Malta’s 
economic growth equals that of its EU counterparts, it does provide the jurisdiction a 
short-term advantage that Malta is eager to exploit. The domicile related costs in Malta 
are lower by a half to a third than in the other states of Europe. However, cost is not the 
only important issue for hedge fund managers and promoters of the island
642
. The 
MFSA
643
 has made a name for flexibility together with meticulous attention to detail. 
Although the regulation was considered too strict by many – especially as compared to 
Luxembourg and even Ireland – in a world distressed by negligent regulation, it is 
quickly gaining advocates. As an onshore EU authority with advantageous tax rates
644
 
and a population that is acknowledged “for its hard working, fast learning and elevated 
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moral principles”645, the combination seems to make Malta win even more businesses 
during the next period. Even though the total number of funds domiciled in the 
jurisdiction is still small as compared to the more established centres, the industry 
started to grow.   
 
Currently, Malta is creating a niche for itself. This state builds its reputation as the 
jurisdiction chosen by smaller, start-up funds that consider the high costs and crowded 
service sectors of Dublin and Luxembourg to be unfriendly. Under the circumstances of 
a cost-dependant world, funds intend to show investors that their goal is to keep 
management fees low. “They can point to the cost savings offered by Malta as well as 
the safety of an onshore EU jurisdiction.”646 In Malta size is not important. This 
“openness has already gained the MFSA”647 prestige among managers. 
 
Joseph Bannister, chairman and president of the MFSA, believes that Malta’s strong 
regulation is among its greater advantages. The robust regulation is adapted to hedge 
fund managers. The objective is to provide a secure [hedge funds] regime in Europe. 
The policy of pursuing numbers is abolished and quality is the driving force, which is 
very important. The idea is to develop the regime and respond to new ideas from 
managers who are in close contact with the Maltese state. “The aim of the regulation is 
to develop MFSA quality control”,648 he adds. It looks like the hedge funds sector in 
Malta is growing slowly. 
 
4.3.5.4  Could a more regulated hedge funds industry at European level lead to an 
increase of this sector? 
 
MFSA, Malta’s regulator is considered stricter as compared to Ireland and Luxembourg, 
although it has a reputation for approachable and flexible authority. According to Tonio, 
Fenech
649
, tight regulation is nowadays considered good worldwide. Malta’s position is 
very good to capitalise on its reputation, as well as its clear legislation. The real 
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challenge for Malta will be to ensure that it has the necessary skills to provide quality 
services for the industry. Malta’s legislation is pragmatic and well-organised and at the 
same time it provides strong and efficient regulation.
650
 
 
The Maltese regulatory authorities have stated that they are committed to guarantee 
market participation in compliance with regulations but, at the same time, they have 
confirmed a pro-business attitude and the adaptability that can only survive in a small-
sized jurisdiction. As part of the EU, Malta is almost certainly closer to Ireland or 
Luxembourg in terms of strength and depth of its rules than Bermuda or the Caribbean 
jurisdictions. Of course, regulation within the EU is more coherent and stronger than 
that in more classical “offshore” countries. On the other hand, as mentioned above, 
Malta enjoys the advantage of being a small jurisdiction, which has the pragmatic 
complete authority in implementing legislation and regulation. The Maltese regulator 
continuously encourages more custodians to establish in their jurisdiction. 
 
4.3.5.5  The AIFM Directive impact on the Maltese regulatory system 
 
Lately, Malta has a reputation of home-based EU land, which has the ability to draw 
together investment from funds in Europe. The country’s regulatory body is preparing 
“for the effects of the future AIFM Directive”, especially because this regulation 
appears like a major opportunity for Malta to take place as one of Europe’s prime 
financial centres. According to Lawrence Gonzi, in 2012, Malta “ranked among the top 
five emerging financial centres in the world in the City of London’s Global Financial 
Index.”651 Malta provides a perfect entry opportunity for hedge funds managers who 
desire to establish an onshore fund, because the Maltese law is strict and in line with EU 
requirements. Additionally, the MFSA has proved itself practical and business friendly, 
providing an active support to find a key within the context of the laws and legislations. 
 
The effects of this AIFM Directive on Malta are so significant that the hedge funds EU 
market is assumed to increase considerably, probably driven by the presence of a high 
number of funds trying to achieve EU status. Malta is a rather new domicile if we 
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compare it to the other jurisdictions set in the EU. It looks like the growing rate of funds 
during the last five years, the expansion of asset “management companies which moved 
their operations in Malta”652 and the presence of a comprehensive regulatory framework 
for PIFs is favourable for further industry development.  
 
At the same time, the existence of only one regulator, considered accessible and capable 
by the industry itself, further consolidates Malta’s strong position. 
During the following years, Malta will be heading towards challenges and favourable 
circumstances arising from the AIFM Directive. From Malta’s perspective, the 
following “main elements of the UCITS IV Directive are expected to create further 
opportunities for growth: 
 first and foremost, the possibility for UCITS management companies to 
effectively make us of their European passport rights, not only in terms of 
units distribution, but also in terms of UCITS management on a cross-
border basis; 
 the possibility to establish master-feeder structures and the opportunity for 
existing UCITS to convert into a UCITS feeder fund, whereby the master 
and feeder UCITS may be located in different Member States and may 
have different depositaries, auditors and management companies;  
 the streamlining of the procedure and requirements for the cross-border 
marketing of UCITS throughout the EU/EEA.”653 
 
The AIFM Directive is extremely relevant for Malta, which prevails as a well-regulated 
choice of domicile for AIFs, especially following the success of its PIFs regime. 
Though it remains see the practical implementation of the AIFM Directive, it is 
definitely expected to provide new opportunities rather than major restraints for Malta 
as a centre for AIFs and their managers. 
 
As with all new directives, the AIFM Directive will further challenge the international 
funds industry. However, some consider that the benefits will outweigh the challenges 
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and the success of the UCITS Directive, if any, will exercise powerful growth traction 
in the EU alternative investment funds industry.
654
 
 
In a number of offshore domiciles in particular, non-UCITS retail funds and non-retail 
PIFs are already subjected to particular regulation and control by the MFSA
655
. Fund 
management companies operating either in or from Malta, are also regulated and 
controlled by the MFSA in a very similar manner to that of the investment companies 
offering investment management services being covered by MiFID
656
. The tight but 
flexible regulatory regime regulating the alternative investment industry has assisted to 
Malta’s turning into a financial services area and a main onshore fund domicile, and has 
also allowed the MFSA, local practitioners and service providers gain the expertise and 
professionalism necessary to operate and grow in a regulated area. This in itself should 
provide comfort for managers in order to choose Malta as a base for their actions, 
without losing its promising side, that is maximum flexibility (to the extent permitted by 
the AIFM Directive). 
 
Starting from early 2013, the EU managers, qualifying as AIFMs controlling EU AIFs, 
will be provided by the AIFM Directive the right to exercise their passport rights in the 
EU
657
. This means making available services according to the authorisation given in its 
home Member State without asking authorisation agreement from the host Member 
State(s). In addition, in 2015, it could also allow EU managers to manage “non-EU 
AIFs and non-EU managers to manage EU AIFs or non-EU AIFs”658 to take advantage 
from the third country EU passport (simultaneously with the national private placement 
system for a further transitional time of three years).  
 
The EU passport accessible to the manager, related to the management and marketing of 
AIFs, will give managers more freedom to choose where they settle and the AIF they 
control. This will enable them to focus their fund management and marketing activities 
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to reach or involve different European jurisdictions within one EU Member State (and 
have benefits from the cost savings
659
 which naturally bring about). Among the EU 
alternative domiciles, Malta would be a pioneer, with the advantages mentioned above. 
These advantages will be discussed further on. At this stage, it seems that the options 
accessible to the managers would be based on whether “one or both the manager and the 
AIF is/are based inside or outside the EU.”660 The EU managers who want to capitalize 
the European market will be given a strong incentive to set up or move their AIFs in or 
to the EU, in that they are going to “manage and market EU AIFs”661 across the EU as 
from the Directive’s transposition date, which is believed to be early 2013 (the single 
passport from July 2013) – namely, two years prior to the other managers.  
 
EU managers of non-EU AIFs may be facing various problems before they will be able 
to take advantage from the third country EU passport if they try to market within the 
EU, as from 2015. In addition to the manager’s need to comply with the AIFM 
Directive generally, its aptitude for trading AIFs outside the EU under the third country 
EU passport will depend on whether its home Member State meets a number of 
provisions.  
 
A very significant aspect consists in “the introduction of the third country EU passport 
itself, and the phasing-out of the national private placement regimes in 2008, will 
ultimately depend upon the outcome of the ESMA Report and the EU’s positive 
decision on the matter. On this basis, an EU Manager seeking certainty may prefer 
setting up an EU AIF rather than a non-EU AIF or relocating its non-AIFs to an EU 
jurisdiction,”662 (which enables inward re-domiciliation of funds, just like Malta). The 
case of “non-EU Managers managing and/or marketing EU AIFs”, but also/or non-EU 
AIFs may demonstrate to be even more questionable. Besides the problems already 
relayed to EU managers of non-EU AIFs and several supplementary conditions which 
could be relevant for the manager to acquire AIFM Directive authorisation, it will also 
be essential to set up equivalence especially with those third countries where managers 
are usually domiciled to enable direct application of the “equivalence test” if the 
manager wishes to be exempted from special provisions of AIFM Directive. Still, 
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although the AIFM Directive requires the location of the EU funds depositary in the 
same EU Member State of the fund, when implementing the AIFM Directive, Malta is 
expected to make use of the transitional provision under the directive that will enable 
funds established in Malta to appoint a credit institution located in another Member 
State until 22 July 2017. The fund managers will thus be more encouraged to establish 
in Malta.
663
 
  
Managers will certainly be very careful and selective in identifying the most suitable 
EU domicile, which possibly fulfils all their requirements. Despite the many doubts 
concerning the implementation of the AIFM Directive, Malta is believed to compete 
productively for this place, both as a domicile for the fund and for the respective fund 
management operation, thanks to various factors where Malta provides advantages no 
matter of priority order. Malta provides unique environment tax benefits
664
, especially 
for managers and their shareholders with a small resultant tax leakage and has the 
advantage of a wide network of double taxation agreements, while ensuring tax 
neutrality at the fund level. Tax is not, however, the main and only element attracting 
managers to Malta. In addition, the flexible authority, affordability of regulator, 
availability of high professional workforce and the adequate funds infrastructure are 
important elements in turning Malta into the preferred domicile for managers, whose 
number is expected to grow. Especially given the fact that the AIF industry is under 
Anglo-Saxon
665
 players’ control, Malta’s being an English-speaking country has also 
proved to be an influential factor. Another main and attractive point is undoubtedly the 
cost related to locally based service providers, together with those of legal auditing and 
auditing. In addition, another relevant support of the investment services industry in 
Malta is the appropriate accounting and reporting.
666
 
 
To conclude, the introduction of the EU Passport (counting the third country EU 
passport) should give managers new distribution opportunities inaccessible before 
through the national private placement regimes. As mentioned above, the most secure 
option and scenario for managers wanting to (continue to) target European investors, 
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now seem to be that of an EU manager managing an EU AIF and availing itself for the 
EU passport. Meanwhile, other EU fund domiciles will be eager to compete for this 
rank. However, Malta is likely to be the obvious choice for many managers who want to 
access the EU market and this country will continue to support its position as a first 
choice fund domicile and service centre in the EU, considering also its relatively simple 
re-domiciliation procedure.  
 
As the Finance Minister Tonio Fenech said, “Malta has witnessed a rapid growth in the 
number of domiciled funds in the past year”667, a tendency which will probably continue 
in the years to come.  
 
A negative aspect affecting the hedge funds industry is the rule that every AIF must 
assign a depositary in the same jurisdiction in which it [the AIF] is established. The 
growth of the funds services providers network equals the magnitude of Malta’s success 
in attracting funds and their managers. This simultaneous growth represents the 
essential infrastructure necessary to any funds jurisdiction to thrive. The jurisdiction can 
now be proud of a very wide choice of big name fund administrators and auditors, as 
well as lawyers specialising in the funds and financial regulation. One cannot say the 
same about the depositary services providers. Their number is limited at the moment 
and not all of them are internationally recognised brand names. This issue might hinder 
the further industry development.
668
 
 
However, one thing should be remembered: the Maltese hedge funds industry is still 
significantly small as compared to medium-sized hedge funds markets in Europe and 
not only. At the same time, Malta’s industry attracts especially small hedge funds. 
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4.4  Regulation of hedge funds in Swiss jurisdiction 
4.4.1  Overview of hedge funds regulation in Switzerland   
 
There is no specific legal regime that applies to hedge funds and private equity in 
Switzerland. Assets invested in hedge fund products represent approximately 5% of the 
assets invested in Switzerland at present time. This is partially due to the fact that fewer 
restrictions are applied to hedge funds than any other investment vehicles in terms of the 
investments types they can make.
669
 
 
The drawing power of establishing a hedge fund in Switzerland comes first of all from 
its tax favourable jurisdiction, secondly from the light regulatory pressure and thirdly 
from the credibility and lack of uncertainty of the sector. Numerous articles
670
 have 
predicted in 2009 and 2010 a massive relocation of the hedge fund sector from their 
traditional location in London towards the more attractive Switzerland, especially from 
a tax point of view. The anticipated move came in the aftermath of the adoption by the 
British Government of an increase in taxes towards banks and investment firms. Several 
Swiss credit institutions, as well as financial counsellors have therefore made “an 
expertise in alternative investments. Pension funds, insurance companies and even retail 
investors are also increasingly investing in hedge funds, giving them the opportunity to 
diversify risks.”671 
 
 
4.4.1.1  The hedge funds regulatory regime evolution in Switzerland  
4.4.1.1.1  Legal and regulatory framework 
 
The main Swiss legal and regulatory overview in terms of hedge funds is represented by 
the “Collective Investment Schemes Act” of 23 June 2006 (“CISA”) enacted on the 1st of 
January 2007 and adopted by the Swiss Federal Council and the “Swiss Financial 
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Market Supervisory Authority” (FINMA)”672. FINMA issued several circulars relevant 
decisions, respectively, on the 29
th
 of August 2007 updated guides on public offering 
and private placement enacted on the 1
st
 of October 2007, regarding the private 
employment of non-Swiss collective investment schemes. 
 
The CISA was under consultation for revision. The consultation phase lasted from July 
to October 2011. “The Federal Council published the Communication on the Changes to 
the CIS Act and the corresponding draft of the law, subsequently CISA-draft or D-
CISA. Deliberations concerning the revised law should take place in parliament this 
year and enter into force at the beginning of 2013. The law’s revision is urgent because 
Swiss institutions cannot operate foreign domiciled collective investment schemes in 
Europe without approval as asset managers of collective investment schemes following 
expiration of the two year implementation deadline of AIFM Directive in mid 2013.”673 
 
The aims of the CISA partial revision are filling certain gaps in regulation, as they are 
exclusively triggered by the introduction and implementation of the AIFM Directive. 
This being said, lawmakers must be cautious so that rules which go beyond the 
necessary (“Swiss Finish”) do not endanger the competitiveness of Switzerland’s highly 
significant asset management sector. In relation to this, it must be noted that Swiss asset 
managers must also be covered by the duty for authorisation even if they have no points 
of contact to EU Member States in compliance with the AIFM Directive or the UCITS-
Directive. As compared to the initial draft from the 6
th
 of July 2011, liberalisation 
possibilities were introduced in various points within the new CISA-Draft issued by the 
Federal Council on the 2
nd
 of March 2012 and as a result, the “Swiss Finish” was 
somewhat reduced. For the implementation of the corresponding possibility for 
exemption, reference is often made to the Collective Investment Schemes Ordinance 
CISO (“the Federal Council may”) or to the practices of FINMA (“FINMA may”). 
 
In order to avoid a “Swiss Finish”, the manner to implement the new CISA rules at the 
ordinance level and the degree to which FINMA makes use of the possibility to grant 
exemptions will be decisive. The consultation period led to numerous recommendations 
highlighting the need for measures in order to promote the Swiss fund industry. 
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Unfortunately, these measures have to be considered.
674
 Clearly, Switzerland is no 
longer operating outside the “rest of the world.”675 
 
 
4.4.1.1.2  Swiss hedge funds 
 
Looking at the FINMA registered Swiss funds market from the outside to the inside, of 
the 7494 of the total registered funds listed in the Swiss Fund Data
676
 database as at 
8.2.2011, 342 registered funds were listed under the asset class “hedge funds”.  
 
Despite the above-mentioned issues, several structures were located across Swiss. Thus, 
since 1996, the Swiss regulator decided to set up the Swiss FoHF
677
 as “high risk funds” 
under the old “Investment Funds Act” of 1994 (IFA). Over time, this structure has 
turned highly popular
678
 and its flexibility to use single hedge funds was further 
enhanced (e.g., via improved leverage
679
, broader scope of permitted investments), with 
the enactment of the CISA on the 1
st
 of January 2007. The net growth in the amount of 
registered “other funds in alternative investments”680 – proved however quite “non-
existent in 2007 and 2008.”681 
 
Currently, the CISA provides a highly flexible legal background for hedge fund 
processes in Switzerland, setting up innovative regulations for collective investments. 
Yet, very restrictive norms are applied by the relevant Swiss regulations in terms of 
investment restrictions (e.g., permitted investments, limited leverage, etc.), fund 
administration and subscriptions/redemption. “In the past, these may have seemed too 
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many to place Switzerland at a regulatory disadvantage as compared to traditional hedge 
fund jurisdictions, such as Cayman Islands.”682  
The recent difficulties felt by the financial sector and by the hedge fund market in 
particular, but also “the fall-out of Madoff fraud”683, may change this perception going 
forward.  
 
Another form of collective investment schemes is represented by the investment firm. 
Since CISA enactment, these firms came under the jurisdiction of fund regulation (and 
designated SICAFs)
684
, except those companies listed on a Swiss exchange, or not 
allowed to “qualified investors”. The largest part of the pre-existing investment firms 
come under the incidence of one of the exemptions and stay uncontrolled. According to 
regulations, the Swiss investment firm is closed-ended and this often let to a decrease of 
the share price as compared to its net asset value. What came out in these structures is 
much less popular than offshore open-ended hedge funds.
685
  
 
4.4.1.2  Swiss regulatory regime: scope and objectives    
 
The regulatory framework for the regulated hedge funds focuses mainly on investor 
protection. This is achieved primarily through transparency and control of the 
professional qualifications of fund managers and representatives.
686
 
Mutual funds have been authorised since the early ‘90s to register FoHF in Switzerland 
as a particular category of investment, which offers individuals no qualification of 
investors. Besides, FoHF also work under the lawful type of investment firms in 
compliance with “the self-regulating directives of the Swiss Exchange”687 and are 
traded as freely available shares to small investors. 
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The legislative and supervisory construction of hedge funds and FoHF from Switzerland 
focus on investor protection
688
, with emphasis on the professional value of fund 
management firms. In most cases, the licensing procedures for hedge funds but also 
FoHF are stricter compared to those applying to traditional funds.
689
 They involve 
audiences with fund managers and a better evaluation of risk management systems, fund 
managers, reporting lines and internal risk management, and a review of other parties 
involved in the investment scheme, together with the custodian bank, external principals 
and adviser, prime brokers, and managers.
690
 Although not formally presented in the 
regulations, registered hedge funds are placed under strict surveillance. External 
controllers are compelled to have professional background in alternative investments, 
and particular audits must be performed by external professional auditors once every 
three months in the first 24 months after establishment, focusing particularly on the 
structure and risk-return features of individual funds
691
. 
 
The protection of hedge fund investor is also achieved by means of transparency. Even 
funds of managers who are seeking immediate application for an AIFM Directive 
passport and who wish to continue operating under the private placement regime until 
2018 have to comply with various transparency measures.
692
 Hedge fund prospectuses 
are compelled to include a particular warning provision that has to be accepted by the 
SFBC, as well as complete data on the fund investment policy, features, and special 
risks.  
 
Thus, according to UCITS IV, the KII is going to “replace the simplified prospectus.”693 
Target funds are most of the times revealed in the yearbook and semi-annual summaries 
of FoHF, and investors need to be given an opportunity to exert their redemption right at 
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least four times every year. Legal restrictions on hedge funds operations are minimal 
and these focus primarily on protecting the particular structure of the FoHF. FoHF are 
allowed neither to carry out short sales, nor to invest in another FoHF. These are 
prohibited to invest more than 30% of their assets in target funds if these are managed 
by the same manager or management company.
694
 Moreover, funds are not authorised to 
have a leverage for more than six (this used to be a precedent SFBC
695
 practice which 
has been now properly incorporated in the provisions of the regulations). 
 
4.4.1.3  The advantages and disadvantages of the Swiss regulatory regime  
 
Lighter regulation and less costly compliance in present Switzerland appear as an 
alternative to more strictly regulated EU Member States from the perspective of asset 
management. Present regulations stipulate that managers of foreign CIS do not 
necessarily need a regulatory licence to act as managers. This licence is necessary only 
for managers of Swiss-based funds (“mandatory licensing only for managers of Swiss 
funds”696). Certain monitoring duties were delegated to the industry itself by the Swiss 
regulator, setting out industry standards by self-regulation
697
. The configuration of 
management operations in Switzerland is quite simple. Regarding the Swiss-based 
funds, the Swiss regulatory provisions enable the structuring of hedge funds for trade 
investors and/ or accredited investors with no smaller amount of investment boundaries. 
This is an important asset for marketing objectives. The fact that there is no compulsory 
minimum investment (for hedge fund strategies also) allows managers to easily list the 
fund exchange and produce actively managed ETFs
698
 traded on secondary markets. An 
extremely attractive alternative is given to other jurisdictions by the lack of minimum 
investment thresholds in Switzerland, under the circumstances that one seeks liquidity 
in secondary market trading
699. “Except for the AIFM Directive, Switzerland is a very 
stable country”700. It is a country with very stable and static regulatory and tax system.  
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4.4.1.4  A more regulated hedge funds industry at European level could lead to an 
increase of this sector? 
 
Switzerland is very important with respect to investor base, enabling hedge funds to be 
close to their main client segments, which is a vital advantage, especially in times of 
crisis when demand for accessibility of managers increases. Switzerland hosts a wide 
range of hedge funds (FoHF), and it also provides managers broad exposure to 
institutional clients, in terms of sizeable pension funds, family offices and very large 
diversity of independent asset managers
701
. Apart from this proximity to customers, 
Switzerland overruns many of its European counterparts in terms of political stability 
and quality of life, which is frequently considered by managers as a central reason for 
relocating.   
The expected hedge funds migration from London to Switzerland and the exodus of 
entire organisations has not started yet, but managers are expected to keep opening 
offices in Switzerland.  
 
While profitable functions such as trading will be moved to Switzerland, many hedge 
funds have started, and are likely to continue to keep at least parts of their staff in their 
original locations. Interest in Swiss-domiciled fund structures could increase because 
Switzerland is not directly under the jurisdiction of the AIFM Directive. The “Swiss 
Collective Investment Schemes Act
”702
 also provides relevant favourable circumstances 
with its moderately flexible investment boundaries for alternative funds. Thus, the 
“other alternative investment fund” enables short-selling, leverage of up to 600%703 and 
the possibility to employ a foreign prime broker. 
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4.4.1.5  The impact of the AIFM Directive on the Swiss regulatory regime    
 
The AIFM Directive does not apply because Switzerland is not a member of the EU
704
. 
Still, the FINMA has made no statement whether some transparency aspects of the 
AIFM Directive should still be adopted, and whether co-operation agreements between 
the targeted EU country, the Swiss authorities and the fund domicile’s local authorities 
should be in place
705
. At this moment, the FINMA license is binding only for hedge 
fund managers of Swiss-based hedge funds. Offshore fund managers should not seek a 
regulatory license in Switzerland. Switzerland, as an offshore centre, will also change 
several aspects to suit the AIFM Directive.
706
 
 
The AIFM Directive had a direct impact on the Swiss alternative market: Switzerland 
has become more appealing to the EU managers, mainly to those managers in the UK 
that seem to be most adversely affected by the new rules, besides the impending tax 
reform adopted in the country. Since the implementation of the AIFM Directive, local 
consultants and lawyers have been overwhelmed with inquiries from UK asset 
managers questioning about setting up in Switzerland. The Swiss law has become more 
attractive as a result of its light regulation background. Cantons such as Zug or the city 
of Pfaeffikon in the canton of Zurich will become more attractive to hedge fund 
managers from the UK. The same trend is noticed by Lecocq
707
. For example, provinces 
around Zurich have succeeded to attract a considerable number of hedge funds 
managers due to tax reasons. As a final remark, Switzerland offers high quality of life 
and acceptable to very low taxes.  
 
Nevertheless, recommended changes to be incorporated within the laws of investment 
market in Switzerland raised several concerns because European regulation is already 
very strict and it seems that this country intends to implement even stricter regulations. 
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4.5 Conclusions drawn from the comparison of national hedge fund regulatory 
regimes in single selected European jurisdictions  
 
This chapter has examined the laws and regulations governing the marketing of hedge 
funds in Italy, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta and Switzerland. Given the lack of 
harmonisation of such laws and regulations, the author raised a series of questions to 
order and to compare, at least to a certain extent, the position in these above-mentioned, 
different jurisdictions. 
 
This chapter provides a comparative summary of the legal forms applicable to hedge 
funds in six jurisdictions. It focuses on and explores five EU Member States’ hedge 
fund regulations plus Switzerland.  
 
The author has chosen Ireland, France, Luxembourg, Malta and Italy because they are 
relevant from the point of view of the diversity of regulatory frameworks that co-exist in 
the EU. In addition, the chosen European countries represent the countries with highly 
developed financial sectors inside the EU. Although Switzerland is not an EU member, 
it is also included in the analysis, mainly because, in the international financial world, 
Switzerland is an important player and accordingly, especially as a consequence of its 
foreign policy, many, if not all global financial organisations are to some extent present 
in Switzerland. 
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Figure 10. National legislative measures governing hedge funds 
 
 
Figure 11. Definition of the hedge fund concept 
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Currently, none of the countries subjected to study has a clear definition of the term 
hedge funds, and this conclusion could be applied to all the countries in the world. For 
instance, hedge funds in France are called “multi-market category of funds”, while in 
Italy, they are known as “fondi speculativi” (or speculative funds). It seems that all 
nations agree on the broad concept that hedge funds represent “other fund additional to 
the ones defined”, which can actually mean anything. 
 
The EU can define hedge funds and make a regulation proposal to enable and facilitate 
hedge funds trading outside borders, similar to UCITS funds. Currently, “a hedge fund” 
undeniably represents “an investment vehicle”. The lack of interdictions is the main 
reason for not being defined according to its features, but rather according to what it is 
not. Still, “the EC’s Expert Group on hedge funds”708 proposed to “the EC” to start 
regulating mainly because this will positively affect the trading of FoHF across 
frontiers. However, this Group considers that “the EC” should not start the negotiations 
again regarding essential proposals of the UCITS directive and consequently change it 
one more time, but instead it should start to authorise “UCITS to invest in derivatives 
on fund indicators.”709 
 
Figure 12. Categories of hedge funds which may be set up 
 
Every country enables the setting up of funds, by means of its regulation. They do it 
because there are many returns and knowledge coming from the hedge funds, and if 
they would not, the market and the investment professionals would abandon the 
countries moving in a more auspicious location. For this purpose, countries do not wish 
a tightened hedge funds rule, mainly due to their high relevance for liquidity and 
portfolio diversity. Most of the time, risk mitigation is discovered in the manner how 
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“funds are exchanged to investors and the manner how the domestic funds invest the 
funds’ capital.”710 
 
 
Figure 13. Hedge funds allowed to advertise 
 
Accordingly, various states anticipate the risks connected to hedge funds in various 
ways. The only country that does not allow advertising at all is Italy, while countries 
like France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta and Switzerland do not consider that 
advertising represents a problem if the funds are properly registered. 
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200 
 
 
Figure 14. Limitations regarding how SHFs may invest 
 
One can notice in the above table that various states use different standards. Quite often, 
domestic funds are limited by a certain concentration and therefore have to obey rules 
concerning risk spreading. As already seen in figure n° 12, Italy does not allow 
advertising but when it comes to limits concerning the manner of investing the funds 
capital, there are none. However, if admission “to hedge funds for retail investors” 
proves easy, limitations can frequently be found in the funds’ way of investing their 
financial assets. 
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Figure 15. Is the hedge fund manager regulated or not ? 
 
All the analysed states regulate the hedge fund administrator in order to mitigate the 
risks.  
 
 
 
Figure 16. Is the hedge fund itself regulated or not ? 
 
All the analysed states preferred to regulate the funds directly for risk mitigation. 
 
Since Luxembourg and Ireland accommodate a significant part of the EU-based 
investment funds, it is important to provide an efficient framework on their regulatory 
regime, but also on the regulatory regime in the UK and the rest of the analysed 
countries. Many hedge funds from UK tend to be controlled from London, although 
they are located within small tax jurisdictions. On the contrary, regulation from 
Luxembourg and Ireland was introduced with the aim of allowing them to set up and 
thus re-domicile within their own jurisdictions.  
 
Luxembourg regulatory body enables hedge funds to set up according to the stipulations 
of the 2007 law regarding private investment funds. Accordingly, funds may behave 
like common funds, SICAVS or SIFs, net assets worth EUR1,250 million being 
imposed. SIFs are subject to malleable regulations such as: decrease to 30%, similar 
investment in securities issued by the same entity. According to regulations, a 
prearranged meeting between a Luxembourg - governmental official and an investor, on 
behalf of a Luxembourg fiscal organisation or an institution located in Luxembourg, but 
originating in another EU country is compulsory. It is also binding that assets are 
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evaluated fairly. While proceeding “to a public offering, a prospectus will be required as 
approved by the CSSF.”711  
 
The Irish regulatory regime, similar to that of all EU countries, is founded on a clear 
differentiation between UCITS – which may be exchanged throughout the EU, and non-
UCITS, which may be exchanged cross borders in case the local regulation allows this, 
most of the time relying on some particular investment. Only under exceptional 
circumstances, “non-UCITS” may be sold out for “retail investors”: this can be applied 
usually for “Funds of Hedge Funds” which may become thus an investment in an 
expanded group of non-regulated funds. Thus, “hedge funds or private equity funds” 
should usually select “non-UCITS” models, for instance, “the QIF”, a recipe for which 
the investment and borrowing requests tend to be flexible. These are meant for both 
organisational and high net value persons. Also, funds are compelled to appoint a 
custodian from one bank in Ireland, “or a branch of an EU bank settled in Ireland.”712 
 
Administration has to be provided by management companies, either “licensed by the 
Irish supervisor”713, or acknowledged according to MiFID regulation. 
 
Many states are very restrictive with hedge funds on their territory, enabling only the set 
up of certain hedge funds. In addition, some countries have enacted detailed regulation, 
while others have not. 
 
For instance, the Italian regulations are elaborated by BoI, a credit institution which 
regulates the organisation together with all hedge fund-related processes. Accordingly, 
the latter can be given maximum two hundred persons, each contributing with at least 
half a million EUR. Therefore, BoI does not seem to supervise “hedge funds” directly. 
 
A similar case occurs with the Swiss regime, which does not set up lawful requests upon 
hedge funds, and at the same time, certified and/or experimented investors are given 
without restrictions funds domiciled outside Swiss. While Swiss set up funds are 
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compelled to register, those not domiciled in Swiss can hardly register according to 
money laundering laws. 
 
As already mentioned by the author, in terms of legal regime, regulating hedge funds 
knew two phases: before the financial crisis, the largest part of the jurisdictions had not 
implemented particular regulations regarding hedge funds. In France, for instance, 
regulation is very closely connected with the regulation on common investment funds. 
However, all national analyses stipulated that investment administrators were usually 
regulated regardless of the processes developed within the hedge fund market. 
Additionally, some nations adopted a more liberal approach as far as “funds of hedge 
funds” are concerned, and these countries implemented particular laws in this respect. 
Therefore, their brief overview is considered useful, trying to recognise their common 
characteristics. 
 
The Maltese regime provides low tax rates, low costs and lighter regulation, making it a 
fashionable alternative over other regulatory paradises such as Switzerland or Ireland. 
The low rates of tax, easiness of incorporation and light touch taken by the MFSA have 
made Malta an increasingly attractive destination of choice for many hedge funds. Its 
low cost but high standard of living and warm climate also contributed to Malta’s 
attractiveness for many who seek to relocate. With no sign of improving fiscal and 
regulatory conditions in the UK, many more hedge funds may yet become vulnerable to 
the lure of the Maltese falcon.  
 
In terms of hedge funds exemption, the private offering exemption represents a 
frequently used technique to manage hedge funds. Funds are therefore allowed to be 
exempted in spite of not being given freely “to the public”, although normally they 
might fall under the regulatory approaches of “investment fund”. There are several 
methods to define a private type: by mentioning a number of investors, or by stipulating 
the lowest start up investment. In some countries, “qualified” or expert investors can be 
solicited, while in other states, the number of investors per fund is limited. For instance, 
the Irish and the Luxembourg systems enable access for individual investors through a 
“qualified investor scheme.” 
 
204 
The French and Maltese systems are also connected to the lowest investment 
(USD125.000) and to the investor’s wealth. The Italian system requires a minimum start 
up investment of EUR500,000. Switzerland relies on the interference of authorised 
brokers, with an examination of the supervisor’s prospectus for fullness and 
consistency.  
 
In terms of the FoHF, in locations where FoHF can be made available to the public, 
norms tend to be mild. For example, in France, they reach the lowest amount of 
EUR10,000, and a similar action is also used in Italy. In case of the Irish regime, FoHF 
are accessible only by means of the listing regime. 
 
In terms of the “private law aspects”, hedge funds can be classified in various manners: 
often as lawful authorities located in a jurisdiction with minimal requests, and low 
taxes, if any. In Ireland, the fund can be managed outside the area of authority with 
“advanced financial markets.” At the same time, the depositary function, as well as that 
of backing up will be set up or managed outside “the latter jurisdictions.” Initially, funds 
used to be organised under small alliances, with administrators acting like proactive 
associates and investors behaving like limited associates. This institutional category is 
noticed in several jurisdictions, for instance, in Switzerland.  
 
Simple “contractual funds” are often used mainly due to taxation impartiality. Usually, 
they are not mentioned in regulations, apart from the point of view of the asset 
managers’ obligations. For example, in France, this particular fund is under control of 
severe requirement in case it intends to address itself to external investors. This trust 
type is also used in Ireland and other states whose regulators have implemented the trust 
use for business aims. 
 
The risk of anxiety due to complicated and advanced financial services makes the 
author ask himself: should the financial market and its services be supervised by 
politicians both in the EU and internationally, or should they be supervised by particular 
regulators like “the FSA” from the UK? It is undeniable that it worked in the UK if one 
thinks of the fact that UK represents the largest financial market in Europe. Also, UK 
did not experience many problems, or at least less than in other jurisdictions where there 
are no national similar authorities such as FSA from UK to legislate. The financial 
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industry has become so complicated and innovative that it takes particular amount of 
intelligence and professionalism to understand it. Innovative services are often 
discovered and exchanged due to their high request by investors and individuals who try 
to manage risks. Therefore, is the inability of the officials to regulate rapidly enough or 
stop financial services from being traded a good enough reason to allow the parliaments 
and policy-makers located in the EU stop the aforementioned individuals from handling 
their risks ? Or is the inability of the former to understand the latter and therefore, their 
fear of them a good enough reason?  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
REGULATION OF HEDGE FUNDS IN THE US 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
The most important “federal securities regulations” setting up the solid foundation for 
hedge funds’ regulation on the US territory have been approved at the beginning of the 
Bourse collapse in 1929. The regulatory documents are:   
 “the Securities Act of 1933”714;  
 “the Securities Exchange Act of 1934”715; 
 “the Investment Company Act of 1940”716; 
 “the Investment Advisors Act of 1940”717. 
 
These acts are described in the first part of the chapter. The last part of this chapter 
analyses “the Dodd-Frank Act”718, whose enactment was the direct consequence of this 
ongoing crisis. The above-mentioned legislation stipulates under title IV
719
 several 
recommendations which highly change the act of registering requests and investment 
advisers’ regulation.  
 
The vast majority of hedge funds were not compelled to fill in a registration form with 
the SEC, be it according to the “Investment Company Act” or in accordance with “the 
Investment Advisers Act,” both from 1940. Also, the present chapter addresses the 
premises of hedge fund reforms, particularly in terms of exemption from registration for 
hedge funds advisers and reporting requirements, which culminated with the enactment 
of the “Dodd-Frank Act”. The present chapter represents a survey and research 
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regarding the hedge funds regulation in US, but also a general presentation of “how 
hedge funds together with their managers are to a large extent exempted from 
regulation.”720 
 
Hedge funds but also various private pooled investments usually try to decrease the 
amplitude of their regulation in the US (and elsewhere). They have historically counted 
on exemptions from registering according to the most important “US Securities and 
Commodities Laws” available for PIV721 but also for their promoters. The present 
chapter adds to the research field in several ways. First of all, this study contributes to 
the fast-growing literature on hedge funds regulation, with a detailed research regarding 
the evolution of hedge funds regulations in the US. Also, it contributes to an increased 
understanding of hedge funds operation during unstable periods in America. Another 
contribution worth mentioning is represented by the analysis of future necessity in terms 
of tighter regulation of the US hedge funds, necessity supported by the deep 
preoccupation for financial security and “investor protection.” Also, the study considers 
the features of the Dodd-Frank Act focusing mainly on its accomplishments or errors. In 
this context, another contribution resides in the significance of the analysis for 
individuals interested particularly in the financial ongoing reform from the US affecting 
other jurisdictions as well. The reasons for the author’s belief are fully supported by the 
fact that the US enactment of financial regulations will definitely turn into an inevitable 
indicator directing the efforts towards the international development of financial 
regulations. Therefore, although the chapter adds to the understanding of the analysis of 
the US regulatory framework for hedge funds, it can also be seen as a contribution to 
the international regulatory development dimensions, from a comparative perspective. 
 
The author declares that this chapter will enable academic scholars not only to discover 
data requested for future studies in the field, but especially, in general, (1) to gain 
comprehension with regard to general reputation of the “hedge fund” market throughout 
the US, and in particular, (2) to gain a broad understanding of contemporary debates 
regarding financial regulation with focus on the protection of investors against the 
growing complexity of financial markets, new risks, and other changes brought about by 
financial innovation.  
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5.2  The Investment Company Act 1940 
 
The “Investment Company Act” (hereinafter also presented as the 1940 Act) generally 
governs investment funds in the US. Most alternative investment funds are defined, in 
the absence of an exemption, according to an “investment company” and therefore 
registered with the SEC.
722
 Registered funds comply to several constraints incompatible 
with many investment strategies pursued by alternative investment funds.
723
 
 
The 1940 Act was issued for the protection of investors who use other persons in their 
investments management and diversification. Every investment company
724
 included in 
the definition without being “exempted from the act”725 is bound to register with the 
SEC.
726
 Only if an investment entity acts in compliance with all stipulations specified in 
the 1940 Act, is this entity allowed to become actively involved in some securities-
related processes.
727
 Also, different associations but also the particular interest 
manifested by the managers, counsellors, as well as staff working within an investment 
entity are included.
728
 Thus, for instance, investment companies are allowed to have 
executive principals with maximum 60 percent from individuals who are members 
within the entity, seen as “interested persons.”729 Also, these companies are bound to 
submit income and other various reports.
730
  
 
In agreement with section 3(a) of the Investment Company Act, investment companies 
include every vehicle involved in securities investment. Alternative investment funds 
generally use the exemptions mentioned in sections: 3(c)(1) as well as 3(c)(7)
731
 and 
abandon registration and its substantial associated restriction. Thus, “these private 
investments” firm exclusions were mentioned in two Sections.732 According to the 
above-mentioned exclusions, some pooled investment vehicles are exempt from 
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definition according to the term investment company, and at the same time, they are 
exempt also from substantive regulation in accordance with the Investment Company 
Act. 
 
Out of the two exclusions, the oldest and most frequent seems to be Section 3(c)(1). The 
requests are doubled: first, interests in funds are basically placed personally to investing 
persons; second, the maximum acceptable number of investors is 100. 
 
What constitutes public offerings for objectives mentioned in the 1940’s Act is 
understood in practice to be similar subject to section 4(2) stipulated in the Securities 
Act.
733
 As a result, funds endeavouring to count on this exemption will perform their 
offerings as subjected to regulation “506 of Regulation D”734, which is the safe harbour 
for section 4(2). Furthermore, private placements of fund interests in the US complying 
with rule 506 from “the Securities Act” will not be incorporated with an offshore public 
offering of the interests. Consequently, foreign funds may have up to “100 US 
beneficial”735 owners without falling under the public offering prohibition of section 
7(d) as per the co-called Touche, Remnant & Co doctrine.
736
 
 
The discussion about the counting of only up to 100 investors, for the purpose of section 
3(c)(1)
737
 is not entirely self-evident and is subject to various rules and clarification. In 
some cases, beneficial owners of distinct funds can be combined according to the 
integration assumption, if the two vehicles represent a distinct fund. Resemblances in 
investors’ profiles and investment strategies are of great interest for this study. The 
experts of the SEC concluded that neither onshore nor offshore funds with similar 
investment aims cannot be merged where the vehicles concern investors with different 
tax positions. 
 
Typically, only investors who are US persons are considered when a fund is organised 
outside of the US. As a result, “for purposes of the 100 ownership limit”738, “the number 
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of other investors in the fund would only be subject to limits imposed in the funds’ 
jurisdiction of domicile.”739 At the same time, new regulations have been introduced 
regarding offshore CIS under section 7(d) as well as section 3(c)(1). According to the 
above-mentioned sections, all the offshore funds which are not registered have the 
possibility to disclose private offerings inside the US borders, while simultaneously 
performing public offerings outside the US borders without breaching section 7(d). 
There is, however, one condition which needs to be considered, namely that these 
offshore funds are enabled to have maximum 100 asset holders who must be American 
residents.
740
 
 
The major regulatory exemption concerning hedge funds is available under the 
provisions of this Act. Unlike regulated investment firms, private funds do not fall 
under the “1940 Act” limitations regarding the participation in financial strategies 
among which one can enumerate: leveraging, “short selling”, and making focused 
standings within one particular sector, company or industry. At the same time, they are 
exempted from worth requests generally applied to investment entities which are 
registered and thus forced to evaluate the entire portfolio securities daily, according to 
the trading price.
741
  
 
In order to qualify for the exemption stipulated by Section 3(c)(1), the hedge fund has to 
fulfil two major conditions. The first one is that maximum 100 holders
742
 are allowed. 
The second one is that public offerings
743
 are not allowed.   
 
“A qualified purchaser” term refers to persons with more than USD5 million in 
investments/firms, but also minimum USD25 million invested.
744
 One very relevant 
issue is represented by the presented exceptions, according to which a fund can count on 
whether the fund’s securities are exchanged in a private placement according to the 
1933 Act.  
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5.3  The Investment Advisers Act 1940 
 
An important piece of US securities legislation, namely, “the Investment Advisers Act 
of 1940”745, is probably better known for its conciseness. Especially if it were to 
compare it to its companion statute, “the 1940 Act”746, “the Investment Advisers Act”747 
does not hinder much the entities that fall within its registration requirements. This 
Investment Advisers Act settles some particular prohibitions on conduct, with emphasis 
on broad proscription of illicit conduct by investment advisers.
748
 
 
This Act appoints every “investment adviser” in the position of every individual paid to 
provide assistance to people on funds value and investments, “purchasing or selling 
securities”749, and the persons who analyse securities. Also, the Advisers Act includes 
fundamental requirements for some investment advisers who meet established 
thresholds, including: SEC registration, maintenance of business portfolios, delivery of 
disclosure statements for clients
750
, but also the prevention of customers deceiving 
because of ethical/legal confidence to act
751
 in the best interests of the client. There are 
however several exemptions. Thus, Section 203(b)(3) stipulates that those persons 
called investment counsellors with maximum 15 customers “during the preceding 
twelve months”752, must not present themselves usually in front of the public as 
investment counsellors, and they do not represent counsellors for any “registered 
investment”753 firm.  
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Nevertheless, the individuals eligible for the exemption have to follow the SEC 
antifraud provisions, but they are not required to file registration forms to identify 
themselves, keep business records according to SEC provisions, apply compliance plans 
or ethical norms or subordinate themselves to SEC supervision. Also, if it is not 
registered with the SEC, no investment adviser can use mails or other methods of 
interstate trade in relation with his/her profession of “investment adviser.”754 The latter 
may register by filling in particular data “with the SEC.”755 
 
Further on, the definition of the investment adviser will be presented. Section 202 (a) 
(11) states that this profession includes every individual involved in the marketing 
industry either dealing with the value of the shares, or with suitability regarding the 
investments in securities,
756
 doing this for compensation. Therefore, the concept 
presented above largely includes every individual who provides advice about securities 
as part of a regular business, in order to get a compensation.
757
 In the absence of an 
exemption, their registration according to the Act of 1940 is required as per section 
203(a). 
 
Several exclusions from the definitions are made for persons who incidentally provide 
advice to their own businesses, including: 
 Professional individuals, among which one can mention lawyers, as well 
as accountants; 
  Individuals engaged in publishing printed material; 
  Broker dealers;  
  Credit institutions.758 
 
In addition, a number of exemptions are provided for advisers with limited operations 
only. Of primary importance are “private investment advisers”, with maximum 15 
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customers during the last year, who are not making them generally available like the 
public advisers.
759
 
 
Registering as an investment adviser implies fiduciary duties
760
 owed to clients, as well 
as substantial requirements that must be met. In the first case, this includes providing 
appropriate advice, best execution and full disclosure of conflicts. In the second case, “a 
registered adviser must comply with detailed rules addressing, among other things: 
advertisements, custody, performance fees, record keeping and privacy.”761 
 
According to Paul F. Roye
762
, US SEC, managers of funds need not to forget their 
obligation towards their customers despite their light regulation. He also warns them 
that not only the Commission but also other authorities and individuals pay attention to 
ensuring the ability of fund managers to meet all legal and ethical responsibilities.
763
 
This statement was triggered by suits of hedge fund fraud which led “to regulators’ 
investor protection concerns. Even if many enforcement litigations have implied 
investment registered advisers, the number of investment advisers continued to increase 
lately. Still, the most challenging characteristic of companies that comply to the 
provisions of the Investment Advisers Act does not reside in their number but rather in 
their variety; advisers nowadays “run the gamut from financial planners to separate 
accounts managers, to mutual fund advisers, to hedge or other private fund 
managers.”764 Nowadays, litigations are filed on various grounds, from portfolio 
inflating, failure to achieve investment purposes, non-achievement of performing high-
quality work, as well as breaching fiduciary duties.
765
 
 
5.4  The Securities Act of 1933 
 
                                                 
759
 Spangler, Timothy et al, (2010), Op. Cit., p.111. 
760
 Gibbons, Gary and Stone, Heather M., "PE Managers as Registered Investment Advisors”, The 
Journal of Private Equity Winter 2011, Vol. 15, n
o
 1: pp. 8-15, DOI: 10.3905/jpe.2011.15.1.008 
761
 Spangler, Timothy et al, (2010), Op. Cit., p. 112. 
762
 Director of the Division of Investment Management. 
763
 IA Compliance Summit and Best Practice Update (8 April 2002). 
764
 Nat’l Regulatory Servs. & Inv. Advisers Ass’n, 2007, “Evolution Revolution Report 4”, available at 
http://www.investmentadviser.org/public/evolution_ revolution-2007.pdf (reporting on investment 
adviser industry demographics). 
765
 See, SEC v. Burton G. Friedlander, Civil Action n
o
 01 Civ. 4658 (S.D.N.Y.), Lit. Rel. n
o
 17021. 
214 
One main aim of the “1933 Act” resides in protecting the investors. In this respect, it is 
illegal to either offer or sell securities
766
 transparently if they were previously recorded 
under the SEC (Commission).
767
 Its major occupation is represented by the first 
securities’ distribution and less by the subsequent exchange. To reach that aim, a 
request of registration with the SEC needs to be submitted and data distribution of 
securities should be performed before being publicly exchanged. “A registration 
statement” turns operative 20 days after it has been submitted to the Commission, 
except when this is either postponed or interrupted.
768
 This is composed of two parts: 
the first part is the prospectus, offered to each security’s purchaser, and the second Part, 
includes information and exhibits which are not compulsory, offered to purchasers and 
also accessible for public inquiry. Similarly, Section 7 in the 1933 Act
769
 refers to 
“Schedule A”770 and presents data that has to be included in the registration declaration. 
This program demands a high amount of data, like the underwriters, business type, 
relevant associates, debits and possessions of the firm and beliefs concerning 
legitimacy. “Section 10(a)” of the 1933 Act presents general data commonly contained 
by the prospectus.
771
 Also, the Commission issues many rules which include new 
aspects regarding the possibilities of registering as per the 1933 Act.
772
 
 
When marketing an alternative investment fund to investors from the US, exemptions in 
connection with the fund’s potential status as an “investment company” are necessary, 
simultaneously with the guarantee that every offer and trade of interests in the fund is 
exempt from registering according to the Securities Act. Embodied as a limited 
association, “a unit trust” and even a corporation, the interests of a fund will be subject 
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to the “security” definition. In the absence of a suitable exemption, the registration with 
the SEC will be required for the offer and trade of such interest.
773
 
 
The objective of the Securities Act is to provide the necessary disclosure of data to 
investors when offers are made to the public. Exemptions to the registration requests are 
reachable to some offers and trades that can take place in the secondary market or can 
represent private placements. Therefore, hedge funds are forbidden from general 
advertising and this implies securing investors through consultants, registered 
representatives, brokers or investment advisors. The decreased public disclosure by 
hedge funds leads to decreased transparency and therefore to a low degree of investor 
protection. But these new exemptions exemplify the SEC’s inclination towards 
regulating by exemption. Still, although the SEC’s purposes are laudable, the question 
that remains is whether this represents indeed a sound regulatory strategy. 
 
To evade from registering their securities, a high amount of “private funds”, comprising 
hedge funds count on exemptions stipulated “in section 4 (2)” referring to private 
placement. According to this section, the exchanges that do not involve “public 
offerings are exempted”774 as per the 1933 Act. According to this, they will be 
exempted from registering unless the interests are traded without involving public 
offering. Usually it will not be regarded as public offering if the investment manager 
does not advertise the selling, and if the selling is available only to a limited number of 
experienced investors.
775
  
 
The logic of believing this resided in the fact that it was considered that there was no 
need to protect the potential investors, since they could protect themselves. Still, as it 
can prove difficult to know what the term public offering actually supposes, there are 
many fund managers confiding in the legal safe harbour in Regulation D under the 1933 
Act.
776
 “Regulation D effective on April 15, 1982”777, provides a manner to establish 
that you did not make an open, “public offering” for goals stipulated at section 4(2). In 
this context, as an unregulated entity, the hedge fund investment manager has the 
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freedom to undertake greater risk on more volatile positions and by doing this, he can 
expose investors to possible substantial profit but, at the same time, to substantial losses 
as well.  
 
In this respect, there are many funds trusting Rule 506
778
 from Regulation D
779
 to meet 
the particular exemption concerning the refusal of making public offerings. 
Accordingly, not one “public offering” occurred in the case when the institution issuing 
it failed to engage to an overall request of its securities. This request is available for at 
least “35 investors” without accreditation. This law enables selling to a limitless range 
“of accredited investors”780, like most financial organisations, which are either an 
individual who at that moment of purchase has a net worth surpassing USD1 million, or 
an individual who had a profit exceeding USD200,000 in the last 24 months.
781
 
 
“Accredited investor” is a basic concept from Regulation D. Only if the other 
stipulations under Regulation D are complied with, a limitless number of accredited 
investors can invest in a fund without giving up the private placement exemption 
stipulated by Section 4(2).
782
 Maximum 35 persons can invest in the fund, individuals 
who are not “accredited investors”783. 
 
Meanwhile these exemptions were a consequence of push backs against a strict and 
ample framework for the registration of public offerings and the governance of mutual 
funds, anomalies emerged in the financial markets, questionable and not in the interests 
of the retail investors that the SEC tries so hard to protect. The achievement of SEC 
exemptions was made through the use of the above-mentioned “accredited investor” 
approach, implemented into “Securities Act” by a Congress intolerant to the SEC’s 
denial of being more flexible in its views of the private offering exemption. 
 
In compliance with the Securities Act, “an accredited investor” according to stipulations 
under Regulation 501 stipulated by Regulation D implies the following: 
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(i) Somebody with a net income (it is also allowed the joint net income by 
adding his/her wife/husband’s worth) on that occasion, of investments 
exceeding USD1 million (excluding the value of their main residence);  
(ii) Somebody with a net worth (it is also allowed to include additional 
worth on behalf of his/her wife/husband) exceeding USD200,000 during 
the last 24 months. At the same time, joint worth on behalf of his/her 
wife/husband exceeding USD300,000 is also allowed, on condition to 
be gained during the last 24 months at the same time being requested to 
gain similar profit during the next period
784
 (current year).  
 
Sales of interests must be limited to persons who qualify as “accredited investors”, 
together with up to 35 additional persons who, although failing to meet that definition, 
qualify for “sophisticated investors.” Thus, the latter represents the person with very 
good information and skills regarding financial and entrepreneurial issues, who is at the 
same time able to evaluate both advantages, but also risk processes regarding potential 
investments.
785
 An individual might also qualify for a sophisticated investor, in case 
he/she acquired this qualification together with a purchaser representative.
786
  
 
In addition, the issuer or his/her agent must know that the future purchaser has the 
financial means and sophistication to make such an investment. Even after all the 
potential purchasers would otherwise qualify for “accredited investors” or 
“sophisticated investors”, the marketing of securities may still be deemed a “general 
solicitation” where, for example, a mass marketing is conducted. A comment needs to be 
added: the Madoff fraud (see chapter six) exposed a surprising lack of critical diligence on 
behalf of various sophisticated investors. And this occurred in the context of sophisticated 
investors having been expected to defend their own interests especially since they did 
have the means to do so. Thus, one cannot help to ask himself which was the reason that 
so many sophisticated investors fall prey to Madoff’s fraud. Why were these institutions 
and individuals not able to defend themselves?, why did they not ask questions?, why 
did they refuse to defend themselves? As a consequence of this - and in opposition to 
legislative intention, the operation of the sophisticated investor exemption seems to 
have undermined the SEC’s capability to fulfil its objective to adequately protect the 
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public financial markets. In this vein, the author considers that a new regulatory 
framework focusing on increasing transparency within these industries is of great need. 
 
What needs to be clear is that SEC proposed an increase for the accredited investor 
standards under the above presented Regulation only after the Goldstein decision, 
Regulation D, with the main purpose to increase antifraud protection for investors
787
. 
For a long time, SEC has long been very clever at using its power to define terms to fill 
gaps or solve problems in the hedge funds laws, but as the court showed in Goldstein, 
such an effort needs to be reasonable. When dealing with the concept of the accredited 
investor maybe the SEC has been too wise and not consistent enough in defining its 
purposes and thinking through the results of its regulations. 
 
5.5  The Securities Exchange Act 1934 
 
If the 1933 Act refers mainly to offering and registration actions, the 1934 Act refers 
mainly to secondary trading.
788
 The 1934 Act was based on the concern that hedge 
funds investors were provided unsatisfactory protection with regard to fraudulent 
schemes, misleading, but also inappropriate disclosure.
789
 Hence, this Act addressed 
various issues, comprising also the act of disclosing the information to investors, which 
can be performed through permanent but also up to date filings to the Commission.
790
  
 
Thus, this Act allows “the SEC” to require certification but also data communication at 
fixed intervals by authorities issuing publicly exchanged securities. Also, section 12 (g) 
imposes an issuer to have at least 500 owners with classes of stock
791
, but also at least 
10 million dollars in holdings for registering stocked items. At the same time, the Act 
stipulates that every issuer with classes of securities exchanged on the NSE
792
 owns 
also, in some given situations, overall holdings which exceed USD1 million. Also, 
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classes of stock
793
 with minimum 500 holders need to register according to the above-
mentioned Act.
794
 Any authority issuing bound to record according to “the 1934 Act” is 
obliged to make a repository at fixed intervals, and secondary reports to the SEC.
795
   
 
Marketing efforts in the US may also give rise to broker-dealer registration problems. 
The central issues here are which of the fund manager’s employees are engaged in 
marketing and how are they compensated. The broker is being defined according to 
section 3(a)(4) as every individual involved in entrepreneurial securities trade on behalf 
of different investors.
796
 No distinction is made between privately – placed and 
publicly-offered securities. If a fund manager’s employees receive commissions from 
the sale of participations in a fund, they will be deemed brokers. As a result, they must 
be joined individuals of the 1934 Act officially recorded broker-dealer. The main 
reasons for tight regulation of this broker-dealer industry are “its economic importance” 
together with “the possibility of investor abuse.” As observed along the entire Exchange 
Act but also in the regulation of broker-dealers, the important role of investor protection 
and fairness is widely spread. 
 
Pursuant to Regulation 3(a)(4) - 1 under the 1934 Act, the safe harbour can be set up, 
allowing counsellors, managers or employees of either the fund or the fund manager to 
trade involvement in a fund which does not necessary have to register.
797
 
The requirements of the safe harbour include the following: 
 the individual has not been associated with a broker-dealer during the last 
12 months; 
 the individual must not have participated in the marketing of any fund 
during the last 12 months ; 
 the individual needs first to make considerable duties for the fund manager 
others than marketing the fund;  
 the individual must not be compensated for the marketing effort by 
officials or various remuneration due to selling securities. 
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Where the safe harbour is not available, employees of the fund manager should limit 
their discussions with prospective investors to the investment objectives of the fund. A 
registered broker-dealer should be left with the responsibility to require, negotiate and 
accept participations from the investors. 
 
The major “thrust of the 1934 Act lies within Section 10b and Rule 10b-5.”798 Section 
10(b)
799
, one of the main antifraud sections, and “Rule 10b-5”800 offer one motivation of 
action for damages either caused by exclusions, misstatements, or manipulations of 
material data within declarations different from the ones registered in reports within 
SEC.
801
 Accordingly, these provisions have turned into powerful tools in fighting 
securities fraud. Still, even if the three sections of Rule 10b-5 offer wide indications of 
conduct violating Rule 10b, the negative issues are that no details are provided (within 
the text of the law) regarding the elements or conduct representing a violation of Rule 
10b. In spite of Congressional desire to protect the investors, none of the two Rules 
mentioned above offers a cause of action for plaintiffs affected by securities fraud. 
Federal courts involved Congressional intention for a private cause of action according 
to Rule 10b, which is similar, “but is not identical to, common law actions for deceit 
and misrepresentation”.802 
 
Additionally to this aim of protecting investors, the 1934 Act also intends to authorise 
“adequate disclosures from companies who are being registered with the SEC under 
Sections 12, 13 and 15.”803 
 
Section 12
804
 implies the registration of a comprehensive declaration regarding the firm 
when the latter registers for the first time under the 1934 Act. According to rule 12h-3, 
an issuer having more than USD10 million in assets, which could to the contrary be 
submitted for filing requests in compliance with section 15(d), is exempt from offering 
reports if less than 500 individuals hold its securities on record. Most of the time, hedge 
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funds try to maintain the amount of registered owners below 500 individuals to avoid 
falling under these registrations and reporting requirements.
805
 
 
 
5.6  The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 
 
In 2006, the SEC adopted a rule asking investment funds to register as investment 
advisers, in response to the impetuous growth of hedge funds’ assets under management 
(AUM) and growing concern over their operations and transparency for better 
protecting investors. Nevertheless, during the same period, “the US Court of Columbia 
Circuit” abrogated this law considering that it was not compatible with the 1940’s 
Investment Advisers Act.  
 
Immediately after the beginning of this financial crisis, hedge funds became again a 
target for increased regulation. Due to the increase of negative investor feeling, hedge 
funds found their inclusion in the Dodd-Frank Act, which became law in July 2010. 
 
The aim of the Dodd-Frank Act was generous: to avoid another financial crisis. Also, its 
strategy proved to be really respectable: increase transparency, investor protection, 
prevent credit institutions from assuming extreme risks, stop harmful financial actions 
but also prevent institutions apparently too large to fail through authorising regulatory 
authorities to apprehend every large, collapsing financial company and gradually 
diminish it.
806
 However, Dodd-Frank Act is much more complex. It has 848 pages and it 
might be compared to Glass-Steagall (the famous reform following the 1929 Wall Street 
failure). Additionally, every page requests that regulators make further studies. Some 
parts of these examinations are presented on hundreds of pages. Only one tiny part, the 
Volcker rule, aiming at curbing risk asset exchanging by credit institutions, comprises 
383 interrogations divided in no less than 1,420 sub-questions.
807
 All in all, the hedge 
fund registration and disclosure requirements stipulated in the Dodd-Frank Act increase 
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hedge funds supervision and seem to solve the “tension between the industry and the 
regulators”.808 
 
From a critical point of view, adverse consequences for clients have already emerged. 
As is often occurs, measures meant to defend investors can lead to harming them. Due 
to Dodd-Frank’s breadth, these consequences vary from probable threats to privacy, as 
involved in the Title I section, to low investor choice as opposed to high consumer 
costs, as involved in the Title X and XIV sections. Taking a careful look at Title XIV 
section an obvious example of a troubling trend in regulatory policy can be noticed - the 
opinion that government knows better than investors what is best for them. In this 
direction, government authorities have taken on “the paternalistic role of safely steering 
citizens toward “better” or “safer” products and services.”809 Consequently, investors 
are going to be increasingly confronted with a one-size-fits-all market that implies 
higher costs and provides fewer choices. 
 
Consequently, America urges a more intelligent approach for regulation. Thus, total 
major laws need to be analysed from the “cost-benefit” point of view by an autonomous 
caretaker. More imperative, laws must be simplified. Regulators must propose clear 
laws, and they must be allowed to enforce them. 
 
Section 404 and Section 406 from “the Dodd-Frank Act” combine in several pages. On 
the 31
st
 of October 2011, two agencies which were supervising US’s financial market 
turned the above several data into one complex, 192 pages file, which needs to be 
expanded by hedge funds and by several different companies. Filling it out for the first 
time could cost, in accordance with one unconventional research of hedge fund 
administrators, around USD100,000 – 150,000 every company. The second time, costs 
might fall to USD40,000.
810
 Dodd-Frank’s wide and equivocal data-collection purposes 
were interpreted by the SEC and the CFTC in the new Form PF. Because of its length, 
complexity, and generally unclear data requirements, Form PF represents a major 
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burden on the advisers to which it is applied. Along with other regulatory costs, the 
costs of these new laws are going to be passed on to investors. 
 
The general conclusion was that, nowadays, compassion towards hedge funds is not 
common. On the contrary, officials understand the urgency for more regulatory 
enforcements. Thus, the officials’ assigned job implies a lot of bureaucracy, although 
this represents only an example of all the requirements involving taxes but also office 
work used by Dodd-Frank Act to cover one ample part from the American 
economics.
811
 Many organisations came into sight for enjoying the support of “the 
taxpayer” as they were said to be “too big to fail.”  
 
When the “Dodd-Frank Act” was authorised, its promoters considered that combining 
its unsolved issues could last between one year to one and a half year. After one year 
and a half, the previous predictions seemed desolately childish. Policy-makers and 
authorities in charge of “Dodd-Frank Act” appear somewhat optimistic regarding 
achievements and future challenges, when addressing to the community. Still, one 
banker deeply involved in this matter is in agreement with lots of people while 
predicting a decade of turmoil, with permanent debates in court and governmental 
bodies, in the end exhibiting one set of rules damaged due to exemptions or shades 
which can, due to its complicated form, aggravate systemic risks instead of mitigating 
them.
812
 Still, while bankers are concerned, lawyers are happy. Constant Dodd-Frank-
related updates by Davis Polk and Morrison &Foester are very popular. Thus, 93 of 400 
requests ordered by Dodd-Frank Act were made, while deadlines were omitted for 164.  
 
In the summer of 2011, on the 22
nd
 of July, the American “Court of appeals for the 
District of Columbia” accepted one dispute between two commerce entities about a law 
from “Dodd-Frank Act” regarding shareholding voting promoted “by the SEC”. The 
Tribunal considered that particular law unsupported by studies regarding the prices paid 
or the advantages involved. On December the 2
nd
, another similar case was filed at some 
“Washington DC District Court” versus the “Commodities Futures Trading 
Commission” (CFTC), dispute between two securities-market commercial corporations, 
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regarding “restrictions on derivative holdings.”813 In case the tribunal pleads also in 
favour, litigants predict an avalanche of new lawsuits (see chapter 6). 
New era 
The 21
st
 of July 2010 was the day when the American President ratified “the Dodd-
Frank Act”.814 By signing this Act, the US President initiated a new era in financial 
regulatory reform. In this respect, the above-mentioned regulation provides an ample 
regulatory reform, with the main goal of “the promotion of financial security in 
America”815 through the establishment of careful observing regarding risk-exposure, 
through an overview of the entire system. While the Act focused primarily on banking 
institutions regulations and related matters, it has also significantly changed the 
landscape affecting investment advisers and many aspects of the investment 
management industry, including, among others, the regulation of domestic and foreign 
investment advisers assisting various types of private investment vehicles and investors. 
 
A major Dodd-Frank Act aim resides in limiting the risk of “the shadow credit 
institution system”. Another objective is to limit the damages inflicted after the crash of 
important financial entities in order to minimise costs to society and taxpayers (negative 
externalities). 
 
According to the first Title of the Act, the “Financial Stability Oversight Council” 
(FSOC) is made up of different managers which are members of the financial regulatory 
authorities, but they are also secondary persons. Dodd-Frank Act states that the above-
mentioned Council is entitled to monitor the potential risks endangering US financial 
security, but also to require from the Board of Governors of the FRB
816
 to supervise the 
indicated non-credit financial institutions which might induce major risks to the US 
financial security under various circumstances, such as: material financial distress, crash 
or as a consequence of own businesses.
817
 Similarly, the Dodd-Frank Act provides for 
the FSOC the recommendation towards FRB of highly prudent norms in respect to 
                                                 
813
 “Too big not to fail- Flaws in the confused, bloated law passed in the aftermath of America’s financial 
crisis become ever more apparent”, The Economist, 18th 2012, p.18. 
814
 Public Law 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) 
815
 S. Conf. Rep. N
o
. 111–176, at 2–3 (2010) (Senate Committee Report). 
816
 Federal Reserve System. 
817
 See the Dodd-Frank Act, Section 112. 
225 
several selected non-banking institutions
818
, being aware of the fact that FSOC is going 
to be helped by several regulatory authorities. In this respect, Dodd-Frank Act remedies 
several statutes, among which the Investment Advisers Act, for the authorisation or 
orientation of some Federal authorities in supporting FSOC. Accordingly, FSOC needs 
to find the appropriate level of oversight in order to satisfy, on the one hand, the 
requests of the industry for lower levels of oversight as opposed to, on the other hand, 
the need for investor protection. 
 
Title IV revises “the Advisers Act” to impose the need for advisers of hedge funds and 
those of various private funds to register under the SEC.
819
 That request was made by 
the Congress mainly since it considered data concerning dimension, strategies but also 
status of funds might prove essential for regulatory efforts with regard to possible, yet to 
come, crisis.
820
 At the same time, this implies registered investment advisers to keep 
records and any other data that could be necessary and suitable for avoiding systemic 
risk, preventing fraud, and providing investors with useful data about the funds, thus 
trying to increase the protection of investors. Title IV builds up a new, innovative 
legislative regime for advisers to private funds. Accordingly, Dodd-Frank menaces to 
drive funds offshore, harm investors instead of protecting them, and make it more 
likely, not less, that these funds are going to be someday the recipients of government 
largesse. However, this represents an unfortunate evolution, as hedge funds and other 
private funds have usually appeared and disappeared as a consequence of market forces 
and not due to government intervention. 
 
In particular, it is the Dodd-Frank Act that grants secondary obligations concerning 
“advisers to private funds.” These types of funds might be considered entities acting as 
an “investment company” according to the “1940 Act”, except the exemptions further 
specified in the 1940 Act.
821
 These two exemptions are the most commonly used. Also, 
“the Dodd-Frank Act” points out the net value requirements that need to be met by the 
investors in a private fund. 
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Specifically, the Dodd-Frank Act eliminates the 14-or-fewer “private adviser exemption 
from SEC registration” that was previously offered by the Advisers Act.822 However, it 
was only after the Madoff Ponzi scheme in 2008 (see chapter 6), that regulators and 
commentators have turned to the question of whether and how the regulatory regime in 
force at the time was adequate to protect investors, forcing the Congress to remove the 
private adviser exemption. Dodd-Frank Act creates innovative exemptions from SEC 
registration, involving non-US based advisers meeting several conditions, advisers to 
family offices, and “advisers to venture capital funds.” 823 The result of these changes 
was that many previously exempt advisers had to forcibly become registered to the 
SEC.  
 
The SEC is bound by the Dodd-Frank Act to exempt from registering requirements for 
investment advisers holding no more than USD150 million in AUM.
824
 Nevertheless, 
this is available only for investment advisers acting only as advisers for private funds 
while having also maximum USD150 million AUM in the US. 
 
Another exemption stated by the Dodd-Frank Act consists of “venture capital fund 
advisers from registration under the Advisers Act.”825 In order to qualify for this, every 
adviser has to act like an investment adviser either for a single or for more venture 
capital funds. 
 
One final exemption stipulated by Dodd-Frank Act is that of registering the foreign 
private adviser. This is defined as the investment adviser who places his financial 
company outside the American borders, who does not have more than 15 customers in 
America and American investing individuals investing money in private funds in 
compliance with the adviser’s advice, but who also has maximum USD25 million in 
total AUM on behalf of this type of customers or investors.
826
 
 
The Dodd-Frank Act asks “FSOC to monitor the financial services marketplace”827 in 
order to identify risks that might affect the US economic stability. Similarly, the Act 
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enforces FSOC to gather facts from associated authorities in order to support its 
objectives.
828
 According to Section 404, the SEC must compel advisers of private funds 
to maintain reports and fill in records,
829
 due to the significance of their data for the 
SEC regarding the interests of the public. Other reasons are the assessment of risk-
exposure and the protection of the investors. Therefore, if considered compulsory, 
FSOC could guide the “Office of Financial Research” (OFR) in gathering extra data 
from non-bank financial firms
830
, in order to increase investor protection.  
 
A key aim of the Dodd-Frank Act
831
 consists in minimising future systemic risk-
exposure. This can be achieved through empowerment of regulatory authorities to 
impose higher financial asset requirements, but also new limits in the control of 
corporations by creating regulatory, and market structures for financial derivatives, and 
by setting up systemic risk surveillance and provide particular officials to intervene.
832
 
The author of this thesis considers that a major problem emerges as the Dodd-Frank Act 
is generally focused on monitoring systemic risk, and consequently, the new legislation 
leaves many of the investor protection issues created by the hedge fund industry, 
unsolved.  
 
There are two exemptions abolished by the Act.
833
 The first is stipulated under Section 
403, removing “the de minimis exemption from the Advisers Act.”834 This can be 
applied to that particular adviser: having maximum 15 customers along one year; not 
holding himself out under the title of investment adviser but also not advising registered 
investment firms. Usually, this exoneration is driven by individual fund administrators 
marketing maximum 15 funds due to the fact that each fund is usually considered one 
singular customer of the administrator regardless of the necessary number of 
investors.
835
 Secondly, the same Section states the following: “advisers to private funds 
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are not eligible to use the current exemption for investment advisers whose clients are 
all residents of the adviser’s home state.”836  
 
Section 406 imposes authorised investment counsellors of “private funds” to provide 
secondary data regarding every “private fund” administered by them to “the SEC and 
FSOC.” According to the Act, the SEC has this obligation to lead examinations at 
regular intervals for the verification of every document “of private funds” administered 
by licensed investment counsellors. Those documents are under the confidentiality 
clause without being disclosed to the wide public. These provisions become operational 
a year after the enactment of the Act. 
 
Dodd-Frank Act additionally subjects every registered investment adviser who is 
adviser for private funds to new recordkeeping and reporting obligations. A registered 
investment adviser may be required to keep records but also to file with the SEC some 
data regarding every advised private fund and to make such information available to the 
FSOC, and Federal department or agency, and to every self-regulatory organisation.
837
 
This information which should remain confidential will include: 
 AUM and leverage use; 
 correspondent credit risk disclosure; 
 evaluation tactics and procedures; 
 categories of owned assets; 
 side agreements; 
 sale procedures. 
In addition, the SEC and the FSOC are allowed to request additional data, as established 
at certain regular intervals.
838
 However, it is questionable whether the Dodd-Frank Act 
provides hedge fund investors with sufficient information in order to adequately defend 
themselves from the unique informational challenges that are connected with hedge 
fund investments. These unique issues include a total lack of standardisation in the 
hedge funds industry, especially as far as its disclosure practices, risk assessments and 
valuation procedures are concerned. This lack of standardisation, together with a narrow 
public disclosure regime, puts investors into difficulty to adequately study a certain 
hedge fund investment. Additionally, investors are not able to effectively choose an 
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optimal hedge fund investment since the above-mentioned informational challenges 
make it hard to adequately compare a large range of hedge fund opportunities. It is our 
belief that this limits significantly investors’ choice and competition within the industry, 
and as a consequence, investors’ protection. 
 
The standards controlling the qualification of natural persons as investors in private 
funds have also been changed. The net worth requirement to qualify “as an accredited 
investor under the Securities Act” shall not include the worth held by “the primary 
residence of such natural person.”839 In addition, for this four years period which starts 
at the coming into force of the Act, the net worth threshold will be USD1 million, and 
thereafter the threshold will be in excess of USD1 million.
840
 
 
A significant consequence of registration is that an investment adviser is restricted in his 
capability of charging effectiveness taxes on clients. Rule 205-3 provides an exemption 
for clients having minimum USD750,000 AUM with the counsellor. At the same time, 
the same exemption is available for those with a net value reaching at least USD1.5 
million. Customers who are “qualified purchasers” and certain employees of the adviser 
are also exempt. 
 
 “International Collaboration” 
In order to evaluate risk, FSOC is compelled by the Dodd-Frank Act to coordinate its 
policies with those of the international authorities.
841
 The collaboration can be 
individually essential for the systemic risk assessment connected to hedge funds and to 
different private funds since they usually operate internationally and make major 
investments in companies and financial markets at the international level.
842
 
 
                                                 
839
 Krainer, Robert E., (2011), Regulating Wall Street: Dodd-Frank act and the new architecture of global 
finance, Journal of Financial Stability. Volume 8, Issue 2, April 2012, Pp. 121-133. 
840
 Ibid. 
841
 Section 175 of the Dodd-Frank Act. 
842
 Alexander, D., “Global Hedge Fund Assets Rebound to Just over $1.8 Trillion, Hedge Fund 
Intelligence” (2010). 
230 
Several actors already admitted that it was absolutely necessary that an international 
regulation was enforced, particularly due to the globalised markets where both 
managers and funds alike operated.
843
 
 
To this end, international regulatory coordination has been considered, mainly having in 
view the future financial crises. It becomes obvious that collecting constant and 
comparison-relevant data would definitely help with the international reporting of 
systemic risk and thus improve the usefulness of data dividing through US and foreign 
financial regulators. The first step towards this accomplishment were Basel III and 
Dodd Frank macro prudential measures which focused on facilitating financial 
stability
844
. In this regard, a more effective coordination and communication is required 
among standard setters and supervisors like the Basel Committee and national 
supervisors implied in the adoption of Basel III and the Dodd Frank Act regulatory 
reforms, more transparent and more “authoritative” mandates are needed in making sure 
that the objectives of financial stability are achieved. 
Provisions regarding hedge funds 
The Dodd-Frank Act introduced enhanced prudential standards for hedge funds and 
included particularly strict prohibitions regarding proprietary exchanging, but also 
hedge fund holding, innovative risk-based capital, leveraging and liquidity stipulations. 
Indeed, the “Dodd-Frank Act”845 represents a significant progress in tightening the 
regulation. 
 
The 2010 “Dodd-Frank Act” plays an innovative role in prohibiting some assets 
exchanging processes by credit institutions associations, insured depository 
organisations and their partners. This condition or stipulation was called “the Volcker 
Rule.” It is named after the previous “Federal Reserve Board Chairman”, who supported 
and encouraged its adoption. The major objective of the Volcker Rule
846
 is to draw 
some boundaries or limits on bank activities as far as businesses with high degrees of 
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risk are concerned, including asset exchanging but also hedge fund and private equity
847
 
activities.  
 
“The Volcker Rule” states that no credit institution can become involved in asset 
exchanges, sponsorship or investment, be it in hedge funds or in private equity funds.
848
 
This Section, besides additional issues considers that a credit institution entity is 
considered “an insured depository institution, a company that controls an insured 
depository institution, a company treated as a bank holding company and any 
subsidiaries of such institutions or companies, including broker-dealer and fund 
manager subsidiaries.”849  
 
Nevertheless, despite the aforementioned interdiction, credit institutions can however 
promote either private equities or hedge funds, only if a certain number of requirements 
can be met. Thus, the first requirement is that the bank offers “bona fide trust”, 
depositary or investment consultative assistances for the fund. Another condition 
stipulates that the fund is offered only in relation to consultative assistances and just for 
clients of the bank. Also, another condition is that the credit institution and its branches 
are not engaged in “covered transactions” with the fund and consider the fund to be 
some associate in order to attain the objectives contained in the Federal Reserve Act, to 
be more precisely, in Section 23B.
850
 It is necessary that the credit institution lacks 
assurance of responsibilities or efficiency of the hedge fund or every umbrella fund. 
Another requirement is that neither the credit institution nor the fund are allowed to 
share one denomination or similar names. Another important condition is that only 
principals or credit institution staffs offering services in order to fulfil certain purposes 
of the fund are allowed to hold legal proprietorship interests in that particular fund.
851
 
At the same time, the bank must disclosure to investors that the credit institution is not 
going to cause failures. One last condition is that the credit institutions make the so-
called “seed investment”, which means use of money to set up a new business or 
company, or different “de minimis investment”852 within funds. 
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Another relevant rule of the Dodd-Frank Act is that it forbids credit institution holding 
firms, depository corporations, and their associates to promote or withhold “any equity, 
partnership, or other ownership interest in a hedge fund or a private equity fund”853, 
including several exemptions. Despite the fact that some restrictions will not go into 
effect for several years, companies are examining their proprietary trading desks and 
internal hedge funds, partly because of the concern that employees move to other funds. 
 
On the one hand, the so-called Volcker Rule imposes no interdictions on those 
companies controlled by the Board, which are not bank financial firms
854
 although, on 
the other hand, it does require that they are subject to additional capital conditions and 
assets exchanging, hedge fund but also private equity fund activities. Even otherwise 
admitted processes, including promotion and investment both in a private equity and in 
a hedge fund, where the relevant requirements are met, the “Volcker Rule” forbids them 
to do this if the activity might lead to a conflict of interests with regards to materiality, 
which could occur between the credit institutions, on the one hand, and its clients, 
customers and third parties, on the other hand.
855
 Moreover, any transaction that would 
lead to risk-exposure or put forward any risk concerning the security and soundness of 
either credit institutions or the American financial security is forbidden. Regulatory 
authorities are implementing regulations explicitly preventing processes in such a 
way.
856
 While the conflicts of interest represent indeed the main harm that regulators are 
trying to address, the author considers that it may make sense to consider other solutions 
like additional disclosures and regulations to defend the public from that kind of 
conflicts. Therefore, it is the author’s opinion that legislators focus on conflicts of 
interest that can be solved, as already mentioned above, through other methods, without 
any cost to diversification, economies of scope, and global competition. 
 
As a result of the Volcker Rule, leverage may become less readily available to, or more 
expensive for bank-affiliated private equity funds because of increased risk weightings 
by financial institutions for loans to bank-sponsored funds. The Volcker Rule’s ban on 
assets sale and significant limitations on promoting or “investing in private funds”857 
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could result in financial institutions restructuring their private equity or hedge fund 
businesses or spinning out existing groups. 
 
Half a year later after “the Act’s enactment”, the Council has to fill in terminology and 
limits of the Volcker Rule. Nine months later, Regulators must agree upon suggestions 
and changes to be made.  
 
In terms of timeline for implementation, the Volcker Rule does not become effective 
until 21 July 2012. Following the effective date, it is one transit interval comprising 24 
months subject to, if needed, three 12 months prolongations. The fact that Regulators 
decide changes in less than 12 months after the Volcker Rule enactment is not likely to 
happen. This means that, the Volcker Rule shall turn enforceable 24 months later from 
its enactment. Another possibility is that there will be no effective regulation within 24 
months. Hence, the law becomes enforceable without any guidance. 
 
As a concluding remark, all in all, the real challenges of the Dodd Frank consist of:  
1. Increased government reporting=> increased investor protection 
2. Increased reporting to investors => increased investor protection 
3. Disclosure to both governing authority and investors=> increased investor 
protection 
On the whole, one can say that the financial community has approved of the higher 
reporting requests concept under Dodd‑Frank. 
 
However, according to the above-mentioned issues, the Volker Rule has three different 
drawbacks. The first one is that it relies very much on regulatory interpretation and an 
equivocal separation of trading activities that are permitted and prohibited. Due to these 
ambiguities concerning the legal line, banks could avoid appropriately hedging risks. 
The second one is that restricting bank activities may increase bank fragility by 
restraining diversification, and thus, less diverse banks could be less secure. Last, the 
Volcker Rule, due to the fact that it restricts proprietary trading, can harm market 
liquidity, although it is clear that liquid markets are those supporting economic growth, 
the transparency of their prices and the decrease of their costs of capital. 
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Closing remarks on Dodd-Frank Act  
In the author’s opinion, the Dodd-Frank Act represents a step towards better regulation 
regarding hedge funds. According to the Dodd-Frank Act provisions, the hedge fund 
industry has been strongly affected. According to this Act, the large hedge funds might 
be seen as systemically major companies. The Act does not clearly state the size 
thresholds, the “Federal Reserve System” (FED) and FSOC being the ones who would 
have to decide on this matter. Hedge funds considered systemically crucial will fall 
under severe regulatory monitoring. At the same time, hedge funds could be under the 
impact of some extra conditions, as registering with the SEC in case their assets are 
larger than or equal to USD150 million. The result of all these will be: stricter reporting 
and recordkeeping.  
 
All the above-mentioned requirements will lead to consequences such as: limited gross 
margin, re-appraisal “of their balance sheets, amendments to their operational and legal 
entity structures and modifications to their tax procedures.”858 In this respect, it becomes 
obvious that the severe regulatory monitoring and the main clarifying requests on 
derivatives, might force funds to rearrange their own activities and diminish their own 
balance sheets to respect all provisions of the Act. The hedge funds margins of profit are 
likely to diminish in the future. 
 
According to Davis Polk’s Dodd-Frank Progress Report, an amount of 221 rulemaking 
requests deadlines have passed. The figure below shows a clear view of the current 
situation:  
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Figure 17. Dodd-Frank Act rulemaking requests deadlines 
 
The Report also states that it represents 55.5% of the 398 overall regulatory requests, 
but also 78.9% of the 280 regulatory requests with specific time limits. From all these, 
221 already exceeded the deadlines, 136 representing 61.5% were skipped, while 85 
representing 38.5% reached final stipulations.
859
 At present, the authorities’ 
recommendations are missing for 19 from the 136 omitted laws. Similarly, from the 398 
overall regulatory requests, 30.9% (123) reached final stipulations and there have been 
suggested stipulations which might reach other 134 (33.7%).
860
  
 
5.7  Concluding remarks 
 
This chapter analysed the evolution of the hedge funds regulation in the US. Thorough 
consideration has been given to the financial reform adopted via the ratification of “the 
Dodd-Frank Act”, particularly regarding the regulation of investment advisers, and 
specifically of hedge fund managers and other alternative investment managers who 
were previously able to organise their operations in such a way as to avoid registration 
with the SEC.  
 
The author of this thesis considered necessary to first describe and examine all the laws 
concerning hedge funds regulation and the manner these contributed in the past to the 
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shaping of this industry, in order to fully understand the revolutionary financial reform 
implied by “the Dodd-Frank Act.” Thus, the ability of hedge funds to mitigate the risk 
of loss to investment portfolios has an important relationship to a fundamental policy 
objective of U.S. regulations. By disclosing material information and reducing the 
exposure of investment capital to losses, hedge funds complement the legislative and 
regulatory objective of investor protection. 
 
This reform has to be read and analysed also in the context of the 21
st
 century 
depression which has affected the world of global finances. In the aftermath of the 
crisis, governments were asked to implement strong financial reforms in order to avoid 
a Lehman Brothers scenario in the future.  
 
In addition, the author points out the strong impact that this reform has had on the hedge 
fund market. The so-called father of this post-modern hedge fund industry, George 
Soros, has decided to close all his hedge funds and establish a family office explaining 
his choice by the burdensome impact of “the Dodd-Frank Act” on this industry. The 
consequence of his decision could lead other hedge fund managers to end their 
businesses or to relocate towards other more lightly regulated jurisdictions.  
 
As seen so far, investor protection is a hallmark goal of federal securities law and the 
author accentuates the fact that this reform would really impact “the hedge fund 
industry” focusing mainly on investors’ interests protection, and that it would be 
challenging to study how the sector will cope with all these massive changes and in 
particular whether hedge funds will decide to stay and comply with all the reporting 
requirements or to relocate towards other more lightly regulated jurisdictions, ignoring 
the SEC’s major principle oriented towards investor protection. 
 
This chapter argues that the beneficial outcomes attained by hedge funds for their 
investors are widely attributable to the legal regime under which they operate. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION REGARDING HEDGE FUNDS 
 
“A lawyer with his briefcase can 
steal more than 100 men with 
guns”. 
Don Vito Corleone 
 
6.1  Introduction 
 
Besides the prosecution of major fraud and insider trading schemes, including the 
Madoff, Stanford and Petters cases, there has been a wave of litigation and arbitration 
cases filed against hedge fund managers during recent years. Such cases would have 
been extremely rare in the previous years. Indeed, litigation and arbitration cases with 
regard to hedge funds now regularly feature in the legal press,
861
 astonishing the global 
community
862
 and illustrating the lack of investor protection. These cases represent 
evidence that hedge funds investors need more protection. They relate to a diverse range 
of problems, as described below. For instance, in a process taken to court from the 
initiative of several funds versus a firm from Germany, it was concluded by the 
SDNY
863, according to “the Exchange Act”, respectively, Section 10(b), that this has no 
intention of changing agreements referring to foreign accumulates. Another example is 
given by the “Financial Industry Regulatory Authority” (FINRA) legal procedure 
declaration versus Goldman Sachs concerning its failure to perform the analysis of its 
hedge fund client’s cheat. Similarly, disputes arose between top broker Morgan Stanley 
and a hedge fund concerning a trading account limit condition that determined the 
failure of the hedge fund. Meanwhile, the New York Appellate Division concluded that 
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a hedge fund compliance agent tending to use the funds with no liability
864
, working in 
retaliation due to analysing duplicity, does not have a national regulatory 
countermeasure. In addition, tribunals from Cayman Islands and from British Virgin 
Islands, too, have concluded several cases referring to the equities of hedge fund 
stockholders who petitioned for bankruptcy.  
 
Besides well known the Madoff case, a similar case in dimension and scale can be seen 
with the scheme of Tom Petters, the architect of a USD3.7 billion, ten-year deceit that 
was discovered in September 2008. A similar situation is that of Robert Allen Stanford, 
whose scheme emerged in February 2009 and is thought to have lasted ten years, 
involving the enormous amount of USD 8billion, and S. Rothstein, who admitted to 
managing an approximate USD1.2 billion Ponzi scheme at the end of 2009.
865
  
 
The question arises as to why these unprecedented legal actions have occurred at this 
time. This chapter demonstrates exactly how this ongoing crisis effectively exhibited the 
vulnerabilities as expected for the traditional hedge funds pattern.
866
 After almost a 
decade of prodigious, yet unbelievable development, major hedge funds seem now very 
passive and even damaged by litigation and arbitration. In fact, some hedge funds are 
entirely vanishing. Therefore, this chapter focuses on the conflicts of interest faced by 
hedge fund managers and the regulatory measures necessary to better protect hedge 
fund investors. This chapter provides general background information about litigation 
and arbitration cases of hedge funds. Then it discusses the numerous conflicts of interest 
inherent in the hedge funds management, and makes the case that hedge fund investors 
are poorly protected from the injurious effects of these conflicts by both state and 
federal law. The conclusions of this chapter present, from the author’s opinion, different 
proposals for mitigating and preventing conflicts of interest in hedge funds and 
therefore, recommend how hedge fund investors can be better protected from these 
cases and other risks they are exposed to. 
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Recently, many investments were lost due to hedge fund frauds. This has nourished 
important contradictory debates about whether authorities are able or not to control the 
hedge funds market. The hereby chapter presents several performance notices, which 
would be set on abnormal incomes generated by funds, as these are markers in terms of 
fraudulent risks-exposure. Several cases of hedge funds being charged with violating the 
law are collected but also studied over the course of this chapter, in view of the idea that 
regulation carries with it an implicit promise that laws are being enforced and at the 
same time, law breaches can be detected, because if this were not true, a misleading 
safety feeling could be indulged to investors.
867
  
 
This chapter also addresses some of the main legal aspects involved in the extensive 
round of hedge fund litigation that is currently underway, namely, lawsuits - brought by 
one or more plaintiffs on behalf of a large group on a common legal claim. These are 
already developing, regardless of the fact that the lawsuits are against credit institutions, 
versus rating agencies or against “mortgage-backed securities” (MBS) and/or CDO 
purchasers.
868
 The author highlights in this chapter several probably major categories in 
the resolution of these cases:  
 The differentiation of feasible ex ante presumptions, and active 
development concerning ex post profit losses;  
 The differentiation of complete openness concerning the description of all 
underlying securities which are under securitisation, but at the same time 
the openness to which industry members are being subjected regarding 
hedge funds profit losses;  
 The differentiation between aspects apprehended by investors and industry 
members and things apprehended by particular corporations from inside 
the organised investment activity.  
 
Similar to any debate on the future of hedge funds facing uncertainty as a result of the 
crisis and concerns about the effects of the Madoff fraud, this chapter discusses recent 
significant litigation cases brought to the courts of justice or to arbitration. These stories 
such as Stanford, Petters and Madoff can be labelled as not typical, due to the size of 
their collapse or due to the level of malfeasance connected with the fraud, but, however, 
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the author considers that they help illustrating the reason why both regulators and  
supervisors must pay greater attention to hedge fund industry regulation and protection 
of investors. 
 
6.2 Civil litigation 
6.2.1 Previously reported cases 
 
Many relevant cases are ongoing. This sub-section provides an update of the civil 
arbitration and litigation cases and highlights the last cases of civil litigations, focusing 
also on enforcement processes related, particularly, to hedge funds industry. The main 
purpose is to present and analyse risks of investors induced by the absence of hedge 
funds regulation in the US until the Dodd-Frank Act. Regarding the first case, it has 
been noted that tribunals largely used Morrison Company to include derivative 
securities referencing foreign assets.
869
 The next presentation uses at first two cases of 
exploring the high disorientation following “the Morrison holding”. Hence, the file 
regarding Elliott Associates fund against Porsche Company will be presented. This 
involves one agreement to swap concerning foreign assets. Furthermore, a similar case 
will be analysed, consisting of the SEC against F. Tourre.
870
 These two cases are 
important in revealing the limitations of the international regulatory frameworks at the 
global level,
871
 and therefore the limitations regarding investors protection before the 
enactment of the Dodd Frank. 
 
Section 10(b) does not apply for swap agreements regarding Foreign Securities, and 
here one can mention the case file of Elliott Associates against Porsche.
872
 
The complainants from Elliott involve several types of hedge funds – a part of them 
being structured according to American regulations, while others are organised 
according to non-US regulations. However, these have one thing in common: they are 
managed by administrators whose location is New York. These entered in agreements to 
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swap concerning assets value of “Volkswagen” multinational from Germany. The 
litigant is represented by “Porsche”, another multinational from Germany.  
 
In the spring of 2010, an association of hedge funds brought legal charges in New York, 
more precisely in its Southern District
873
 against Porsche, alleging that it hid their real 
intention to buy VW, also arguing that its adoption in calculating exchanges aimed at 
hiding its correct stock standing was illegal. In compliance with hedge funds, most of 
them being retailers in VW stock, several misstatements were made, and also several 
laws were breached by Porsche, namely: Section 10(b)
874
 as well as Rule 10b-5
875
. This 
determined the hedge funds to be deprived of more than USD2 billion in protecting their 
own short sales.
876
 Complainants lost more than USD2 billion the very moment when 
suspects brought about the so-called “massive short squeeze”, according to Reuters, but 
also “a short squeeze” having outstanding dimensions, according to New York 
Times.
877
 Subsequently to the amendment of this accusation of funds, according to the 
decision of the Supreme Court’s agreement in the file conducted by Morrison against 
NAB
878
, Porsche attempted to dismiss the legal suit claiming mainly that the deceit 
dispositions in accordance with Section 10(b) was by no means available for securities 
undertakings which were not catalogued according to the American trades. Because 
most assets were held by the state or by different index funds, individuals who were 
short-selling had “to close their positions at hugely inflated prices”879, which tripled 
VW’s share prices. This turned VW into one of the biggest corporations at the global 
level, according to the estimation of the business shares. The severe liquidity impact 
emerged although the industry for “Volkswagen” shares proves usually highly 
productive.  
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Towards the end of December 2010, every hedge fund-related complaint registered in 
the Southern District of N.Y. was rejected.
880
 The court of law declared that Morrison 
had put a limit to exchanges of securities according to Section 10(b)
881
 catalogued on 
internal transactions and to internal exchanges in different securities. The funds were 
involved in domestic securities based on change settlements, which highly credited 
foreign VW capital.
882
 Accordingly, VW denied their implication within internal 
exchanges in other securities, claiming to have done this only according to the aim of 
Section 10(b). Nevertheless, the tribunal discovered how change settlements have been 
the functional equal
883
 to exchanging all implicit Volkswagen dividends within the 
Germanic stock and declared that it was revoltingly creating laws which could cause the 
falling of external issuers not closely connected with America under their scope and 
thus their involvement in lawsuits for the simple fact that autonomous parties from that 
state signed a securities agreement regarding the foreign capital of the respective 
institution.
884
 Pursuant to this, funds petitioned a Second Circuit at the very beginning 
of 2011. 
 
It has been remarked that a major interrogation which emerges as a consequence of 
Porsche’s reached resolution refers to the fact whether this predicts one tendency 
towards broadening the Morrison case above its initial objective. If this proves to be 
true, all funds having to do with the stock of a foreign issuing institution, or just signing 
financial agreements referencing the stock of a foreign issuing institution – are going to 
encounter no securities fraud remedies in the American tribunals.
885
 The real issues 
revealed by Elliott law case show that the so-called “bright line test” that Morrison 
fixed, might prove all-encompassing, allowing American regulation application within 
apparently absurd contexts.
886
 Thus, Courts might carefully take into consideration 
making attractive or acceptable “the bright-line test” through sustained efforts for a 
sensitive test use. Therefore, similar consequences are expected: rapid growth “of 
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vaguely related variations on the test”887 which was harshly disapproved by the 
“Supreme Court” being considered one failure of the “old conduct and effects tests.” In 
this case, political interests in diplomacy and accordingly, dispute avoidance, compete 
with political interests which favour the achievement of certainty and transparency of 
American regulations. All in all, it becomes clear that such failures are both unfair and 
inconsistent in terms of investor protection aim of the US securities laws. In this respect, 
the European Commission “strongly urge[d] … against” a cross-border extension of 
Section 10(b), stated that an “extraterritorial application of the antifraud provisions of 
the United States’ securities laws … where the nexus is stronger with a foreign 
jurisdiction [] is liable to violate the EU’s and its Member States’ sovereignty, and to 
impede the proper development of [the] EU’s securities regulation.”888 This point was 
supported by several comment letters which also noted that other jurisdictions offer 
investor protection that can be compared to the level of investor protection provided by 
the US securities laws
889
. A common argument advanced which supports enactment of 
the conduct and effects tests for Section 10(b) private actions is that this action could 
increase investor protection due to stronger enforcement of the federal securities laws. 
 
Therefore, as seen above, the high pressures placed by liquidity and price will be 
probably more appreciated within markets that are less efficient than in those with 
increased performance indicators.
890
 Bayou and Goldman Sachs have proved to be 
highly negative hedge fund misconduct examples, especially considering the great 
losses the investors were subjected to, and also the period and goal of the fraud. 
 
6.2.2 New developments in securities litigation 
 
Starting with the spring of 2010, many signs of litigations to come could be seen. First, 
the crisis filings were rejected, while around 1/2 of the decisions to date
891
 were motions 
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to dismiss. Nevertheless, it is obvious that not only accusations but also products and 
defendants keep on changing, while lawsuits against particular accused litigants, among 
which one can mention especially those involving mainly CRAs
892
, successfully 
survived some motions for dismissal and will continue to do so. In addition, the current 
cases brought by the SEC increase insecurity regarding future directions, but also 
central points of the litigation.
893
 
 
SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co. They say about hedge funds that they used to be 
important buyers not only of Collateralised Debt Obligations, but also of CDO 
tranches
894
 with subprime exposure. In this section, the author of this thesis identifies 
the major issues occurring due to the overestimation of investment tools like CDOs and 
“Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities” (RMBSs) which are considered to have 
significantly contributed to the international economic crisis. According to data supplied 
by public area, the author of this thesis also explores the manners in which investment 
banks used to manage their assets, considered mainly the estimation of investment tools 
and whether there has been any conflict of interest in their study, this involving a 
conflict emerged from the banks’ interests and those of their investors. The author 
analyses as paradigm case the context resulting from an unrelated US case regarding 
civil proceedings, respectively, Goldman Sachs.  
 
In 2006, Goldman Sachs & Co was the 4
th
 most important Collateralised Debt 
Obligation contributor in America, pledging securities and investments equivalent to 
USD16 billion.
895
 After Goldman Sachs became conscious of an important decrease in 
value of RMBS assets, it started to acquire short positions in order to gain advantage. 
Goldman Sachs was essentially hoping for the decline of RMBS industry. However, 
according to the American SEC, he kept on advertising as well as selling CDOs. 
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During the same period, the SEC registered one civil implementation action within 
Unites States District Court for the SDNY
896
 versus Goldman Sachs,
897
 but also versus 
one manager, F. Tourre, who confessed an undisclosed short interest. The SEC’s 
complaint referred to the fact that at the end of 2004 and the commencement of 2005, 
Goldman Sachs delivered a correlation-trading portfolio, providing, among other things, 
the manufacture and marketing
898
 of synthetic CDO generally known by the name of 
ABACUS. 
 
It seems that the so-called Abacus 2007-AC1 was a financial tool made to fit precisely 
Paulson, an intimate organisational customer.
899
 Starting with 2006, Paulson & Co, Inc. 
(hedge fund) changed its investment technique because they believed that some “mid-
and-subprime RMBS rated Triple B”900, namely debts at the supposed value BBB by 
Standard & Poor’s or, according to the rating of Moody - Baa2, might be exposed to 
negative circumstances causing the significant fall of their value. In reality, Paulson 
considered that not just secondary place RMBSs, but also more senior AAA-rated 
tranches, could turn worthless. Paulson aimed at several RMBSs triple-B rated
901
, 
considering them as encountering significant difficulties. After that, Paulson discussed 
with Goldman Sachs and asked them to help it ensure safety by means of payment, 
through CDSs, by shorting an investment portfolio containing these RMBSs in an 
advantageous manner.
902
 
 
The SEC stated that Paulson, assisted by Goldman Sachs, produced a synthetic CDO
903
, 
which included a portfolio of assets chosen by Paulson that Goldman Sachs could 
advertise to stockholders.  
The SEC Complaint provided a number of examples of Goldman Sachs’ data on the 
diminishing trend of the CDO market from 2007,
904
 when they had a discussion with 
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Paulson
905
. For instance, the SEC prepared for testimony an e-mail from the litigant 
Tourre to a friend written on the 23
rd
 of January, 2007, in which Tourre confessed that 
due to the highly leveraged system, there was an imminent crash risk of the entire 
foundation at any moment.
906
 
 
With that piece of information at hand, SEC affirmed that both Goldman Sachs and 
Tourre started to prepare the concealment of the fact that the short investor, Paulson, 
took part in this data hiding from other investors by saying that a professional, but also 
autonomous collateral manager from third-party selected those credit portfolios.
907
 
Goldman Sachs discussed ACA - a director they allegedly thought would consent to the 
choices of Paulson - to help as the “Portfolio Selection Agent.”908 ACA’s part was of 
major relevance to the advertising and delivery of this CDO. 
 
In the meantime, Paulson managed a verification of triple-B RMBSs. This verification 
was for the benefit of RMBS. It involved elevated scores of “rate mortgages, low 
borrower FICO scores, and a high concentration of mortgages”909 in countries with high 
growth rates of houses value. On the 9
th
 of January 2007, an amount of 123 RMBSs 
emerging from Paulson’s verification were e-mailed to ACA, to be studied.910 On the 
26
th
 of February 2007, Paulson and ACA consented to a citations portfolio of 90 
RMBSs for ABACUS 2007-AC, which was made up mostly of Paulson’s choices. The 
SEC has confirmed that ACA did not know of Paulson’s intention to actually short that 
RMBS portfolio it was assisting.
911
 
 
Thereafter, a few months after the managers at Goldman Sachs anticipated the decline 
of the RMBS market, a notice of almost 200 pages on ABACUS 2007-AC1
912
 was 
finished. Paulson was not mentioned in this file. The SEC has affirmed that Goldman 
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Sachs’ advertising products used for ABACUS have been neither true, nor accurate.913 
The SEC further argued that during the organisation of this business, Goldman Sachs 
made ACA falsely believe that Paulson planned to make investments in the fairness of 
ABACUS. This is very important because a fair play holder is the first to have a loss in 
case the portfolio fails. Thus, a fair play holder manifests the same permanent interest as 
other stockholders. In reality, on the 10
th
 of January 2007 Tourre e-mailed ACA 
informing them that Paulson was an advocate of the equity tranche.
914
 
 
During the organisation phase of ABACUS 2007-AC1, both Goldman Sachs and Tourre 
started to search for investors. During the first four months of 2007, Goldman Sachs 
sent the bullet-point document, pictures book and offering reminder to IKB, a 
commercial bank having the headquarters in Dusseldorf. The SEC has declared that 
neither Goldman Sachs nor Tourre informed IKB of Paulson’s role in the election 
activity of assets and its short position. Starting with the 26
th
 of April 2007, ABACUS 
2007-AC1 was ended and bought “USD50 million worth of Class A-1 notes and 
USD100 million worth of Class A-2 Notes”915, both rated in a similar way AAA by 
both S&P and Moody. In this regard, it has been stated that Goldman Sachs was 
expected to have the ability to acquire minimum USD15 million and maximum USD20 
million
916
 for organising but also advertising ABACUS. 
 
Both weak results “of ABACUS 2007-AC1” and consequent payout to Paulson are clear 
for all to see. IKB was effectively deprived of an investment comprising almost 
USD150 million. Paulson received most of that invested amount, through successive 
transactions that Goldman Sachs and Paulson performed themselves. Around the 7
th
 of 
August 2008, the RBS
917
, having bought the highest place in ABACUS 2007-AC1, 
offered Goldman Sachs an amount of USD840 million to “separate its position.” It is 
clear that a substantial money part went from Goldman Sachs to Paulson.
918
 
 
The SEC litigation asserted in relevant part that [Goldman Sachs] as well as Tourre 
deliberately, riskily or maybe simply in a negligent manner mislead investors through 
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material terms, presentation book and also through the memorandum offered regarding 
the ABACUS product, making them believe that it was ACA the one who selected that 
particular portfolio and omitting to mention that, in fact, Paulson held a major part in 
that selection. At the same time, the fund had strong financial interests in transactions, 
truly adverse not only to IKB, but also to ACA, as well as to ABN AMRO.
919
 
According to the same SEC litigation, [Goldman Sachs] as well as Tourre mislead 
ACA, persuading it about Paulson’s investments “in the equity of ABACUS 2007-
AC1”920, but also about the fact that the interest Paulson manifested in the collateral 
section activity was very similar to that of ACA. De facto, there was a conflict of 
interests. 
 
A week later, on the 27
th
 of April 2010, after the registration of the SEC Complaint, the 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations to the “Committee on Homeland Security 
and Governmental Affairs”921 sustained several hearings examining several grounds but 
also impacts of recent financial crisis.
922
 The fourth section focused on the part of 
investment banks and moved around the attestation of a few head representatives from 
Goldman Sachs. The rumour came after the Subcommittee examined 18 months worth 
of documents that Goldman Sachs and various organisations had acquired with 
particular reference to the RMBS market.
923
 
 
In his declaration from the start, Senator Carl Levin depicted the results of the 
Subcommittee in connection with the operations of Goldman Sachs and various 
investment credit institutions. According to the proofs, most of the time, Goldman first 
took care of his own returns and incomes to the disadvantage of those of his customers. 
Similarly, his wrong use of glamorous but also complicated economic constructions 
contributed to the spreading of harmful mortgages all over the globe within the entire 
financial practices. What happened later was the rationale: global finances crashed due 
to the above-mentioned harmful mortgages. Obviously, Goldman took advantage of 
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this. According to the company’s data provided later to the SEC, it became clear that, 
although the Corporation used to sell risky derivates regarding mortgages, in the same 
manner it placed major confidence in this American industry.
924
 The company 
continued to deny having taken significant bets despite all the proofs. The problem here 
is that Goldman misled their investors about the inexistence of any conflict of interest 
occurring between their company and the investors they had to counsel. The disputed 
aspect is that whenever the investors were having financial problems, Goldman was 
doing well, while on the contrary, when their investors gained profit, Goldman was not. 
These realities reveal that Goldman’s operations amounted to much more than being a 
simple market-marker, connecting buyers and sellers in a place. On this point, it has 
been noted that they acted as important speculations that the pledge securities industry, 
assisted at creating by Goldman, joined for an impressive comedown.
925
 
 
On the 14
th
 of July 2010, Goldman Sachs reached a concluding judgment.
926
 Goldman 
Sachs offered USD300 million in amends and USD250 million as compensation to 
investors. IKB was declared to obtain USD150 million while RBS was stated to obtain 
USD100 million.
927
 Moreover, while declaring that it neither recognised nor rejected the 
allegations of the complaint, Goldman affirmed that they were lacking data within those 
marketing products used for the ABACUS 2007-AC1 transaction. Most important, the 
biggest error consisted in the fact that those products stated that it was ACA who 
selected the portfolio, without mentioning Paulson’s primordial function in its selection 
activity,
928
 but also that Paulson’s financial interest has been contrary to CDO investors. 
In the end, Goldman regretted the missing data from those staffs. 
 
Goldman Sachs seems to have developed a market in CDOs, and then asked certain 
bonds for customers. Apparently, their customers could benefit from the trade failure, 
                                                 
924
 Tuch, A. F. (2011), “Conflicted Gatekeepers: The Volcker Rule and Goldman Sachs”, Discussion 
Paper N
o
. 374/2011, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA 02138, p. 8. 
925
 Litigation, SEC v Goldman Sachs & Co, 2010, para 4. 
926
 www2.goldmansachs.com/our-firm/investors/financials/ archived/8k/pdf-attachments/07–14–10–8k-
doc.pdf, accessed on 22.05.2012. 
927
 “SEC Settlement with Goldman Sachs for $550 Million Approved by US Judge”, Bloomberg, 21 July 
2010, www. bloomberg.com/news/2010–07–20/goldman-sachs-settlement- with-sec-for-550-million-
approved-by-u-s-judge.html, accessed on 22.05.2012. 
928
 Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc, “Proceedings Examiners Report”, Executive Summary of the 
Examiner’s Conclusions, Vol I, at 2, http://lehmanreport.jenner.com, accessed on 22.05.2012. 
250 
but also from the bankruptcy.
929
 Thus, a major criticism is that CDO originators offered 
investors inadequate disclosure and warnings concerning different risks. 
 
The SEC implementation operation against Goldman Sachs illustrates the problems 
faced by managers in resolving difficult securities transactions that involve a lot of 
groups and significant conflicts of interest. As a conclusion, in these cases, investors’ 
interests are prejudiced by fund manager's conduct in the pursuit of their own interests 
at the fund investors’ expense. In most cases, there was awareness among regulators 
regarding the risks beyond the regulatory perimeter and several steps should have been 
taken in order to address them by supporting self-regulatory approaches (for example, 
codes of conduct). Arguably, such behaviour urges for the introduction of conduct of 
business regulation even in the context of unregulated funds. Any endeavour by the 
Department of Justice to register an identical complaint in a criminal operation would 
have encountered powerful resistance i.e., it would have been claimed that Goldman 
Sachs lacked the intention to defraud IKB or other stockholders. On the other hand, the 
civil action caused indeed a settlement. 
 
This represents an issue whose implicit meaning consists of the fact that the place where 
the location of transactions of investments is connected to the place of occurrence of the 
final agreement/settlement. This last act provides legal responsibility
930
 for buying and 
selling. However, the parties are able to manipulate this.  
 
One way to understanding the aspect presented above can be considered like a 
continuation of the principle according to which parts involved in the transactions of 
securities can employ forum clause, and stipulations from the regulation for selecting 
the policy that will govern the transaction.
931
 Nevertheless, the above-mentioned 
approach worked in a very restrictive manner.  
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Several issues were noticed in this regard. First, this was not broadened largely after the 
Lloyds case studies, which involved investing individuals who were truly experienced 
professionals. Then, the regulation selected for the above-mentioned cases seemed 
particularly similar to the US antifraud regulation.
932
 Likewise, it has been stated that 
probably the Courts would have been made no enforcement on those particular 
stipulations and that no removal of those claims would have been made from the 
attention and apprehension of the US regulation if the discussed foreign regulations 
were not so similar.
933
 However, these provisions represent a consequence of a definite 
settlement
934
, the mediation of which needs to offer clearness, but also fairness. The 
ongoing perspective is that every individual selling stocks may easily locate 
himself/herself in other location than US while officially accepting, but also avoiding 
being subjected to the US regulation
935
. In this regard, it has been noted that acting in 
such manner means not only being manipulative, but might as well signify being 
confusing for the other party. The allowance of determining the relevance of US 
regulation can thus withdraw some exchanges by protecting that particular regulation in 
the lack of protective stipulations usually attending “the contractual exercise of party 
autonomy.”936 Several measures were taken after this scandal. If implemented properly, 
they could restore investor confidence and prompt a new wave of primary issuances. 
For instance, Dodd-Frank Act recently resolved an issue concerning the necessity to 
inform investors and disclose information to them. Thus, Title IX, Subtitle D requires 
the SEC to pass disclosure requirements for asset-backed securities, including CDOs. 
Accordingly, these upcoming SEC rules need to clarify what information CDO 
originators are obliged to disclose. In the future, when CDOs are going to regain their 
status as a viable and trustworthy financial tool, confidence is going to need to be 
restored. The author considers that effective regulation may accomplish this. To be sure, 
different statutory measures were introduced, but it takes time to establish their ultimate 
impacts. As an alternative, the industry can eventually correct itself by learning from its 
past mistakes. 
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This chapter presents several Ponzi schemes. Some of these schemes imply the study of 
SEC’s motivation policy failure to encourage thorough examinations of possible 
securities fraud. Also, the chapter analyses whether previous SEC employees currently 
working as independent professionals standing for customers investigated by the SEC 
induce excessive pressure on present SEC employees while solving litigations falling 
under the breach of securities regulation.
937
  
 
6.3.  Regulatory enforcement  
6.3.1 Recent development in Ponzi schemes litigation 
 
Investment fraud comprises every type of action taken with the purpose of getting some 
financial profit from investors by using deceit.
938
 These types of frauds may be 
uncomplicated (for instance, the total stealing, when investors do not recover their 
money), or on the contrary, complicated schemes (for instance, Ponzi frauds). Similarly, 
these corporations may also act as governed either by the rule or principle or law, or not, 
capable also of taking various statutory shapes, starting from “joint stock companies to 
hedge funds or simple pools of assets.”939 
 
Prior to approaching the Thomas Petters, Robert Allen Stanford and Bernie Madoff’s 
schemes, it is important to understand first the Ponzi scheme concept. A Ponzi scheme 
represents mainly an illicit financial investment scheme where people who invest 
receive payment of their interests from the investments that new investors are 
making.
940
 Regarding the operation of the scheme, the operator is said to guarantee in 
most cases huge profits regarding return rates. Also, this one makes sure that interest is 
going to be paid quickly 
941
, as agreed, by generating significant spoken communication 
advertising sent on behalf of pleased investors.
942
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In this regard, the more new investments are performed, the more these schemes thrive. 
Still, the real problem emerges when not a single investor (or very few) is left and thus 
the operator finds himself incapable of paying the interest. It is then when the entire 
scheme crashes.
943
 Similarly, it has been noticed that scammers have been using Ponzi 
schemes for some decades. The only difference is that, lately, they started to initiate 
bigger and by far more highly qualitative, quite exceptional schemes.
944
  
 
The present economic crisis issued out of the real estate crisis revealed many Ponzi 
schemes starting with the Madoff scheme to the Palm Beach Capital scheme.
945
 These 
used to be schemes no longer capable of masquerading and pretending to be an entity 
enjoying profitability, while in reality, the industry was melting down.
946
 Fraudulent 
actions not only hurt investors, but also competitors. Also, investors are going to shy 
away from investing when there is the perception that neither the SEC nor other 
authorities are looking after their interests or protection. 
 
Despite the fact that Madoff’s story happened four years ago, its consequences 
regarding hedge funds remained relevant. Even now, the SEC brings law 
implementation actions with regard to recently disclosed Ponzi schemes. Meanwhile, 
the SEC brings to trial different issues originating in ancient Ponzi schemes that have 
trapped new persons and new funds. The most popular of them is by far the “Bernard 
Madoff’s Ponzi scheme”, of course. This has been described as being of great 
amplitude, which apparently started two decades ago, involving far beyond USD 
65billion frauds money actually lost by investors. However, it was in December 2008 
that everything became known.
947
 Similar to the Madoff scandal
948
 in size and 
amplitude stands the fraud of Tom Petters, the planner of a USD3.7 billion ten-year 
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deceit discovered in the autumn of 2008. It is also the case of Robert Allen Stanford, 
whose fraudulent actions became known at the beginning of 2009, although they are 
considered to have lasted for ten years, and involved a total of USD8 billion. Another 
similar case is that of S. Rothstein, who towards the end of 2009 admitted to have 
managed a Ponzi scheme estimated to around USD1.2 billion. 
 
The above Ponzi schemes have triggered major complaints in tribunals from US and 
other states. There are several ongoing cases against the authors of the Ponzi schemes 
themselves, while in other cases, complainants have filed against feeder funds, banks, 
investment councillors, audit companies and other groups who allegedly had a role in 
causing investors’ losses. 
 
While some cases still continue, many Courts where this type of cases was pleaded 
conducted to essential resolutions regarding actual culpability of financial inspectors.
949
  
 
Several recent litigation and arbitration cases are discussed below. 
 
6.3.1.1 Thomas Petters 
The above mentioned fraud scandals widely-covered by the media
950
 have led to an 
increase in the hedge funds regulation.
951
 For this reason, these cases are important for 
the understanding of the nature of regulation and enforcement of hedge funds. The first 
case discussed in detail here is the Thomas Petters litigation case.  
 
Some hedge funds and their presidents were accused of complicity in fraud to an 
amount of USD3.5 billion under the Ponzi scheme managed by Th. Petters.
952
 Towards 
the end of 2009, he was found guilty.
953
 Four months later, he received a 50 years
954
 
                                                 
949
 Lawrence, J. et al, (2010), Op. Cit., p. 101. 
950
 Kelleher, Leslie M., Caplin & Drysdale, (2012), “Liability&Defense, Hedge Fund Managers Beware: 
Unless Claims are Assigned, Managers do not Have Standing to Sue for Their Funds”, Bloomberg Law 
Reports, p. 5. 
951
 An unfortunately long list of proven and alleged fraudulent schemes is to be found on the 
hedgetracker.com website. See http://www.hedgetracker.com/halloffraud.php., accessed on 05.05.2012. 
952
 Pozza, Clarence L. Jr., et al., “A Review of Recent Investor Issues in the Madoff, Stanford and Forte 
Ponzi Scheme Cases”, 10 Journal of Business. 
953
 “Tom Petters Found Guilty of Ponzi Scheme Fraud”, Reuters, 
Dec. 2, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN024978920091202, accessed on 
05.05.2012. 
954
 Phelps, D., & Tevlin, J. (2008, November 2). “The Woman Who Brought Down Tom Petters.” Star 
Tribune. Retrieved from http://www.startribune.com, accessed on 05.05.2012. 
255 
sentence.
955
 Petters defrauded a large number of investors, including more than 100 
clergy participants, several non-profit institutions, and some hedge fund managers. 
Many victims were deprived of their jobs while others were deprived of their entire life 
savings.
956
 Two of the legal actions in Petters’ case are discussed here, the case of SEC 
v. B. F. Prévost and D. W. Harrold, but also that of SEC v. Marlon Quan. 
 
“SEC v. B. F. Prévost but also D. W. Harrold.” After charging Petters with fraud, the 
SEC filed secondary accusations against Prévost, but also against Harrold on the 
account of facilitating Petters’ Ponzi scheme.957 
 
In October 2010, the SEC accused the above-mentioned two Florida fund directors of 
several laws infringements, including breaches of “Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, 
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5-communicated there under, Sections 
206(1), 206(2) and Sections 206(4) of the Advisers Act and Rule 206-4(8).”958 The two 
directors were said to have deceitfully inserted within Petters’s scheme more than USD1 
billion.  
 
These two directors supposedly, intentionally and deceptively guaranteed stockholders 
that their amounts of investments were going to be kept safely in auxiliary accounts. 
They similarly depicted to investing individuals some false actions capable of ensuring 
the safety of investors’ money. When Petters’s scheme was discovered, Prevost and 
Harrold contrived some false paper exchange transactions with Petters having the 
intention to trap stockholders. Prevost and Harrold plainly traded old IOUs in exchange 
to new IOUs, falsely guaranteeing investors in monthly correspondence that the hedge 
funds had gained profits due to their money. Indeed, the SEC asserted that both Prevost 
and Harrold have injected capital into Petters’ account over a period of 4 years, from 
2004 to 2008, removing at the same time almost USD58 million during the same period. 
At present, there are several pending actions including a liquidation process for Petters 
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Group Worldwide
959
, a SEC operation against Petters and one of his hedge fund 
customers who avowedly took part in the fraud
960
, and a lot of civil legal processes, 
some of which contain claims against auditors. 
 
Sec v. Marlon Quan. Another lawsuit related to the fraudulent scheme of Petters, dating 
back at the beginning of 2011, more precisely since March, testifies that the SEC 
authority received one imperative interdiction stopping M. Quan, who at that moment 
was a hedge fund director located in Connecticut, from moving in his own accounts 
settlement funds. These funds had been raised specifically for victims of these 
schemes.
961
 M. Quan, as well as all the companies he managed, have been found to have 
previously transferred capital in the accounts held by Petters during the 2001-2008 
period. Therefore, because of the above-mentioned issues not only Quan but also the 
funds he managed are considered to have breached “Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, 
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 there under, Section 206(4) of the 
Advisers Act, and Rule 206-4(8) there under.”962 
 
At the same time, Quan was found to have made false guarantees to investors that his 
firms would ensure the security of investors’ money. Rather than doing this, Quan is 
thought to have planned some complex exchanges together with Petters which were 
supposed to have reached the large value of almost USD187 million. This occurred with 
the particular desire of hiding the fraud made by Petters. These exchanges resulted 
directly in the fact that Quan’s actions led to maintaining a fraud, counterfeit image of 
Petters, according to which, he was in fact delivering fees for all companies. 
 
In order to prevent Quan from transferring more than USD14 million into his own 
pockets, the SEC took into consideration the idea of creating a tribunal for critical 
situations. In this respect, Quan was forced to direct his capital to credit institutions
963
 
from Germany or even from Bermuda, which was actually to his own benefit. Another 
accusation that the SEC brought to Quan dealt with him helping Petters to maintain his 
fraudulent activities, while receiving about USD90 million during the period of the 
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fraud. In this regard, Robert Khuzami stated that their actions proved once more that 
they were determined to steadily hunt illegal returns which were actually 
inappropriately taken out of the pockets of trustful investors by means of various Ponzi 
schemes.
964
  
 
Furthermore, the Robert Allen Stanford scheme represents the second Ponzi scheme of 
major relevance discussed herein. This particular lawsuit research enables the 
consideration of different ignored messages or major conditions characterising the 
above-mentioned Ponzi scheme conducted by R. A. Stanford through his Financial 
Company.
965
 
 
6.3.1.2 Robert Allen Stanford 
 
It becomes clear that, in recent years, there were many Ponzi schemes thriving apart 
from Madoff’s, in spite of its being the most substantial. Thus, at the next level of 
financial frauds, one can find that of the Stanford Company, whose basis was set by A. 
Stanford, who also performed the managerial work while owning it. The Group crashed 
in 2009, after it was proved to be nothing but a Ponzi scheme.
966
  
 
From 1997 onwards, the SEC suspected “R. Allen Stanford”967 of managing a Ponzi 
scheme, which eventually cost stockholders almost USD7 billion, but it took more than 
ten years before the SEC began to investigate him in a serious manner.
968
 During 1997-
2004, the SEC undertook four personnel searches, but it was unable to verify his 
businesses thoroughly until 2005. The first one was performed in 1997 and occurred 
two years after Stanford registered his company under the SEC
969
. Thus, a SEC testing 
employee informed the local top-manager about carefully watching over that company 
and its managers, as for him everything looked similar to some Ponzi scheme that was 
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about to burst sooner or later.
970
 However, SEC implementation officials did not pay 
attention to negative signals received from staff working at Stanford.  
 
Robert Stanford was put under investigation for alleged deceit at the beginning of 2009. 
As mentioned in the allegations, Stanford sold deceitful deposit attestations in his bank, 
Stanford International Bank for at least ten years by deceiving the stockholders about 
the returning fees they could obtain on their investments while in fact planning a “USD8 
billion Ponzi scheme.”971 When confronted with the illicit allegations against him, 
Stanford pleaded not guilty. The case went to court in January 2011. The only one who 
actually recognized the charges was the former Chief Financial Officer.
972
 The SEC 
case against Stanford and his avowed co-partners still awaits a decision in connection 
with the illegal charges. 
 
The pertinent question is why did the SEC fail to charge Stanford earlier? It seems that 
the SEC has been suspicious about Stanford’s Ponzi scheme since 1997,973 a scheme 
which eventually cost investors nearly USD7 billion. Yet, the SEC started to really 
investigate ten years later. Four SEC examinations occurred since 1997 until 2004. 
“None of them managed to reveal his scamming before 2005.”974 In 1997, one SEC 
official examined the company and asked the branch supervisor to examine it as well, 
because the official suspected there was a Ponzi scheme involved,
975
 which will 
eventually erupt. However, there were multiple warnings that the SEC authority 
received and ignored the warnings coming from internal employees working at 
Stanford. One particular example resides in the request made by Fort Worth authority, 
when it started to examine Stanford due to high returns, which could not have been real 
because the investment approach was a traditional one. Thus, when the SEC asked for 
particular data, Sanford declined.
976
 Similarly, there was no reaction from the SEC, 
which, in the end, stopped pursuing this issue despite having obligatory 
empowerment.
977
 Another example supporting these statements is that of Leyla 
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Wydler
978
 who has been asking demands regarding the company’s doings regarding 
customers’ investments.979 Obviously, the bosses felt threatened, which led to her being 
fired.
980
  
 
Leyla Wydler complained first to the NASD in 2003.
981
 One year later she went to the 
SEC. She wrote a letter explaining that she was convinced that Stanford was seriously 
involved in fraudulent actions.  
 
SEC did not contacted her before early 2009 – when a case against Stanford was filed. 
At that moment, they contacted her to find out which were her accusations, finding out 
that officials from Fort Worth had hardly analysed the document again, deciding that 
they should neither examine it, nor open investigation on that particular issue.
982
 
 
This case raised two major problems. First, it was clear that the study of various Ponzi 
schemes was considered at that time to be a foolish waste of time, money and other 
things involved. Second, the SEC refused to examine what was so easy to notice,
983
 as 
the officials were concerned about the resources involved. These issues are backed up 
by the fact that former SEC employee, R. Sauer, stated that at the time, the local 
authorities were mainly concerned about the fact that examining this issue could take far 
too much time, and consequently decrease the number of reported lawsuits.
984
  
 
Senior officials from the region where it all started considered vast lawsuits as being 
disapproved
985
 since they were seen as too complex, so no rapid strike. This is why they 
were not encouraged to purse them. Attorney Sauer also added that it is the state system 
the one creating shameful instigations. To impress legislative appropriators, the SEC’s 
reported cases continued to increase yearly, which consequently led to new ways of 
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favouring rapid lawsuits also against everything new or speculative.
986
 Nevertheless, not 
all cases similar, while the easiest cases are seldom the most important. The employees 
who are captive to the state treadmill, most of the time, implied increasing managerial 
problems which resulted in growing difficulties in either opening recent cases or in 
closing unsuccessful ancient cases. Most of the time, the official authorities tend to 
become slaves of the mass opinions, reacting very late to publicised frauds (and to 
allegations regarding the circumstances of its occurrence) through different 
examinations. Regrettably, the SEC often ignored all evidences of fraud presented by 
renowned financial academic scholars
987
 until the press made an issue out of it. 
 
6.3.1.3 Bernard Madoff 
 
As discussed above, the SEC has experienced a number of recent significant defeats, 
including a shameful one: SEC did not understand “Ponzi schemer Madoff.” Several 
conservatives claimed that investor protection under the SEC was worse than without 
any investor protection at all, as the SEC was “just fostering the illusion of genuine 
regulatory effort-its own version of a con game”988. However, moderate voices were 
more temperate, even if these admitted that the SEC was a hardly troubled institution in 
need of a massive reform. The so-called “Madoff case” is very instructive. 
 
SEC’s lack of success leads us to the idea of endless, highly-connected problematic 
issues, beginning with the fact that frauds appearing too complicated tend to be ignored, 
and continuing with the regulatory officials who are not aware and do not know how 
hedge funds operate. Therefore, these officials are unable to prevent frauds. Finally, the 
list of debatable issues ends with the general opinion that the companies and the 
authorities attempt to regulate are seen as possible individuals to provide jobs if they 
abandon their career as public servants. So everything is inter-correlated.
989
 Therefore, 
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the request for legislative freedom, not only in fact but also in display, appears 
threatened and in this context, the regulatory enforcements become obligatory.  
 
Bernard Madoff perpetrated the most complex economic crime from the entire 
American history.
990
 In December 2008, federal researchers discovered what is thought 
to be the greatest Ponzi scheme ever, reportedly lasting for a period of twenty years and 
involving more than USD6.4 thousand million. The scheme was devised by Bernard 
Madoff, who had been previously an investment advisor and the organiser of “Bernard 
L. Madoff Investment Securities, LLC (BLMIS).” 
 
The information recently disclosed to the public regarding JP Morgan’s handling of 
incensement securities provided by Bernard Madoff raises different, yet related 
thoughtful concerns. The custodian entrusted with the liquidation of Madoff’s 
company
991
 started a lawsuit at the Tribunal in Manhattan against JP Morgan Chase & 
Co seeking USD6.4 billion, on the 2
nd
 of December 2010. In 2008, according to Davis 
Louis et al., JP Morgan litigation got down payments on behalf of Madoff’s investors 
totalling USD5.5 billion.
992
  
 
Madoff’s fraudulent action caused many complaints, ranging from illicit accusations of 
Madoff and the individuals who supposedly participated in or alternatively helped at his 
fraudulent procedure, to parallel civil operations supported by the SEC and particular 
groups and cases brought to court by state attorney generals, and liquidation 
proceedings. Most remarkably, stockholders who were allegedly deprived of money for 
Madoff’s benefit have started numerous civil lawsuits in the US and Europe area, in 
their attempt to recover funds from the credit institutions who provided them assistance 
or who made investments using their finances.  
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Madoff used to be president of this Corporation before his arrest at the end of 2008
993
, 
on a criminal charge. He confessed to securities deceit. The Department of Justice’s 
information against Madoff, registered on the 10
th
 of March 2010
994
, included more 
allegations: securities fraud, investment adviser trapping, mail fraudulent actions, false 
declarations, false testimony, filing false documents to the SEC, and stealing from an 
employer-sponsored retirement plan.
995
 Bernard Madoff continued his fraudulent action 
by never processing any trades for his stockholders.
996
 In the summer of 2010, federal 
accusers registered civil fine charges contra A. Bongiorno and J. Crupi, Modoff’s back-
office employees “seeking USD5 million in assets.”997 The allegations state that each 
litigant consciously perpetrated the fraud, although no criminal charges have yet been 
made against Bongiorno and Crupi.
998
 
 
His fraud illustrates two sides of this issue: on the one hand, major deficiencies in 
coordinating things and in supervising
999
 with regard to market trade regulations. Thus, 
an obvious weakness of the internal controls meant to protect investors’ assets from 
fraudulent activities could be observed. Also, at the feeder funds the Madoff or BMIS 
names were never mentioned. Final investors were thus not necessarily aware that they 
were investing with Madoff. When questioned on this point, the feeder distributors 
generally answered that their contract did not allow them to mention the Madoff or 
BMIS name. So this was another risk the investors were subjected to. However, while 
the Madoff scandal shows well how not only financial but also operational risks are 
related, it is primarily for investors a case of operational risk realisation. The Madoff 
scandal clearly illustrates a bias which overtook many investors in whose minds 
performance overshadowed risks. 
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Madoff has been sentenced on June 29, 2009.
1000
 The Madoff case has brought light into 
these matters, raising public’s and investors’ attention, and that of financial market as a 
whole, with regards to this form of financial investments, but also securities fraud.
1001
 
However, the SEC was hardly criticised because they did neither recognise, nor reveal 
this fraud which lasted for more than two decades, particularly since it was provided 
precise and frequent warnings.
1002
 
 
Similar to the Stanford case, the SEC was informed about Madoff and his company 
several times before he confessed. Unknown parties filed at least three complaints to the 
SEC about Madoff, while another fund administrator examined alleged profits. In 
addition, several economic journals wrote about Madoff’s unusual silence reputation 
and the unusual “consistency of his company’s financial statements.”1003 While SEC 
officials were in an unrelated thorough check of another company, they found Internet 
messages
1004
 showing that Madoff’s records were false. Most importantly, in 2001, 
2005 and 2007, H. Markopolos, the person who exposed this fraud, had filed clear but 
also meticulous complaints.
1005
 Nobody listened to him. 
 
As seen in the Stanford case, although the supposed scheme was printed in the news, 
this was neglected as proof by the SEC, which therefore missed this chance of catching 
Madoff. Consequently, several reports published in Barron’s and in MARhedge raised 
questions about SEC’s examination procedures.1006 Following the above-mentioned 
warnings SEC initiated about five inquiries, some of whom lasted 12 months, including 
thorough examinations of Madoff’s reports.1007 Unfortunately, SEC officials did not go 
to the next phase required to expose the fraud. Why did not the SEC’s officials reveal 
his lack of managing sales? Still, when criticised for failing to answer to all the 
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complaints it had previously received, SEC preferred to mention the number of new 
investigations opened.
1008
  
 
Again, as seen in the Stanford case, the SEC made the wrong decision that complex 
investigation was a waste of resources. Professor Macey supports this idea that 
investigating Ponzi schemes was regarded like a burning of resources.
1009
 He also 
concluded that the issue which seemed unusual consisted of the fact that, in reality, such 
a thorough check would have involved less resources than primarily considered.
1010
 
Although the SEC received six major detailed complaints regarding Madoff, none of 
them was careful analysed. Macey noticed: 
 
According to the SEC authorities’ testimony, a thorough check seemed very costly but 
also monopolizing. At the same time, the SEC was unable to really see the proof, 
despite being conscious about it.
1011
 
 
All in all, it is the author’s opinion that, for many investors, being caught in a hedge 
fund fraud can also have major reputation and business connotations which go far 
beyond the value of the actual investment loss. In this context, the role of the 
operational due diligence function is not only to stop monetary losses in the portfolio 
but it can also be considered as a key function meant to protect the asset management 
business itself and, by this, investors as well.  
 
Larson and Hinton found that, before the disclosure of Rothstein’s fraudulent activity, 
the first two largest schemes filed by the SEC consisted of: first, Madoff’s (USD50 
billion), second, Stanford’s (USD8 billion).1012 Since Larson and Hinton wrote their 
study, Tom Petters was convicted in a USD3.7 billion Ponzi scheme.
1013
 That would 
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mean that Rothstein’s lawsuit currently represents “the fourth largest Ponzi scheme”,1014 
revealed until now. 
 
6.3.1.4 Scott Rothstein 
 
One of the many important Ponzi schemes discovered so far is that of the American 
lawyer Scott Rothstein. The moment when his plan started to reveal itself, in the winter 
of 2009, Rothstein made a confession in front of the federal accusers, admitting fraud, 
money laundering, mail fraud and wire fraud. Considering the allegations against him 
and his company, stockholders have attempted to procure shares in private settlement 
decisions. In fact, the settlements did not exist, and the investor hedge funds had already 
been used in order to continue Rothstein’s Ponzi scheme.1015 
 
In January 2010, Rothstein admitted his guilt to all the criminal accusations against him 
and six months later he was convicted to 50 years in prison. Besides Rothstein, Debra 
Villegas, former Chief Operating Officer in his law company confessed her guilt. 
 
At present, Rothstein’s law company, Rothstein Rosenfeldt Adler, PA (“RRA”) is in the 
process of liquidation operations in “the Southern District of Florida.”1016 The Rothstein 
act of deceit has also caused civil lawsuits, most remarkably a 2,200-plus page litigation 
in Florida State Court of Justice.
1017
  
 
The development of a cohesive regulation to respond to nefarious corporate behaviour 
directed by managers who use their respective corporate entities is stringent. This 
necessity is further emphasized by the case describing how fraudsters can indirectly 
punish victims and creditors in relation to the current lack of coordination between the 
authorities and bankruptcy trustees. Protection of investors from undue losses can be 
performed with agreement among regulators to strongly consider prosecuting 
corporations used as vehicles for investment fraud aims. In these circumstances, doing 
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so would be theoretically justified and also, from the practical point of view, adoptable, 
but also would further victim and creditor recovery so that would increase the equitable 
nature of both criminal forfeiture and bankruptcy proceedings connected to corporate 
fraud. 
 
The Petters, Rothstein, Madoff and Standord cases illustrate how the existence of 
pessimistic motivation structures for investigation can effectively prevent the 
investigation of several types of cases. In this regard, it becomes a necessity for the SEC 
to carefully consider all the above-mentioned matters and to approach them, otherwise 
this will be considered amateurish, inefficient, or even worse, chained to particular 
stakes, other than those of the truthful individuals investing in hedge funds.
1018
 
 
Moreover, the next sub-section will exhibit market manipulation and misrepresentation 
cases.  
 
6.3.2 Market manipulation 
 
It has been stated that, usually, plaintiffs in the US use two major claims.
1019
 The first 
refers to material misleading and information deficiency, while the second one makes 
reference to market manipulation in exchanges. It has been noted that although these are 
very different, there has been a tendency to consider them quite similar from the legal 
point of view. Thus, plaintiffs were asked by the tribunals to bring about proofs alike, 
which would further make investors trust the market exchanging the assets and thus 
acquire their status of being reliant. Main motivations considering why these proofs 
were required cannot be applied to both misrepresentation cases and market 
manipulation cases.
1020
 
 
Complaints regarding industry manipulation must not be imposed to prove an efficient 
market for taking advantage of the fraudulent actions on the market philosophy’s 
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assumption of confidence. In case the complainants “are made to make any showing at 
all,”1021 they must prove the causes of their losses. 
 
A significant case is that of SEC v. Ficeto. On the 24
th
 of February 2011, two hedge 
funds experts, a dealer, and two companies involved in a allegedly case removing plan 
involving stocks with a very low amount of market capitalisation, have been accused by 
the SEC. Supposed infringements comprised “Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, 
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5, Section 15(c)(1) of the Exchange 
Act, Section 17(a) of the Exchange Act and Rules 17a-4(b)(4) and 17a-8, and Sections 
206(1) and 206(2) of the Advisers Act.”1022 
 
All the accused persons used manipulative trading practices firstly to increase the 
returns of funds, and secondly to overstate net assets, as mentioned by SEC. Then, 
consequently, in accordance with this authority’s point of view, litigants managed to get 
several USD million in performance
1023
 shares, but also certificates they did not have 
the right to own. The litigants allegedly transferred matched orders; they removed 
orders that established the daily closing price while they managed wash sales, made for 
one main scope: exaggerating stock values by artificial means.
1024
 The accused persons 
allegedly used even some different IM
1025
 program enabling free chat/talk about non-
legal performances and there was little chance of being discovered. In 2007, the 
investment representative rapidly resigned, which led to the fact that both funds and 
their shareholders found themselves in debts. The debt was between USD440-530 
million.
1026
 The SEC is searching ongoing “injunctive relief”; unwillingly surrender of 
illegal benefits with “prejudgment interest”1027 and financial penalties. 
 
The usual type of fraudulent breach of law for hedge funds is represented by the abusive 
securities and associated misleading.
1028
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There is usually no permission for hedge funds regarding investing in any form of assets 
whatsoever.
1029
 At the same time, their advisers are exempted from specifying what 
categories of investments or which particular strategies are going to use for investment 
purposes.
1030
 The following sub-section will present misrepresentations regarding 
investments.  
6.3.3 Fraudulent misrepresentations to investors  
 
Cases on fraudulent funds have been thoroughly mediatised, illustrating the various 
manners the managers devoid of scruples can cause losses to investors and this is the 
main reason for regulating hedge funds.
1031
 Hedge funds must pay attention in order to 
ensure that any declarations and representations made to stockholders are entirely 
correct. The cases below suggest large-scale deceitful operations on the part of the funds 
and their agents. Even careless incorrect declarations can lead to a great deal of trouble 
down the road. 
 
In SEC v. Kowalewski, on the 6
th
 of January 2011, SEC registered a civil injunctive 
lawsuit accusing St. Kowalewski and SJK Investment Management, LLC, with 
infringements of the federal profits regulations, for depriving stockholders 
inappropriately within two funds managed by the latter
1032
. Violations contain several 
regulatory sections.
1033
 It was claimed that the litigants took USD65 million
1034
 for two 
hedge funds. The litigation were supposed to state that: (a) the money placed in 
repositories are going to be deposited in independent latent funds searching complicated 
techniques for investing; (b) not even a single underlying reserve could be distributed an 
amount of above 15% from the total funds’ currencies; (c) all repositories should be 
liable to pay either for their “institutional” or for their beginning expenditures at the 
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same time according to specific functioning expenses; last, (d) as a reward for offered 
assistance, SJK company should get maximum 1% security management share in one 
year and 10% returns incentive share.
1035
 Indeed, this litigation confirms the litigants’ 
creation of an unique, unravelled reserve to which they removed stockholders’ 
investments for individual and entrepreneurial costs, but also administrative taxes; In 
reality it proved to be USD5million that were to be found in Kowalewski’s wage 
accruing.  
 
These fundamental reasons for the hedge funds’ industry performance request are “not 
applicable to manipulation claims.” In this regard, it has been remarked that industry 
performance did nothing to suggest that there is a causative relation between having 
faith in the financial value provided by the industry and the scheming behaviour.
1036
 On 
the other hand, parties undertaking “market manipulation” must be asked to determine 
causes for losses “at the class certification stage”1037 for linking that confidence with the 
supposed manipulative actions. Requests like this should act in favour of coherence and 
efficiency, like a doorkeeper for “class certification’ avoiding “violence to Supreme 
Court precedent.” 
6.4.  Arbitration cases 
 
It was noticed that those investments made by hedge fund managers and directed 
towards their proper funds (among these one can mention loans coming from a certain 
fund to a manager) are to be found at completely opposite parts on the illegal scale.
1038
 
First, the generally called “skin in the game” represents a particular situation when an 
executive in a publicly-traded entity makes use of his/her own money to buy stock in 
that company. This is considered as aligning interests of both investing individuals and 
managers.
1039
 On the contrary, the other tends to be considered like compassioning their 
interests which are at conflict. It is however certain that, from various motivations, 
investors wish to know everything about them.  
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SEC v. Quantek Asset Management LLC.  
The SEC considers it suitable and important to citizens that public administrative and 
C&D
1040
 processes be implemented according “to Section 8A of the Securities Act of 
1933 - Securities Act, Sections 203(e), 203(f), and 203(k) of the Investment Advisers 
Act of 1940 - Advisers Act, and Section 9(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 
Investment Company Act”1041 against Quantek Asset Management, LLC (Quantek), 
Bulltick Capital Markets Holdings, (LP  Bulltick), Javier Guerra (Guerra), but also 
Ralph Patino (Patino) all in all considered Respondents.  
 
Recently, on May 29, 2012, the SEC accused a fund adviser located in Miami of having 
deceived investing individuals regarding the managers’ investments made in a fund 
located in Latin America.
1042
 
 
According to the examination performed by the SEC, it was discovered that different 
misleading representations have been made by Quantek regarding “skin in the game 
along with investors in the USD1 billion Quantek Opportunity Fund.”1043 Similarly, it 
has been noted that “skin in the game”, under this fund management given 
circumstance, represents that particular situation in which the adviser/executive decides 
to invest his/her own capital in that company. This is considered, in the opinion of each 
fund investor a major means of aligning all advisers’ interests to his/her own, leading to 
a better control and to a better risk management.
1044
  
 
In fact, Quantek’s managers never invested their capital in the Funds. Similarly, the 
SEC’s research revealed how Quantek manipulated investors regarding investments of 
those funds it managed,
1045
 but also some connected-party exchanges involving 
manager Guerra, as well as his previous owning corporation Bulltick LP. 
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In the enactment process conducted by the SEC, Quantek, and several persons including 
Bulltick, Guerra, and Ralph Patino have been accused together.
1046
 They paid the total 
amount of USD3.1 million, while Guerra, just like Patino were forced to assent to 
securities industry bars.
1047
 
 
Besides, the SEC has discovered a crucial element, namely, that information was not 
accurately revealed to investors by neither Quantek nor Guerra or Bulltick. This proved 
to be another key element in this file. Thus, around four or even five years ago, due to 
the fact that Opportunity Funds allowed related-party exchanges between the parent 
entity belonging to Quantek, Bulltick but also various associates, investors had been 
alerted with regards to exchanges improperly disclosed. Both Quantek’s and Bulltick’s 
staff took care but also backdated omitted capital lent data.
1048
  
 
Javier Guerra resigned on September 28, 2011.
1049
 According to press reports
1050
, the 
portfolio manager of QAM
1051
 and Quantek Opportunity Fund, LP (Partnership or 
Feeder Fund), submitted his relinquishment of responsibility (he resigned) leaving the 
job due to losses in arbitration to Aris.
1052
  
According to the arbitration bureau, it was reported that Quantek Asset Management 
introduced Aris by fraud for investing in the Feeder Fund (USD15 million were 
invested
1053
) while, at the same time, it commanded Guerra to pay losses worth USD1 
million. 
 
Quantek procured incorrect notifications to investors regarding some connected-party 
exchanges by the funds. Through its processes, Quantek broke several anti-fraud, 
compliance and records management agreements from ‘the Advisers Act and Securities 
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Act.’ Guerra, Quantek’s manager and its former operations manager, Ralph Patino, had 
made misstatements concerning Quantek’s account. Bulltick had helped and encouraged 
this, causing several of Quantek’s violations.1054 
 
Quantek
1055
, Guerra
1056
, Bulltick
1057
, and Patino
1058
 established charges in the absence 
of any guilt confession.  
 
In this regard, Quantek and Guerra decided in favour of paying around “USD2.2 million 
in disgorgement and pre-judgment interest, and financial penalties of USD375,000 and 
USD150,000. Bulltick agreed to pay a penalty of USD300,000, while Patino accepted to 
pay a penalty of USD50,000. Guerra consented to a five-year securities industry bar, 
and Patino consented to a securities industry bar of one year.
”1059
 Censorship was 
granted by Quantek and Bulltick. 
 
As seen above, this claim of malpractice was resolved by monetary penalties, 
censorship and securities industry bars. Nevertheless, it should be clear that every 
broker’s obligation is stated to investors as accurate as possible, always providing them 
the best solutions and recommendations which best suit each investor. Accordingly, the 
stage of life, soundness, but also financial complexity, or its lack, must represent major 
indexes for each broker. The law and the SEC are there to help protect investors, and 
here they helped in that particular case to correct a dangerous path the company was 
taking. 
 
 
6.5 Concluding remarks 
 
The cases presented above are some of the most recent and most famous. According to 
Poser, unlike Madoff’s scheme, which seems to have been an impressive, immense 
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fraud, most of litigations and arbitrations involved fraudulent actions widely spread in 
the entire funds market,
1060
 seriously affecting investors. Poser noted that due to SEC’s 
inability or unwillingness to fulfil its enforcement responsibilities investors have lost 
billions of USD.
1061
 Since 2000, regulators were unsuccessful in taking appropriate and 
efficient action to restrict abuses in relation to hedge funds, which leads to the 
conclusion that both regulatory enforcement and investors’ protection are highly 
necessary.  
 
With regard to why the regulators failed in the above cases it has been remarked that: 
 
The explanations include conflicts of interest among employees, poor employees’ 
training, constraints related to finances, and a devised nature of the regulatory 
system.
1062
 The various players in these litigation and arbitration cases acted in ways 
that in the end turned out to be against their own interest. A high number of 
sophisticated but also ordinary hedge fund investors favoured these funds for a long 
period and lost money. The administrators and the auditors were willing to accept the 
manager’s explanations, if any. Still, this acceptance led to disastrous consequences for 
their funds or business. Above all, the SEC did not assure too much protection for 
investors. 
 
Nevertheless, the basic motivation explaining failures is the anti-regulatory atmosphere, 
supported by academically generated anti-regulatory approach that has pervaded 
government during the last twenty or thirty years. Apparently, the SEC’s major aim 
shifted: it no longer protects investing persons but rather it protects those firms and 
investment companies that it regulates. As one commentator concluded, in spite of 
having been made particularly for protecting investors, the SEC changed into some 
authority protective with financial scammers.
1063
 This is an exaggeration, of course, but 
it needs to be taken into consideration. 
 
Now, it is likely that conflicts concerning both redemptions and distressed hedge funds 
will end up in court during the years to come. The conflicts of interest in these cases 
                                                 
1060
 Ibid. 
1061
 Poser, N.S. & Fanto, James A., “Broker-Dealer Law & Regulation” (4th ed. 2007, with 2008 Supp.), 
pp. 4-9 to 4-11. 
1062
 Poser, N. S., “Why the SEC Failed: Regulators against Regulation” (February 24, 2009). Brooklyn 
Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law, Vol. 3, 2009. 
1063
 Lewis M. et al, “The End of the Financial World as We Know It”, New York Times, Jan. 4, 2009, p. 9. 
274 
concern not only instances of confessed fraud that emerge as bankruptcy declines and 
losses rise, but also valuation conflicts and controversies between stockholders and 
hedge repositories over the timing of salvations. Many of these demands have been 
litigated in other countries, but US complaints are also on the rise.  
 
A shift in the modern view of hedge fund investments but also organisational audit is 
underway. These consequences rising from the Madoff crisis together with the current 
recession is going to affect hedge funds’ due diligence, mainly with respect to 
operational risk. On this point, it has been remarked that not only investors, but also 
funds are going to obligatory reconsider prior rigorous due diligence assumptions. In 
order to survive in the post-Madoff world, they ought to make themselves ready to 
paying prices related to the growing resources necessary to be invested in order to 
efficiently solve “operational due diligence.”1064 
 
During recent years, new regulatory modifications have been suggested. The political 
requirement to enact new measures quickly, however, has led to proposed alterations 
that are adapted to the specific features of the hedge reserves fraud. Unfortunately, there 
does not seem to have been a complete assessment of the present regulatory system for 
hedge funds.  
 
This chapter described several case studies concerning various claims that financial 
organisations and investors might encounter if a regulatory enforcement crashes. It is 
certain that, due to the worldwide financial circumstances, claims against financial 
institutions are going to grow. The following quote from Johnson et al. sums up much 
of the recent debate following these cases: 
 
“In the aftermath of a Ponzi scheme’s collapse, financial institutions, whether direct or 
indirect participants, will almost certainly face litigation risks for even the most remote 
involvement in financial frauds.”1065 Recently, it was seen that litigations and 
arbitrations are changing, respectively, persecuted investors tend to become more and 
more innovative, prosecuting every financial sound company, generally financial 
companies which could have played significant roles. The economic situation is 
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standing still while indignation is going stronger in people’s lives due to light regulation 
of the financial market, which can become a model.  
 
While stories such as Stanford’s, Petters’ and Madoff’s can be labelled as atypical due 
to the size of their collapse or due to the level of malfeasance connected with the fraud, 
they help to illustrate the reason why both regulators and the public in general must pay 
greater attention to hedge fund industry regulation and the protection of investors. 
 
As highlighted above, substantive regulation directed towards the elimination and 
governance of conflicts of interest has its limits. It is the author’s opinion that where 
these limits emerge, only mandatory and voluntary disclosure is able to offer the 
necessary protection by shifting part of the responsibility for the protection of investors 
to the investors themselves. This is especially because, as well known, disclosure offers 
the foundation for the regulations and especially of investor protection laws.  
 
In addition to explaining many of these risks and conflicts of interests associated to 
hedge fund management, this chapter has demonstrated the risks that they induce to 
hedge fund investors, particularly sophisticated but also indirect investors who are often 
not aware of their hedge fund investment.  
 
Lately, due to the increase of arbitration and litigation cases, hedge fund investors, 
specifically institutional investors, have been intensifying their requests for better 
safeguard. Therefore, investors within the hedge fund industry lost their confidence and 
have come to understand that improved investor protection is imperative.  
 
The increased attention on the issue has led to the creation of hedge fund “best 
practices” documents, making a multitude of suggestions that, if made, could greatly 
improve the level of  investors’ interests protection . Still, best practices are generally 
voluntary suggestions that, so far, hedge fund managers have proven little desire of 
adopting and implementing. 
 
As a concluding remark, it is necessary that regulators take action to ensure that hedge 
fund investors receive adequate protection from the funds’ many risks and conflicts of 
interest. Through the introduction of increased transparency to hedge fund investment 
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and standardisation of the valuation process, regulators are able to defend investors’ 
rights without eliminating the specific flexibility that enables hedge funds to confer 
major benefits on the markets. 
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FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
The main goal of this thesis is to establish the framework for a global regulation of 
hedge funds, focusing on investor protection, in a continuously changing regulatory 
field. This part reveals the closing conclusions of the thesis by comparing and 
presenting the results of the current research. It also recommends several aspects for 
efficient enactment and implementation of hedge funds regulation. 
 
Due to the fact that a number of concerns have been raised on the growth of investor 
interest in hedge funds, this thesis concludes that there is indeed a strong case for 
increased investor protection in hedge funds. Hence, as financial products become more 
complex and innovative, financial regulation and investor protection need to be equally 
innovative, creative, and proactive. A comprehensive research on the possible costs and 
benefits of such regulation concludes that the benefits are likely to be greater than the 
costs, stipulating that regulators need to be aware of regulation excesses and over-
regulation dangers. Therefore, an international hedge funds regulation focused on 
investor protection and risk mitigation is the best answer to a global financial area. 
 
It is a proven fact that the shifts in the legal field have seriously affected hedge funds 
operations. These shifts were caused among others by the financial crisis, the desire to 
mitigate risks, the necessity to better control hedge funds, the need to increase investors’ 
protection and hedge funds transparency. Consequently, all regulators began to 
acknowledge the potential benefits but also the shortcomings of tighter regulation such 
as for example a strategic method to face risks in the hedge funds area and increase 
funds competitiveness, controlling their impact on the hedge funds market and the 
international financial system, on the one hand. On the other hand, tighter regulation 
was thought to illustrate “diversification, competition and price discovery.” 
Nevertheless, according to Photis Lysandrou, there are regulators who still hesitate “in 
tightening the controls on hedge funds”1066, although they are no longer exclusively in 
the area of the sophisticated investors. The more pension plans, endowments, charitable 
institutions, and other institutional investors invest in hedge funds, the biggest the 
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exposure of “ordinary” investors to these lightly regulated investment vehicles. 
Consequently, ordinary investors tend to be subjected to the myriad conflicts of interests 
connected with hedge fund management. In addition to explaining many of these 
conflicts, this thesis has proved the risks they induce to hedge fund investors, 
particularly to indirect investors with a frequent low awareness level of their hedge fund 
investment. 
 
The European and American authorities have much considered lately hedge funds, and 
in this direction, the author acknowledges the cross-border nature of the hedge funds 
sector and therefore the need to create an internationally harmonised regulation regime 
for hedge funds. As they have fallen beyond the boundaries of global public regulation, 
hedge funds have often been considered the proof that international financial markets 
have exceeded the states’ ability to competently regulate and control them. In addition, 
because private industry groups rather than public institutions appeared as major rule-
makers for these markets, this industry seemingly reinforced arguments about the trans-
national ascension of the authorities. The present international financial crisis 
confronted these ideas as nationalities and states have now proclaimed their regulatory 
authority in a globally coordinated manner over this industry. At the same time, there 
was a close connection between the regulatory course of the European authorities and 
the corresponding regulatory actions in the US. While European hedge funds regulators 
were capable, to a certain extent, of generating innovative issues but also legislative 
answers, in some cases they ran behind the Washington’s policies. This is the main 
reason highlighting the necessity of an international regulatory hedge funds regime. 
 
This thesis has examined and compared the hedge funds regulation in several 
jurisdictions such as the US, the UK and the EU, focusing on several single jurisdictions 
in Europe such as Italy, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta and Switzerland after the 
21
st
 century depression. The thesis pursued to depict the progress achieved at regulatory 
level after the financial crisis, with major focus on investor protection. Along our 
journey, the reforms introduced in the regulatory field are described and illustrated, such 
as “the AIFM Directive” in the EU and “the Dodd-Frank Act” in the US. After the 
enactment of “the Dodd–Frank Act”, funds from the US needed to register with “state 
or federal financial authorities” while simultaneously complying with standards 
regarding transparency and disclosure. Simultaneously, funds in the EU will be allowed 
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to operate within every EU Member State on condition that they are registered with the 
ESMA observing also the approved guidelines.  
 
The present research confirms that the lack of global regulation in this industry before 
the crisis simply indicates the preferences of the two prevailing financial world leaders: 
the US and the UK. In return, these two powers were mainly following pressure from 
private financial groups, competitiveness responsibilities and the opinions of major elite 
policymakers concerning superiority of market discipline and self-regulatory 
mechanisms. At that moment, when the shockwaves produced by the current financial 
crisis generated a shift in the domestic politics of the largest financial powers, the 
essence of international rules changed accordingly. The abnormal politicisation of 
financial regulatory politics caused by the widely usage of taxpayers’ money to save 
financial institutions released popular and legislative pressures in the US and Europe for 
policymakers to regulate. In doing this, they acknowledge the complicity of hedge funds 
to the subprime crisis, although one should mention that despite the fact that hedge 
funds contributed to the development of the crisis, they cannot be held responsible for it. 
All in all, the author considers that regulators must develop their registration rules and 
reporting requirements, by gathering a substantial collection of data from all these 
advisers/managers. This collection is intended to help investors and assist the regulatory 
and examination efforts of both the United States Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) and the European Parliament, in prompting investor-centric regulation and in 
enhancing protection for investors’ interests, by mitigating some of the higher risk 
behaviour of hedge funds. 
 
Major regulators also changed their opinion on the merits of market discipline and self-
regulation according to the lessons learned during the financial crisis. At the same time, 
it was assessed that many private actors also came to approve the regulation not only for 
defensive reasons at a time of weakened political legitimacy, but also for more positive 
reasons of improving the operation of their hedge funds industry, bringing back 
confidence, and/or increasing market shares. As the most powerful states agreed, to a 
greater or smaller extent, to move towards tighter official regulation for domestic 
purposes, they had major reasons - as noted in the thesis - to become sure that the 
content of international rules changed in the same direction of investor protection. 
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Analyses emphasizing inter-state power relations could be tempted to consider the end 
of self-regulation to be a result of the decrease of the US and UK power and the 
favourable outcome of states with more interventionist predilections among which one 
mentions France and Italy in overcoming their rivalry. In the author’s opinion, however, 
this interpretation would neglect the importance of the domestic changes in the US and 
the UK in explaining the shift to direct regulation. Accordingly, this thesis stated that 
analysts focusing on inter-state power relations would be right to consider the growing 
capacity of the EU to act as a whole both unilaterally and at global level as an important 
development in this story. As shown above, this shift increasingly constrained UK’s 
autonomy in global regulatory politics, simultaneously with causing global outcomes be 
influenced by more powerful countries, such as France and Italy, as well as regulatory 
bodies such as the ECB, the EC and the European Parliament. 
 
Both the US and the EU have imposed major regulation and reporting requests on hedge 
funds, which were completely analysed and approached both in the US (chapter five) 
and in the EU (chapter three). The AIFM Directive, thoroughly examined and discussed 
in this thesis (chapter three), comprises authorisation, risk management, operational 
risk, depositories, valuation tools, liquidity, capital, leverage, conduct of business and 
marketing for these funds. The AIFM Directive will have to be implemented in the 
national legislations in the EU by July 2013. The impact of the AIFM Directive on local 
jurisdictions in Europe is also described (chapter four). The hedge funds in the US will 
be compelled to keep records on the SEC inspection regarding most of these issues. 
Additionally, the “the Dodd-Frank Act” introduces a reform which restricts the capacity 
of banks to own hedge funds (chapter five). Therefore, this confines the development of 
“the shadow banking” system. In the author’s opinion, a major problem occurs as the 
Dodd-Frank Act is generally focused on monitoring systemic risk, and consequently, 
the new legislation does not succeed in solving many of the investor protection issues 
created by the hedge fund industry.  
 
As a closing comment, one question arises: could this mean the end of self-regulation? 
In an article from 2004, Danielsson et al. argue that regulation of hedge funds should 
not be made in absurdum.
1067
 The opportunities of the hedge funds cannot cease to exist 
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only to eliminate all the risks. This is also something that should be carefully 
considered. The answer to the above question is certainly positive, meaning that public 
authorities have approved formal responsibility over hedge funds regulation. 
Nevertheless, it should also be noted that until now, they have refrained from supporting 
heavy handed and detailed types of global regulation such as constraints on the 
investment strategies of hedge funds. At the same time, public authorities continue to 
depend on various elements of self-regulation. The long life of these patterns is an issue 
to be pursued in the future. Whether the domestic pressures caused by the financial 
crisis fade away and competitive concerns raised by the industry recover strength, 
regulatory bodies in major financial centres will be under pressure to scale back the 
perimeter of public regulation and to go back to more market-driven regulatory 
mechanisms. If the lessons learnt from the crisis generate a more profound ideational 
change or if the alliances of private sector interests intending to gain from greater 
regulation become institutionalised, then the movement away from self-regulation may 
last and may even become more intense in the forthcoming years. 
 
After examining this multitude of attempts to mitigate risks by means of legislation, 
another major conclusion of the study refers to the involvement of jurisdiction. There 
are two major concerns regarding hedge funds, consisting in very small charges and 
little or no divulgement. Generally, hedge funds have the opportunity to choose the 
most sympathetic location. Also, when a state changes major stipulations, be it taxes, 
laws or divulgement requests, principals and fund managers can change location easily. 
This effortlessness in changing the location does not prove providential at all for any 
state because funds are synonymous with high revenues, as this is the essential reason of 
jurisdictions not agreeing to funds changing their residence. Every residence change 
reduces not only incomes, but also risk mitigation efforts. Therefore, state cooperation 
has a double purpose: first, to solve problems that involve residence authority, and 
second, to diminish global risk that can otherwise cause depressions as the present one. 
These risks, also called “systemic risks”, are widely analysed by global authorities and 
officials. 
 
Every risk assumed by each particular person investing in funds, every component of 
the economic and financial structure, as well as Europe’s objective of making “a single 
market” place nowadays funds on the first place in terms of interest not only at the 
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European, but also at international level. Starting with 2007, when Germany became 
President of the “Group of 8”, funds turned into a major issue discussed within multiple 
meetings, with transparency as the main focus. Nowadays, it seems that hedge funds 
market understood that there are many advantages for everyone involved within this 
business, if scammers were annihilated. Accordingly, regulatory bodies and funds 
managers cooperate in the attempt to build a healthy funds market regardless of the fact 
they are based onshore or offshore. 
 
Nevertheless, the author of this research considers that emerging risks cannot be 
completely mitigated. It is clear that it is impossible to mitigate risks directly since there 
is no efficient global regulation (although the Basel laws are quite useful). In the context 
of industry powers moderating the risks, one question arises: “will the world have to 
experience a complete financial crisis first? And if this happens, would it be worth it if 
we can avoid it?” 
 
Another concluding remark is that EU and US legislators are deeply concerned both 
about the hedge funds’ strategies and about the associated risks, in terms of the fund’s 
properties estimations and investor protection. Vast legislation resulted from these 
concerns regarding systemic and particular risks affecting especially the investors. Still, 
the main question which emerges is whether “this massive regulation is really necessary 
for regulatory bodies to interfere and legislate against the promoting of the funds or at 
least fund of funds to investors”. Legislators and regulatory bodies must understand 
hedge funds and the impact of such tighten regulation on the achievement of a 
reasonable legal framework that will not jeopardise their activities and their very 
existence. This is the reason for stimulating and developing initiatives such as the 
researches on the AIFM Directive and the Dodd-Frank Act developed in this thesis.  
 
Another quite intuitive observation is necessary: in the present world, globalisation 
leads to interconnection of markets, as financial aspects ignore state borders when the 
law is enclosed within a defined location, creating a disjunction between territorial 
regulation and international activities. This remark is general, but it can easily apply to 
hedge funds and could prove to be one of the biggest challenges faced by the financial 
law. Indeed, operations and investors in various jurisdictions come together with likely 
conflicting regulations problems, and with high compliance costs. At the same time, 
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another risk should be emphasized - that of forum shopping, since the lack of globally 
coordinated approach enables hedge funds to move away to less rigid jurisdictions out 
of the regulatory authority’s reach, which is certainly not good news for the systemic 
risk mitigation efforts. The author considers that global economic challenges require a 
global answer. International multilateralism within intergovernmental and supranational 
fora is the sine qua non of an effective resolution to the analysed industry crisis and a 
sound reform of the international hedge funds industry. 
 
Florence Lombard
1068
 highlights the above-mentioned aspect, urging for a system of 
mutual recognition of global standards both from onshore and especially from offshore 
jurisdictions. Overall, despite all regulations and regulators, offshore funds regulation is 
still one major issue to be solved. All regulatory reforms seem passive as compared to 
it. It is clear that a coordinated onshore-offshore approach to regulation could prove 
much more effective and it could lead to costs cuts.  
 
The achievement of an international harmonised legal framework for hedge funds does 
not seem utopian now. To the contrary, the international financial architecture 
developed as a solution to the necessity of a common system of global financial risk 
oversight. The author considers that policies must be structured around global institutions 
to achieve collective objectives such as prudential/financial stability regulations, market 
conduct regulations and trading practices, general market integrity regulations and investor 
protection regulation. The international financial architecture is intended to deal with 
international financial regulation. Supervision and regulation are two sides of the same coin. 
As demonstrated in this thesis, there are common objectives of the US and the EU 
financial regulatory frameworks, but the current reform proposals did not size yet the 
opportunity of contingency for promoting a coordinated international approach. Even in 
2013, there is still no consensus on the form and subject of the regulation. This happens 
both in the US and in the EU, where Member States fight to impose their own 
perceptions of financial regulation and do not seek to be eager to compromise and 
proceed towards even greater harmonisation. One thing needs to be pointed out clearly: 
this thesis supports the idea of global financial regulation; it only acknowledges the idea 
that there are some structural and cultural elements that must be carefully considered by 
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anyone who wants to overcome those difficulties and encourage an international 
framework.  
 
Indeed, several deep philosophical and cultural differences have shaped various 
perceptions regarding regulation in general and hedge funds regulation in particular. On 
the one side, there seems to be the UK and the US but also, to a smaller extent Italy, 
which is in favour of a flexible approach to hedge fund regulation. On the other side, 
there is France, which keeps pushing for more regulation, mainly because it has nothing 
to lose. Acknowledging these divergences is the first step to overcome them and to 
develop a global legal framework. It is true that these differences may first of all 
originate in the very perception of the state role. While France has a tight state 
intervention tradition, the US and the UK have a quite liberal one. This may also come 
from the role of the law itself in each of the above-mentioned countries. Hence, France 
has always been a highly regulated state with a massive legislative activity, while the 
US and the UK regulate more lightly and only if necessary. 
 
The hedge funds approach of each of the states discussed in this thesis is at the same 
time influenced by the significance of the funds industry in these states. Accordingly, 
France is not really concerned about the impact of hedge fund regulation on its economy 
due to the fact that this impact could not be so significant (since funds based in France 
are few, although diverse). On the contrary, the UK and the US have a strong 
motivation to maintain their competitiveness, as they are the two major financial centres 
for hedge funds. Finally, and despite the efforts of the G20, there seems to be a 
competition between the jurisdictions analysed in this thesis to impose their own 
regulation perceptions in a very chauvinistic manner, which may prove prejudicial in 
the author’s opinion. 
 
In the present financial world, financial markets can no longer afford this patriotism of 
another age. Particularly, certain statements made by regulators or politicians could be 
seen as regrettable, since they threaten the efforts to build an effective global 
cooperation.  
 
Beyond any philosophical and cultural differences, one competitiveness problem that 
detains the internationalisation of financial regulation. Indeed, even if the achievement 
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of a level-playing field seems compelling in various respects, many states fight to keep 
their competitive edge in sometimes a very protectionist manner. Joseph Stiglitz 
develops this idea in a recent article, stating that each country weights every proposal 
and assesses its effect on its own financial system competitiveness
1069
. Most of the 
times, the aim is to find a regulatory regime that affects competitors much more than 
their own companies. He quotes the saying according to which “all politics is local”, as 
finance represents indeed a major political player in the US and many other 
jurisdictions. 
 
If everybody agrees on Joseph Stiglitz’ above statement, especially because it identifies 
a real issue, the remedy he advocates for cannot be agreed on. Indeed, he considers that 
since international coordination is difficult to achieve, the international communities 
should not lose time in trying to do so. Due to the difficult “systemic risk” phenomena 
and to the interconnection of financial industries, one can barely conceive all delayed 
attempts to establish a consistent, ordered, international fundamental structure for 
multinational operational companies. The author of the thesis insists on emphasizing 
that, in her opinion, this is not a viable choice. Since the PFIARA
1070
 and the AIFM are 
simultaneously discussed, one can regret that the opportunity to promote an 
international approach to hedge fund regulation was not seized despite the 
recommendations made by G20, many committees, research organisations and 
academic scholars. 
 
Failure to achieve international standards in the present reform proposals does not mean 
that attempts in this regard are completely missing. Examples of these efforts to 
establish international cooperation may, for instance, be presented through the existence 
of bilateral agreements between regulators such as the “memorandum of understanding 
on consultation, cooperation and information exchange related to the supervision of 
financial services firms and market oversight” between “the FSA” in “the UK” and “the 
SEC” in “the US.” The above-mentioned “strategic dialogue” between the two 
regulators began in 2006 and several meetings took place to discuss, among other 
things, the regulation of hedge funds and investment advisers. Efforts are also made for 
instance in the “G20, IOSCO, ESMA”, as well as in different forums and authorities to 
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develop global models, and these efforts need to be supported and stimulated. 
Nevertheless, if such initiatives exist, they tend to be rather conventional; therefore, 
they seldom conduct to regulatory harmonisation, mainly because regulators are not 
willing to walk down that path. 
 
The most advanced example of international cooperation until now remains at the Self 
Regulatory Organisations’ level. They easily generate consensus within the industry. 
The directions they provide to the industry are moderate and easily transposable at 
international level. Andrew J. Donohue
1071
, at the SEC, referred to such rules as 
“serving as an excellent model for the way in which industry can work together with 
regulators around the globe to develop smart and sensible solutions to hedge fund 
regulatory issues and to strengthen and enhance confidence in all of our markets.”1072 
The author’s firm belief is that, unless action is taken to harmonise the regulation of 
hedge funds at global level, the confidence of investors in the safety of invested assets 
through a collective investment vehicle would continue to be poor. The other way 
round, it seems it is a favourable moment for an international legal framework in the 
hedge fund industry but, unfortunately, governments and regulators still struggle to 
overcome their national particularities, which leads to a deadlock. Harmonisation of 
legal frameworks seems to be illusory since regulators continue to contemplate national-
based reforms when an effective prevention of systemic risk requires international 
cooperation. The proposal presented in this thesis considers this structural situation 
requiring significant effort. It acknowledges the obvious tendency of jurisdictions to 
handle regulation on a national-basis. The national prerogatives to regulate as each state 
sees appropriate are not denied by the creation of a global database of systemic risk. 
Instead, this promotes an international cooperation framework via an information 
sharing system superimposed on national regulations. This would be for sure one of the 
most far-reaching innovations of post-crisis financial regulation, as it will oversee the 
market as a whole, particularly monitoring investor protection. 
 
The fundamental acquis of the crisis is universality, for the post-Lehman finance design 
achievable by means of international regulation and supervision as well as harmonised 
national policies and rules. The system of concurrent rules and institutions, 
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interconnected by their fortunes represents the finance. The sustainable nature of the 
entire financial system and the capacity of international norms to prevent ambiguities 
and unclear aspects, and the systemic financial stability all depend on how powerful 
single institutions are and how effective national rules prove to be. The crisis was 
followed by an immediate predisposition to protectionism and then by the reaction to 
build a structure that reacts to the regulatory system: the enactment of global norms and 
founding of global institutions capable of managing a global system. 
 
Despite the lack of difficulty in finding risks related to funds, regulatory bodies are 
bound to remember the reasons for hedge funds’ existence: their high request. Except 
the request of individuals (persons who want to invest their money in funds), this 
industry failed to develop. This thesis mentions practical regulations and their 
recommendations issued for some selected European countries, the US and the UK. Yet, 
these policies and the arguments supporting these regulatory tools might prove real for 
every jurisdiction in the world.  
 
Under the circumstances of the entire financial system stability being the main goal of 
macro-prudential policy, this should also include the “shadow banking” system - money 
market funds, hedge funds and structured investment vehicles. They have a significant 
impact on the global market. During the financial crisis, the loaning by means of the 
“shadow banking” system slightly exceeded the traditional banking system. The 
financial system is infinitely populated by ambiguities as far as regulation can only be 
applied to registered institutions classified according to their qualification as a bank or 
financial institution and not according to their function/role or to the de facto activities. 
The current regulation covers only half of the financial activity developed in global 
markets. The author concludes that this global financial crisis marks the passing to post-
modern finance, while revealing the excesses of finance and the failures of a lightly 
regulated and self-regulated system. This is why investor protection should be placed at 
the top of all rules and principles, be they national or European. And above all, global 
hedge funds regulation represents a stringent necessity. 
 
Additional regulation is yet to come as regulators continue to focus on “shadow 
banking” system. Similarly, the abundance of information due to the new regulation will 
probably compel the regulators to new reinforcements. It is sure that neither the Dodd-
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Frank Act, nor the AIFM Directive is the “final piece” of hedge funds regulation. On 
the contrary, these represent only a new wave of enforcements in the US and European 
financial market. Their key characteristic is represented by transparency. Investor 
protection is their major aim. Together, they resume the major objectives of hedge funds 
regulators: transparency and investor protection. These are complementary, as 
transparency means better information, risk mitigation, but also better understanding 
and control. As already stated, the author presumes that the information received from 
fund managers will be used to articulate improved regulation, with major focus on 
leverage, disclosure and investors. Therefore, new waves of regulatory proposals in the 
funds industry are expected to come in the following period. In this context, the author 
considers that disclosure and operating provisions should be at the centre of the investor 
protection architecture, as they will provide a worldwide applied gold standard. 
 
One issue emphasized by the author is the impressive and continuous increase of hedge 
funds set up costs for fund managers. This represents a significant impact of the new 
regulation. The researcher is similarly concerned about the anti-competitive trend 
resulted from these high costs, as they will imply an undermining of the funds 
competitiveness. In this respect, both the European and American regulators must 
review their regulations in order to increase hedge funds competitiveness, especially 
under this financial crisis circumstances. 
 
Regarding to the contradictions and difficulties of practical applicability (antitheses), 
the researcher considers that in terms of hedge funds regulation it is necessary to 
coordinate the term and regulation of the European countries and those of the US, while 
simplifying and concentrating the financial regulatory system. These suggestions 
request structural reform, and in the author’s point of view these reforms can be made 
within the discussion of the future international hedge funds regulatory framework. In 
addition, considering the common core elements, the differences outlined by the 
analysis of the American, British and European regulatory systems could be harmonised 
in a new architecture of the financial regulation. This would ensure structural stability, 
dynamics and adaptability to this field’s inherent disruptions. Therefore, the author of 
this thesis opts for a global hedge funds regulation because she considers that the 
rationale for international financial regulation establishes prudential rules for hedge 
funds operating in various states on the global financial services market. A 
289 
comprehensive global financial regulation is able to meet the challenges in coordinating 
highly divergent national regulations that frequently overlap other higher level 
regulations.  
 
Altogether, it is the PhD student’s intent and hope that this research stimulates the 
careful debate of this issue by global scholars and regulators.  
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